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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2016, Zimbabwe introduced specific transfer pricing legislation to prevent abusive tax 
strategies by taxpayers. This study uses a qualitative interpretive inquiry to assess the 
adequacy of the new transfer pricing regime. This study contributes to the body of knowledge 
in that it explores transfer pricing as a tax avoidance tool, a concept that is at its nascent stage 
in academic taxation literature. Furthermore, it addresses a methodological gap by employing 
a qualitative inquiry in an area that is predominated by quantitative research. Indepth 
interviews and document review were used to gather data, and deductive content analysis was 
employed with the aid of ATLAS.ti 8™. This study confirms previous findings that tax 
consultants play a significant role in the compliance decisions of Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) through the examination of the exploitative strategies practiced by these MNEs. The 
comparison of the OECD and UN transfer pricing guidelines in search for the applicability of 
international guidelines to Zimbabwe’s specific needs helped uncover the contemporary 
dilemmas in global standards versus domestic standards. This study responds to the 
knowledge gap regarding the transfer pricing phenomenon in Zimbabwe through the lenses of 
an under-explored three-layered rationality concept; legal, implementation and exploitative 
rationality. The argument maintained in this study is that this rationality trichotomy is a 
useful lens to understand transfer pricing as a tax avoidance tool, and that international 
standards are not universal and so each country’s unique situation should be addressed at a 
domestic level.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Zimbabwe het in 2016 bepaalde oordragprysingswetgewing ingestel om onregmatige 
belastingstrategieë deur belastingbetalers te voorkom. Hierdie studie het ’n kwalitatief-
interpretatiewe ondersoek gebruik om die toereikendheid van die nuwe 
oordragprysingsregime te assesseer. Die studie lewer ’n bydrae tot die kennismateriaal omdat 
dit oordragprysing as ’n belastingvermydingsinstrument ondersoek, ’n konsep wat in sy 
kinderskoene in akademiese belastingliteratuur staan. Dit verken ook ’n metodologiese 
gaping deur ’n kwalitatiewe ondersoek te gebruik op ’n gebied wat deur kwantitatiewe 
navorsing oorheers word. Omvattende onderhoude en dokumentbeoordelings is gebruik om 
data in te samel en deduktiewe inhoudsontleding is met behulp van ATLAS.ti 8™ gedoen. 
Hierdie studie bevestig vorige bevindinge dat belastingkonsultante ’n baie belangrike rol 
speel by die nakomingsbesluite van multinasionale ondernemings (MNO’s), gebaseer op die 
ondersoek van die uitbuitende strategieë wat deur hierdie MNO’s beoefen word. ’n  
Vergelyking van die Organisasie vir Ekonomiese Samewerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO) en 
die Verenigde Nasies (VN) se oordragprysingsriglyne om die toepaslikheid van 
internasionale riglyne ten opsigte van Zimbabwe se bepaalde behoeftes te bepaal, het gehelp 
om die eietydse dilemmas van globale standaarde versus huishoudelike standaarde bloot te lê. 
Hierdie studie stem ooreen met die kennisgaping rakende die oordragprysingsverskynsel in 
Zimbabwe deur deur die lens van ’n onderontgindedrielaag-rasionaliteitskonsep, naamlik 
wetlike, implementerings- en uitbuitende rasionaliteit, te kyk. Die studie voer aan dat hierdie 
rasionaliteitsdrieledigheid ’n nuttige manier is om oordragprysing as ’n 
belastingvermydingsinstrumente te verstaan, dat internasionale standaarde nie universeel is 
nie en dat elke land se unieke situasie derhalwe op ’n huishoudelike vlak aangespreek moet 
word.  
 
Sleutelterme 
 
Oordragprysing, belastingvermyding, uitbuitende rasionaliteit, indrukbestuur, 
belastingtoevlugsoord, MNO’s, kwalitatiewe ondersoek, internasionale riglyne, 
huishoudelike standaarde, Zimbabwe 
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ISIFINQO  
Ngonyaka we-2016, izwe laseZimbabwe lithula imithetho ebhekene ngqo nokwedluliselwa 
kwezezimali zentengiselwano ukuvimbela ukusetshenziswa ngendlela esakuhlukumeza 
amasu ezentela ngabakhokhintela. Lolu cwaningo lusetshenziselwa uphenyo olukhombisa 
ukuhumusha okuphathelene nobungaki bento ukuze luhlolisise ukudluliselwa kwesikhathi 
sokuphatha esisha ekudlulisweni kokubekwa kwamanani emali. Ucwaningo lunomethelela 
olwazini olufanele ngokuthi lihlola ukubekwa kwamanani njengethuluzi eligwema 
ukukhokhwa kwentela, njengomqondo osesesigabeni sokuqala ukukhula ezifundweni 
zemibhalo yezentela. Ngaphezu kwalokho, sikhuluma ngegebe elikhombisa indlela yokwenza 
izinto ngokusebenzisa uphenyo olukhombisa ubungako bento endaweni egxile  
ocwaningweni olubheke obungako bento. Ukuthola ulwazi ngalokhu kuye kwasetshenziswa 
izinhlolokhono ezijulile kanye nokubuyekezwa kwemiqulu yamabhuku, kanye 
nokusetshenziswa kokuhlaziya okuqukethwe okuphunguliwe ngokubambisana nosizo le-
ATLAS.ti 8™. Lolu cwaningo luqinisekisa okutholakale ngaphambilini okubonisa ukuthi 
abeluleki bezentela badlala indima ebalulekile ezinqumweni zokuthobela imithetho 
yezinkampani zamazwe angaphandle ngokusekelwe ekuhlolweni kokuxhashazwa kwamasu 
enziwa yizo izinkampani zamazwe angaphandle. Ukuqhathaniswa kwe-OECD kanye ne-UN 
mayelana nokudlulisela imihlahlandlela yamanani ekufuneni ukusebenza kwemihlahlandlela 
yeziqondiso zomhlaba wonke ngokwezidingo zaseZimbabwe kusize ekwembuleni izinkinga 
zesikhathi esizayo emazingeni omhlaba ngokuhambisana namazinga ezindinganiso zomhlaba 
jikelele ngokuhambisana namazinga asekhaya. Lesi sifundo siphendula igebe lolwazi 
elimayelana nokwedluliselwa kwesimo sokubekwa kwenani lemali kwezezintengiselwano 
eZimbabwe ngokusetshenziswa kokubhekwa komqondo onezigaba ezintathu ongaphansi 
kwesilanganiso sokuhlola, okungumthetho, ukwenziwa kwakhona kanye nokuxhashazwa 
kwemiqondo. Lolu cwaningo luphikisana nokuthi lomqondo ongunxantathu yinto ebhekwe 
ngamehlo abomvu futhi ebalulekile ekuqondeni ukudluliselwa kokubekwa kwesimo sezemali 
njengethuluzi lokugwema ukukhokhwa kwentela, okusho ukuthi amazinga omhlaba awasiyo 
into efanayo nokuthi izwe ngalinye linesimo salo esingafanani nelinye okwenza ukuthi isimo 
ngasinye sibhekwe ngokwesimo sezinga lasekhaya.  
 
Amagama abalulekile  
 
Ukudluliselwa kokubekwa kwesimo sezezimali, ukugwema ukukhokhwa kwentela, 
ukuxhashazwa kwemiqondo, ukuphatha okuhlaba umxhwele, , indawo yentela, izinkampani 
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zamazwe angaphandle,  uphenyo olukhombisa ubungako bento, imihlahlandlela yomhlaba 
jikelele, amazinga asekhaya, iZimbabwe.  
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) – matches the price charged for transactions between 
associated enterprises with the price that would have been obtained between independent 
enterprises (OECD, 2017:35). 
Associated Enterprise – also referred to as a related enterprise or party means a near relative 
of the person, a partner, a trustee of a trust, a partnership in which the person is a partner and 
controls at least 50% of the rights to the partnership’s income or capital, and a company 
controlled by the person alone or with other associates (Section 2A of the Zimbabwe Income 
Tax Act (23:06). 
Cross-border transaction – is a transaction in international trade involving two or more 
countries (Lohse, Riedel, & Spengel, 2012:2). 
Controlled Transactions – are transactions between associated enterprises (Cristea & 
Nguyen, 2014:2). 
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) – is a corporation that manages production or delivers 
services in more than one country. It can also be referred to as an international corporation 
(Oguttu, 2006a:141). 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines – means the OECD Report on Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, published in July 2010, 
and supplemented from time to time with additional chapters and revisions to the contents 
thereof (OECD, 2010a:4). 
Profit Shifting – is shifting income from higher-tax to lower-tax or no-tax jurisdictions 
(Dharmapala & Riedel, 2012:2). 
Tax Avoidance – is the legal utilisation of a tax regime to one’s advantage, to reduce the 
amount of tax that is payable by means that are within the law (Oguttu, 2006a:138). 
Tax Evasion – is deliberately using illegal means to avoid paying tax (Batrancea, Nichita, 
Batrancea, & Moldovan, 2012:14).  
Tax Havens – are countries that provide a tax environment, which does not only offer 
favourable tax laws (little or no tax liability) for non-residents, but also promotes profit 
shifting through transfer pricing (Davies, Martin, Parenti, & Toubal, 2014:2). 
Tax Consultant – sometimes referred to as a tax practitioner, refers to accountancy and audit 
firms, which offer tax advisory services (Hasseldine, Holland, & van der Rijt, 2012:535). 
Thin Capitalization – using higher proportions of debt than equity in order to obtain a tax 
advantage (Oguttu, 2017:16).  
xvi 
 
Transfer Pricing – is the technique used to come up with a price at which an enterprise in 
country ‘A’ transfers goods or renders services to an enterprise in country ‘B’ belonging to 
the same multinational group (Klassen, K, Lisowsky, & Mescall, 2017:456). 
Uncontrolled Transactions – are transactions between independent enterprises (Cristea & 
Nguyen, 2014:2). 
 
ACRONYMS 
AFRODAD African Forum and Network on Debt and Development  
ALP Arm’s Length Principle/Price 
APA Advance Pricing Agreement 
ATAF African Tax Administration Forum  
BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
DTA Double Tax Agreement 
GAAR General Anti-Avoidance Rules 
GFI Global Financial Integrity 
MOF Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
MNE Multinational Enterprise 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
TC Tax Consultant 
ZEPARU Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit 
ZIMCODD Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development 
ZIMRA Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“Like mothers, taxes are often misunderstood, but seldom forgotten” -  Lord Bramwell 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a preliminary background to transfer pricing and the challenges that 
goverments across the globe are facing due to this phenomenon. The chapter also contextualises 
transfer pricing in Zimbabwe and clarifies the focus of this study by defining the problem 
statement and the ultimate purpose of thesis. The specific research objectives are then described, 
the significance of the study highlighted and the methodology and limitations explained. The 
chapter concludes by providing an overview of the remaining chapters and structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are corporations operating in more than one country with their 
operations transcending national borders (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), 2008:12) for diverse reasons, including cheap labour and slack 
environmental standards (Ahiakpor, 2010). MNEs contribute significantly in their host countries 
(countries where they invest) by means of technological advances, employment and 
contributions to the national revenue (McNair, Dottey & Cobham, 2010:2). Novikovas (2011:5) 
also found that the amount of cross-border transactions concluded between associated enterprises 
exceed 50% of all international trade. Despite the benefits associated with MNEs, they can also 
pose risks to the host economies in the form of lost revenue through tax avoidance (Oguttu, 
2006a:140). Asongu (2015:11) stated that the ever-increasing growth in global trade has 
provided MNEs with opportunities for crafting ‘tax avoidance’ transfer pricing strategies, 
thereby exploiting the natural resources of the developing countries. The increased growth in 
international trade indicates the magnitude and importance of transfer pricing with MNEs being 
the major players in international trade whose operations are interrelated and transactions 
complex, leaving host economies susceptible to tax avoidance through transfer pricing. 
 
Tax avoidance by MNEs (central concept of this study) is an enormous global challenge (Sikka, 
2009) as there are more than 82 000 MNEs worldwide (Eden & Smith, 2011:2). Tax avoidance 
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entails reducing one’s tax liability by exploiting the flaws and loopholes in the existing 
legislation (Fuest, Spengel, Finke, Heckemeyer, & Nusser, 2013:1). Benari (2009:4) describes it 
as ‘creative’ exploitation of tax laws by taxpayers at the expense of the citizens. Sikka and 
Willmott, (2010:2) describe transfer pricing as a technique for optimal allocation of costs and 
revenues among divisions, and subsidiaries within a group of associated enterprises. Ekstrom, 
Dall, and Nikolajeva (2014:7) define it as the process of establishing the transfer price in 
associated party transactions. The United Nations (2013) describes transfer pricing as the setting 
of prices for cross-border transactions between associated enterprises. Oguttu (2006a:139) 
defines it as a systematic way of manipulating prices to avoid taxes. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the researcher follows Oguttu (2006a:139) and defines transfer pricing as the setting of 
prices for controlled transactions between associated enterprises in order to minimise their tax 
liability.  
 
Unlike tax evasion, tax avoidance is legal (Kadet, 2016). However, in its legality, nations are 
losing revenue, which could have been used for the provision of strategic goods and services 
(Sikka & Willmott, 2010:27). Taylor and Richardson (2012:1) found that enterprises use a 
combination of strategies to avoid tax, but a substantial amount of revenue is lost through 
transfer pricing (Sikka, 2009). Christensen (2012:49) echoed that tax avoidance, particularly 
through transfer pricing, distorts competition in favour of MNEs as they use transfer pricing 
extensively to shift profits to tax havens.  
 
Sikka (2009) described transfer pricing as the biggest tax avoidance scheme of all with 60% of 
world trade occurring internally among MNEs. Transfer pricing is thus a double-edged sword 
which can be used either positively or negatively. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 2014), in a press release, stressed that: 
“As for corporates, their main vehicle for tax avoidance or evasion and capital flight 
from developing countries is the misuse of ransfer pricing... ” 
 
The significant revenue losses in developing countries have been supported by both anecdotal 
and empirical evidence as explained below. Several studies (Fuest, Hebous & Riedel, 2011:1; 
Lohse, 2012:164; Fuest & Riedel, 2010) have found evidence of income shifting through tax 
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planning activities by MNEs in developing countries. Henry (2012) estimated that transfer 
pricing has accounted for about 80% of financial outflows from developing countries. Majoni 
(2015), in a report entitled “Zimbabwe loses US$12 billion to multinationals”, also explains how 
Zimbabwe lost large amounts of revenue from financial outflows in the last three decades.  
 
The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) and the Zimbabwe 
Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU) (2014:5) and ZIMCODD (2014:35) 
reported that Zimbabwe is indisputably losing funds through siphoning to other countries 
because of its weak tax system, which lacks transparency and accountability. One recently 
reported case of a transfer pricing scheme in Zimbabwe is that of Econet Wireless which was 
unearthed by a Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) forensic audit report of 2016 where 
Econet is alleged to have overstated prices through its sister company Econet Capital in 
Mauritius, resulting in a tax revenue loss for Zimbabwe of US$300m (Sunday News online, 
2017).  
 
A weak tax system is a cause for concern especially as Beer & Loeprick (2013:2) found that the 
existing regulatory framework in host countries is a potential driver of MNEs’ profit shifting. In 
their investigation on the impact of tax enforcement on income shifting by MNEs, Beuselinck, 
Deloof and Vanstraelen (2014:1) established robust evidence of income shifting when local tax 
enforcement is weak. Murphy (2012) stressed that the chances of transfer pricing taking place is 
increased by the absence of or the worsening weak enforcement of related rules and regulations 
in developing countries. The Guardian (2015) added that the following had to be done in order 
for developing countries to be able to finance their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): 
“First, ensure fair taxation. Governments and international institutions now have to 
make good on promises to fight tax avoidance and tax evasion. Second, strengthen tax 
inspectors. Developing countries need support to broaden their tax base and build tax 
collection capacity.” 
 
Such a statement is strong enough to spur interest to conduct a study on tax avoidance from 
international trade as increased trade should be matched with increased fiscal revenues. The 
injustices brought by tax avoidance expose Zimbabwe to abject poverty and cripples its ability to 
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economically develop and meet its obligation to provide public goods and services (Sikka and 
Willmott, 2010:30). This is detrimental to an already crippling economy faced with economic, 
political and social instabilities, weak legislative systems (Zimbabwe Environmental Law 
Association (ZELA), 2016:24), few operating industries and high unemployment (Kwaramba, 
2016). While the magnitude of global trade is vast, Murphy (2012) notes that the possibility of 
transfer pricing detection to be very low, yet the incentive to transfer price is immense. He 
attributes this to the secretive nature of MNEs and weak regulation.  
 
In response to transfer pricing abuse by MNEs, the OECD delineated five methods that seek to 
determine the transfer prices of controlled transactions according to the widely accepted arm’s 
length principle. The United Nations (UN) has also issued transfer pricing guidelines for 
developing countries which follow the OECD principles (UN, 2017). However, there has been 
heated debate over the applicability of the OECD guidelines to developing countries by Durst 
(2015a) and Oguttu (2016:20) which this study sought to address by examining the applicability 
of the UN and OECD guidelines to the Zimbabwean context. This examination will aid in 
uncovering any deficiencies experienced by developing countries in applying international 
standards. An examination of this kind is supported by Oguttu (2016:18-20) who acknowledged 
that Africa’s fight against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is weakened by irrelevant 
international tax laws which fail to capture its specific needs. BEPS refers to tax planning 
strategies by MNEs to shift profits to low tax countries (Oguttu, 2016:6). Murphy (2012) further 
noted that even though arm’s length rules exist in developing countries, problems of enforcing 
them are overwhelming. ZELA (2016:31) also believes that the implementation of laws and 
policies is a big constraint in Zimbabwe. 
  
While many developed economies, and some developing countries legislated transfer pricing 
decades ago, Lohse (2012) points out that there still remain a sizeable number of countries with 
slack transfer pricing regulations. For many years, Zimbabwe had anti-avoidance measures in 
place [Section 98 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) Chapter 23:06 (1996)], which only granted the 
Commissioner power to disregard any transactions which the Commissioner deemed to be solely 
for tax avoidance purposes. However, in 2014 the country amended its anti-avoidance rule 
[Section 98 of the Income Tax Act Chapter 23:06 (1996)] as the Minister of Finance said that 
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these rules lacked sufficient guidance on the reporting procedures for taxpayers (National Budget 
Statement, 2016:251). The amendments to the anti-avoidance rules incorporated transactions 
between associated enterprises and income splitting between associates. In January 2014 the 
section was split into Section 98A (income splitting) and 98B (anti-avoidance). In January 2016, 
the country introduced specific transfer pricing rules (with the 35th schedule amending Section 
98B) which follow the arm’s length principle in line with the OECD guidelines (Hudzerema, 
2016).  
 
The Zimbabwean economy remains peculiar after having been severely hit by: (i) a world-
breaking hyperinflation rate in 2008; (ii) erratic changes in policies over the years; (iii) undefined 
currency; and (iv) lack of statistical data (see Kwaramba, Mahonye & Mandishara, 2015:3). As a 
consequence, more financial resources are required to resuscitate the struggling Zimbabwe 
economy (ZELA, 2016:1). In light of these concerns, and Zimbabwe’s decision to promulgate 
transfer pricing rules in 2016, the assessment of their adequacy and enforcement is necessary. 
Bradley (2015:65) hinted that MNEs view taxes associated with transfer pricing as costs to 
avoid. This potentially exposes Zimbabwe to errant taxpayers, which raises the question of 
which legislative path to take given the global disparities in tax systems. The choice would be 
between maintaining consistency with international standards or exercising national sovereignty 
to meet the country’s particular needs (Dharmapala, 2014:2).  
 
Maya (2015:7) reported that domestic revenues for many developing countries are way below 
the levels needed to meet public demands, and believes that if transfer pricing abuse by MNEs is 
addressed, enough revenue would be generated to finance these demands. The world’s average 
government revenue percentage to GDP is 30.23%, and Zimbabwe’s 2017 ratio was estimated at 
25.80% which is 4.43% less than the average (Economywatch, 2018). UNCTAD (2014) also 
stressed that in order to finance their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), developing 
countries would need a tax system that helps to increase their tax revenue. Context-wise, 
Zimbabwe becomes an important research setting to which this study is able to contribute 
pragmatic recommendations to. This context gap serves as an inspiration for this study. 
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Following the accusations that MNEs siphon taxable profits out of Zimbabwe, the availability of 
various transfer pricing methods (UN, 2017) and the recently enacted transfer pricing legislation 
(Section 98B of the ITA), this study considers the diverse transfer pricing methods and the 
strengths and limitations of the legal and administrative capacities of ZIMRA in regulating cross-
border transactions. It departs from the conventional quantitative methods that are common in 
tax compliance studies as alluded to by Finer and Ylonen (2017) and follows the qualitative 
paradigm to achieve the research objectives. This paradigm shift from traditional accounting 
literature was given impetus by the study objectives and motivated by Collins and Mulligan 
(2014) who employed qualitative methods and interviewed tax consultants in Ireland. Their 
research was limited to the experiences of tax consultants and they recommended additional 
research which considers other stakeholders such as tax legislators be undertaken. Collins and 
Mulligan (2014) applied the new institutional theory in their study and proposed future research 
which draws on alternative theoretical views to enhance understanding of the transfer pricing 
concept. The methodological standpoints and theoretical underpinnings applied in the current 
study respond to this call and attempt to uncover abusive transfer pricing practices in Zimbabwe 
despite noting that tax avoidance research inclines towards post/positivist paradigms.  
 
Transfer pricing continues to be a global issue and the measures and guidelines intended to 
mitigate tax avoidance through transfer pricing are continuously being revised and progressively 
changing (Oguttu, 2016:9). Therefore, this provoked curiosity in the researcher and informed the 
research problem, research questions and research objectives that guide this study. 
This gives rise to consideration of the problem statement. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Zimbabwe, among other developing countries, is losing billions of dollars of tax revenue through 
transfer pricing practices by MNEs. This is mainly attributed to dysfunctional regulation, weak 
enforcement and corruption (ZIMCODD, 2014). Observing the increase in revenue leakages 
through manipulation of transfer prices by MNEs, Zimbabwe introduced transfer pricing rules in 
January 2016 which follow the arm’s length principle recommended by the OECD. However, the 
transfer pricing rules applied in Zimbabwe may not be applicable in Zimbabwe as expected, due 
to different economic conditions and technological advances in other countries. Considering the 
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importance of international trade worldwide, and given the scale, nature and complexity of the 
transactions amongst these MNEs, it is imperative for governments, including Zimbabwe, to be 
conscious of and cautious to prevent tax avoidance through cross-border trade. Oguttu (2016:24) 
also emphasizes the importance of a continuous review of legislative and administrative 
frameworks. This spurred interest in the researcher to assess the ability of the tax reforms 
undertaken by Zimbabwe to reduce tax avoidance, generate more revenue and alleviate poverty 
in the country. Besides the context gap, the literature signals a number of important theoretical 
and scholarly gaps which also give momentum to this research. 
 
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to assess the legislative and administrative measures adopted by 
Zimbabwe to regulate MNE’s cross-border transactions, in order to protect its tax base from 
leakages through transfer pricing without impeding foreign investment in Zimbabwe as guided 
by rationalisation and qualitative methods. The legislative, administrative and literature gaps in 
the Zimbabwean context are highlighted from this assessment. The study modestly theorises the 
notions of MNE tax avoidance as well as behaviour, and the attendant responses of tax 
authorities and tax administration and therefore address an academic gap by providing novel 
findings. It expands the literature on the implications of transfer pricing at social and economic 
dimensions in Zimbabwe - an area which Sikka and Willmott (2010:28) believe is neglected. The 
research objectives are delineated for this study as shown in the next section. 
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
Empirical and anecdotal evidence agree that billions of dollars are lost by developing countries 
through transfer pricing (AFRODAD & ZEPARU, 2014). Therefore, an assessment of 
Zimbabwe’s laws and the administrative capacity of ZIMRA to effectively implement these laws 
would inform policy makers and tax authorities of any loopholes and help them plug these 
loopholes as well as stimulate behaviour change in taxpayers. In pursuit of the aforementioned 
goal, the following research objectives guided the study: 
 
1. To explore the transfer pricing methods outlined in the OECD and United Nations 
     (UN) guidelines. 
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2. To compare the laws and policy measures that regulate transfer pricing in Zimbabwe 
    against the OECD guidelines and the UN guidelines. 
3. To examine measures in other countries that curtail transfer pricing in order to draw 
     lessons for Zimbabwe. The researcher firstly chose China and South Africa because they 
    are part of the five major emerging economies; Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
    (BRICS) that are also Zimbabwe’s major trading partners (Kwaramba et al, 2015:2).  
    BRICS is a group of the largest emerging economies. Secondly, the United Kingdom and  
    Kenya were chosen because the former is also one of Zimbabwe’s major trading partners 
    (representing the developed world), and the latter representing another important 
    developing economy which has been aggressive in fighting transfer pricing abuse.  
4. To examine the nature and types of transfer pricing strategies utilised among MNEs in 
     Zimbabwe by means of a document review and then operationalising it in an interview 
     schedule to assess whether Zimbabwean rules are enough to curtail tax avoidance through 
     transfer pricing. 
1.6 Research Questions 
To achieve the above research objectives, the following research questions are asked: 
1. What are the different measures that can be used to mitigate transfer pricing as outlined in 
    the OECD and United Nations guidelines?  
2. What are the laws and policy measures that currently regulate transfer pricing in  
    Zimbabwe?  
3. Which measures are employed by other countries (such as the United Kingdom, South   
    Africa, Kenya and China) to counter tax avoidance by means of transfer pricing?  
4. What are the main types of transfer pricing strategies used by Zimbabwean MNEs to avoid 
    tax and are these addressed by the laws and policy measures currently adopted by 
    Zimbabwe? 
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
Extant literature shows that extensive research on transfer pricing has been conducted mainly in 
developed economies (for example, Ekstrom et al, 2014; Beuselinck et al, 2014; Davies et al, 
2014; Cristea & Nguyen, 2014; Beer & Loeprick, 2013; Lohse & Riedel, 2013; Lohse, Riedel & 
Spengel, 2012; Taylor & Richardson, 2012; Heckemeyer & Overesch, 2013; Klassen & 
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Laplante, 2012; Solilova, 2010; Weichenrieder, 2009). However, in developing countries 
research on transfer pricing is still nascent. De Waegenaere, Sansing and Wielhouwer (2006:138) 
report that the interaction between tax compliance and transfer pricing has received less attention 
in academic literature than in the practitioner literature, and this study fills this academic gap.  
 
The current study is policy-oriented and as such seeks to contribute to the knowledge of 
legislators and tax authorities (Dul & Hak, 2008) as well as educate taxpayers (MNEs) on how 
the new transfer pricing regime impacts them. Given that Zimbabwe has recently promulgated 
rules designed to limit tax avoidance through transfer pricing against the MNEs’ tax planning 
strategies, the need to assess these rules becomes crucial as Solilova (2010) stresses that transfer 
pricing rules should prevent taxpayers from shifting income. The rules follow the OECD 
guidelines which are rationally anchored. Wells and Lowell (2014), however, believe that 
foundational problems with transfer pricing are rooted in the long standing OECD Transfer 
Pricing guidelines. Oguttu (2016:20) encourages transfer pricing research that address specific 
needs at national level and Dharmapala (2014:4) acknowledges the limitations of the BEPS 
Action plan in addressing domestic problems. This study seeks to understand the nature of 
transfer pricing in Zimbabwe in order to influence policy and its implementation by asking 
questions like how well it works (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) in a bid to appraise the effectiveness of 
what is in existence. This study intends to address scholarly gaps by contributing new knowledge 
by exploring an under-explored and researcher-conceptualised three-layered rationality view. As 
is required of a study at this level, the researcher has built on existing theoretical frameworks 
deemed relevant to the research objectives and direction of this study. The three-layered view, in 
terms of ‘rationality’, is not written up, as yet, outside of this study. The study uncovered these 
notions, and presents the theorising thereto, as the original contribution. The direction that the 
study took captures the subjective human dimensions which Li (2005:47) indicates are neglected 
in the existing transfer pricing theory.  
 
The methodological and epistemological positions applied in this study depart from the current 
mainstream approaches to such studies, because of the qualitative, interpretive approach as 
opposed to statistical inferences. They provide insight on transfer pricing at a policy and 
implementation level. Perspectives experienced by people ‘in the trenches’, so to speak, are 
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better able to contribute towards the contemporary dilemmas in global and territorial standards. 
Dilemmas, as logic advises, are often rooted in human based behaviours and not simply 
statistical calculations. This study can make an important contribution when considering the tax 
revenue that would be raised if all economic transactions that are currently escaping tax were 
taxed by the introduction of a robust tax system that prohibits tax avoidance activities by MNEs. 
This study therefore contributes to the body of knowledge in relation to transfer pricing with 
regard to contextual, theoretical and methodological gaps, as highlighted in the introductory 
paragraphs above. The next section explains the scope of the study. 
 
1.8 Scope of the Study 
This study is centred on tax avoidance through transfer pricing of cross-border transactions by 
MNEs, and does not intend to cover domestic transactions, since revenue lost through these may 
be negligible (Oguttu, 2006a:139) compared to cross-border transfer pricing. This study 
considered transfer pricing as a broad concept without looking at specifics such as intangibles. 
Although reviews of transfer pricing policies in other countries were considered, the focus of this 
study was restricted to the Zimbabwean economy, as Bird (2008) indicated that generalising 
about taxation in developing countries may be intricate. The period of the study was from the 
time Zimbabwe started amending its legislation for transfer pricing purposes i.e. from 2014 to 
2018. The targeted population consisted of the drafters of the legislation (Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development (MOF)), the enforcers of the legislation/tax authority (ZIMRA) as 
well as the taxpayers who in this case are the MNEs or the tax consultants (TCs) that assist 
MNEs. 
 
The role played by the researcher’s supervisor and the qualitative research expert gave the 
researcher confidence in the methodological philosophies, designs and analytical tools used in 
this study as explained below. 
 
1.9 Research Methodology 
Research design outlines the procedures for each research activity in order to fulfil the research 
objectives (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). This study sought to find appropriate solutions to 
revenue leakages through transfer pricing. The ontological views of this study as influenced by 
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Tracy (2013) are that the social phenomenon (transfer pricing) is created from the rational 
economic decisions and consequent actions of social actors [MNEs ZIMRA; MOF, Tax 
Consultants]. This study holds that social actors such as taxpayers (MNEs) may place different 
interpretations on the situations in which they find themselves as a result of their own views of 
the transfer pricing rules (Tracy, 2013:58). These different interpretations are likely to affect 
their actions (for instance how much tax they pay). This study, therefore, seeks to understand the 
subjective reality (epistemology) of MNEs in order to be cognisant of their differentiated 
motives, actions and intentions in a meaningful way. The axiological view is that the human-
infused dimensions around transfer pricing have knowledge value (Tracy, 2013:61). 
 
The research followed an interpretivist research paradigm using a qualitative approach (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005). Quantitative measures and the statistical analysis thereof would not be 
coherent with the research objectives (Creswell, 2007:40), given that the research questions and 
intent refer to human decision-making and behaviours. The navigation of ‘rational’ legislative 
systems in an assumed conscious as well as contradictory manner, opened up this study 
appropriately to the approaches, design and methods, as influenced by the lived context. This 
allowed for the probing of assumed theory in the context of the researcher’s positionality in 
which experiential views are considered in relation to their meaning in participants’ words as 
well as the researcher’s interpretation. 
 
Methods of data gathering included a document review and in-depth interviews (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). These choices were made in order to corroborate the results and achieve the 
research objective coherently (Bowen, 2009:28). The targeted population consisted of the 
drafters of the legislation (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOF)), the 
enforcers of the legislation/tax authority (ZIMRA) as well as the taxpayers who in this case are 
the MNEs or the tax consultants (TCs) that assist MNEs. The researcher drew samples of persons 
and text purposefully to glean the most knowledgeable sources to respond to the research 
objectives and research questions. Data gathered from both MNEs and tax consultants 
enlightened the research on the effectiveness of the transfer pricing rules together with some of 
the transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs.  Sikka and Willmott (2010:28) espoused that 
research on the commercial tax avoidance strategies sold by accountancy firms to MNEs has 
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been neglected by accounting researchers that predominantly focus on auditing and accounting. 
Purposive sampling (Marshall, 1996) and the snowball sampling techniques (Noy, 2008) were 
employed to select the most relevant information-rich participants. Snowball sampling was 
useful in getting data on the MNEs perspective of transfer pricing rules. The first identified 
MNEs (through peer references) were requested to refer the researcher to other potential MNE 
participants. These participants were approached and added to the respondents list based on their 
cooperativeness. Others referred the researcher to their tax consultants who were also 
interviewed. This procedure was repeated until the sample size was sufficiently large to 
understand the nature of the phenomenon (Collins & Mulligan, 2014). 
 
Deductive and inductive content analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2008:107) served as the data analysis 
method. To intensify rigour, integrate and manage data and to demonstrate transparency of 
analysis, the computer assisted qualitative data analysis software, ATLAS.ti 8™ was used. 
Confidentiality of the project was safeguarded through password protection and erasing of 
personal identifiable information. All ethical considerations were observed (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.9). Organising, categorising, coding and distilling of data were undertaken to make 
informed conclusions regarding the adequacy of the current transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Having discussed the methodological approaches of this study, it is important to indicate the 
research limitations. 
 
1.10 Limitations of the Study 
The initial limitations are summarised in Table 1 while further limitations are discussed in the 
concluding chapter (Chapter 8, Section 8.7). 
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Table 1: Limitations and Sphere of Limitation 
Limitation Sphere of Limitation 
Scope 
 
The focus of the study is on the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe, and is limited to transfer pricing of cross-border 
transactions by MNEs, and does not distinguish intangibles from tangibles, and neither does it transcend to domestic 
transactions since revenue lost through these may be negligent compared to cross-border transfer pricing (Oguttu, 
2006a:139). Tax avoidance was not considered in detail as there is a vast body of knowledge (Kirchler, Maciejovsky 
and Schneider, 2001; Sikka and Willmott, 2013; Dowling, 2014) on this subject and this study focuses only on transfer 
pricing as a means of tax avoidance. Although literature has sought to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, the review 
was limited to four carefully selected countries. It is, however, recognised that while there are other similar countries 
that could have been considered, attention was given to data deemed relevant and accessible to achieve the desired 
research objective. 
Design and 
methodology 
 
The study adopted a qualitative approach and methodologies followed included purposive sampling (Marshall, 1996). 
In order to mitigate potential bracketed bias (acknowledged by qualitative research), snowball sampling was employed 
to increase purposive coverage of knowledge invested in the participants (Noy, 2008).  
Access 
 
Due to the sensitivity of taxation studies, more so transfer pricing, the major limitation of this study was gaining access 
to MNEs as these were less willing to participate for fear of victimisation. However, the researcher only worked with 
those who were responsive to participating in the study. Participation was voluntary. Some MNEs also referred the 
researcher to their tax consultants. This assisted the researcher in gaining access to relevant and larger sets of data than 
what would have been gathered directly from the MNEs (refer to Chapter 7). Access to primary legislation for the 
selected tax jurisdictions was a challenge, and in such instances the researcher resorted to secondary data in order to 
review the transfer pricing guidelines of these countries (see chapter 5). 
Secrecy Act 
 
The declaration of confidentiality and secrecy by ZIMRA officials as well as the Ministry of Finance staff at their time 
of recruitment was anticipated to impede their freedom to disclose sensitive information. However, participants 
cooperated during the study. Ethical treatment of data also provided security for the participants. The researcher 
circumvented this limitation by researching information from published documents.  
Population 
 
Since there is no MNEs database available in Zimbabwe, the researcher would have preferred to use the ZIMRA 
portfolio of MNEs to define the research population. Unfortunately, efforts to obtain the ZIMRA list of MNEs were in 
vain. Consequently, the MNEs sample frame was limited to MNEs identified through snowball sampling. This led the 
researcher to participants based in the head offices of MNEs located in Zimbabwe’s main cities, i.e.  Harare, Bulawayo 
and Gweru (Chakaipa, 2010:36). 
Findings 
 
The findings have been generated from a purposive sample of drafters and enforcers of legislation as well as snowball 
sampling of MNEs and tax consultants in Zimbabwe. The findings have been derived through deductive and inductive 
content analysis of both interview data and data obtained during the document review (Elo& Kyngas, 2008:107). 
Extensive efforts have been made to ensure credibility, trustworthiness, consistency and conformity of the results. 
However, the findings are limited to cross-border transactions of MNEs in general, and cannot be transferrable to 
specifics like intangible assets. 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
The study does not claim to be transferrable or generalisable as per quantitative norms (Burns & 
Burns, 2008). The researcher has positioned herself and the study within the qualitative 
approach, which means that criteria such as credibility, consistency, conformity and 
trustworthiness (Moon, Brewer, Januchowski-Hartley, Adams, & Blackman, 2016; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011) of the data is provided.  
 
1.11 Structure of the Thesis 
The main outcome of the research takes the form of a thesis. A discussion of the structure of the 
thesis is provided below. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides a background and introduction to the study by highlighting the importance 
of researching tax avoidance through transfer pricing by MNEs. The chapter also discusses the 
rationale for and the aim and objectives of the research and summarises the research design and 
methodology used. It clarifies the limitations and assumptions relevant to the study. 
 
Chapter 2: The Transfer Pricing Concept and Theoretical Constructs 
The chapter provides an overview of the transfer pricing principles and explores the theoretical 
and conceptual foundations guiding the study. It describes how tax avoidance is perpetrated 
using transfer pricing by discussing the various transfer pricing strategies that MNEs use to avoid 
tax. This chapter thus addresses objective 4.  
 
Chapter 3: Zimbabwe’s Transfer Pricing Rules 
This chapter discusses the background of transfer pricing in Zimbabwe together with the transfer 
pricing provisions within the Zimbabwean legislation in order to effectively assess them, and 
compares them with international guidelines discussed in Chapter 4. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of the transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs in Zimbabwe in order to make 
informed recommendations to solve the transfer pricing problem. This chapter mainly addresses 
research objective 2 and also parts of research objective 4. 
 
Chapter 4: International Guidelines 
The chapter provides a deeper understanding of the transfer pricing methods provided by the 
OECD and the United Nations’ international guidelines. It considers the advantages and 
disadvantages of these guidelines as well as assessing their applicability to the developing world. 
This is done by critically exploring the Arm’s Length Principle, Advance Pricing Agreements 
and transfer pricing documentation provisions. By examining the applicability of the OECD and 
UN guidelines to the Zimbabwean context, this chapter widely addresses the 1st and 2nd 
objective. 
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Chapter 5: Transfer Pricing Best Practices 
This chapter describes the experiences of other tax jurisdictions (United Kingdom, South Africa, 
Kenya and China) that are trade partners with Zimbabwe and have fully implemented transfer 
pricing regimes. The review of the challenges that were encountered in their legislative 
frameworks, challenges faced by tax authorities, measures employed to counteract transfer 
pricing abuse, together with their success stories address objective 3 of the study.  
 
Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
This chapter describes the research methodology adopted. It outlines the research paradigm and 
philosophical positions adopted to achieve the study objectives. The study population, sampling 
techniques, the research methodologies, data gathering instruments and data analysis as well as 
ethical considerations are explained in detail in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 7: Data Presentation and Analysis 
The chapter provides an analysis of the interview data as guided by both research objectives and 
theoretical positions, discusses the research findings and reconciles the findings from the 
document review with those from the primary interview data obtained.  
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter concludes the research by explaining how the research objectives were achieved, 
summarises the contextual, theoretical and methodological contributions of the study. It also 
documents the recommendations that flow from the research, and provides suggestions for future 
research.   
 
1.12 Summary 
Chapter 1 has provided an introductory discussion of the scope of the current research. It sets out 
the background, rationale and objectives of the research undertaken. The structure of the research 
in achieving the stated objectives is also discussed. The following chapter defines the theoretical 
constructs relevant to the current research by reviewing literature.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE TRANSFER PRICING CONCEPT AND THEORETICAL 
CONSTRUCTS 
 
“Death is certain, but paying taxes is definitely not — at least, not for everyone” - Blaufus, 
Bob and Otto 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The payment of tax has been described as intricate and ‘planned’ rather than ‘automatic’ with 
complexity issues remaining unresolved (Etienne, 2011). With the increasing growth of 
international trade and the magnitude of transactions within MNEs, tax authorities, in a bid to 
protect governments’ revenue bases from erosion, are faced with the challenge of knowing about 
taxation and transfer pricing within such group transactions (Dharmapala, 2014). MNEs, in 
contrast, continue to create ways of shielding themselves from extensive scrutiny so as to protect 
their group profits and their competitive niches (McBarnet, 2001). Furthermore, Chapter 1 
identified some contextual, methodological and theoretical gaps that exist and revealed that 
deficient tax systems are vulnerable to transfer pricing abuse by MNEs.  
 
To respond to the gaps identified in the literature, this chapter narrows down transfer pricing as a 
tax avoidance concept (Section 2.2), discusses transfer pricing as a concept (Section 2.3), 
considers transfer pricing as a policy issue for tax authorities (Section 2.4) and elaborates upon 
the theoretical lenses underpinning this study (Section 2.5). The theories set up the basis for the 
researcher-generated conceptual framework on transfer pricing (Section 2.8). Transfer pricing 
strategies used by MNEs to avoid tax (Section 2.6) also form part of the discussion together with 
authorities’ reaction to exploitative rationalities (Section 2.7) 
 
2.2 Understanding Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing 
International trade involving MNEs has brought “the good and the bad” (for example, analogous 
employment and tax avoidance), which Bateman (2007:110) refers to as the “mixed blessing”. 
Bateman (2007) clearly explains how the tax and employment benefits derived from the 
existence of MNEs in the host country are set against increasing and irreparable damages to the 
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economy in the form of socio-environmental hazards, health hazards, low wages, tax avoidance 
and loss of trust in the MNEs. 
 
Tax avoidance is arranging one’s tax affairs in order to minimise their tax liability. When 
transfer pricing is used for tax reduction, which is referred to by Li, Tim and Dongxian (2017) as 
tax-motivated transfer pricing it becomes a tax avoidance tool. Fuest et al (2011) has stressed 
that developing countries are vulnerable to tax avoidance through transfer pricing by MNEs as 
they shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions. Although previously tax avoidance might 
have had the blessing of the courts and the law (Hansen, Crosser, & Laufer, 1992:679), the moral 
conscience has since changed as courts and tax authorities now censure it. Societies argue that 
the resultant revenue losses have negative effects on the government’s ability to follow its 
economic and social goals and better people’s lives (Oguttu, 2016:8, Sikka & Willmott, 
2010:27). A case which shows a departure from the previous conception of tax avoidance is in 
the New Zealand case of Elmiger v CIR which held that the:  
Creative legal devices contrived to enable individual taxpayers to minimise or avoid their 
tax liabilities are often not merely sterile or unproductive in themselves (except perhaps 
in respect of their tax advantages for the taxpayer concerned), but that they have social 
consequences which are contrary to the general public interest [Elmiger v CIR [1966] 
NZLR 683 (SC) at 686].   
 
A challenge for tax authorities is whether the tax planning by taxpayers is simply a conscious 
arrangement of one’s tax affairs to achieve a minimum tax liability; or if it is an artificial 
arrangement to manipulate tax laws to achieve outcomes that conflict with, or defeat the spirit of 
the law (Oguttu, 2016:8). Reference is made to Australia, where there is a form of tax avoidance 
that ironically follows the letter of the law and not the intention of the law. It is driven by the 
deliberate exploitation of structural loopholes in the law, such as transfer pricing. Oguttu 
(2016:8) also refers to what is termed ‘impermissible tax avoidance’ in South Africa, meaning 
tax avoidance practices that spread beyond what is legally acceptable, for instance taxpayers 
hiding their assets and income in low-tax and tax-haven countries. The bulk of tax avoidance has 
been said to be occurring through transfer pricing (Taylor and Richardson, 2012). Collier (2013) 
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as cited in Maya (2015) describes transfer pricing as a well established method of avoiding tax. 
Benari, 2009 also emphasizes how transfer pricing can be used to distort tax liability.  
 
2.3 The Transfer Pricing Concept 
Eden (1998); Borkowski (1997); Borkowski (1996); Tang (1993); Kaplan (1990); Eccles (1985); 
Benke and Edwards (1980); and Lall (1973); Thomas (1971) pioneered the discussions on 
transfer pricing. Transfer pricing relates to the pricing of transactions between associated 
enterprises (OECD, 2010a). An associated enterprise refers to a relative of the person, a partner, 
a trustee of a trust, a partnership in which the person is a partner and controls at least 50% of the 
rights to the partnership’s income or capital, and a company controlled by the person alone or 
with other associates (Section 2A of the Zimbabwe Income Tax Act (23:06). Transfer pricing 
facilitates trade between associated enterprises for performance evaluation, decision-making and 
determining group profits (Ekstrom et al, 2014:53). It allows enterprises to create a lower tax 
burden for the MNEs by shifting profits to a lower tax country or through other means such as 
inflating imports (Olivier and Honiball, 2011). Transfer pricing, in itself, is not illicit, but rather 
the intentional ‘mispricing’ of transactions for manipulation/shifting of profits in respect of tax. 
According to Oguttu (2016:8), this is an abuse and constitutes unacceptable tax avoidance.  
 
Transfer pricing issues have been a prime concern globally since the 20th Century. The 
unprecedented growth of transfer pricing continued over the years to date, with some of the most 
recent works by Oguttu (2017), Rossing and Rohde (2014) and Holtzman and Nagel (2014). 
Holtzman and Nagel (2014) introduced the transfer pricing concept while Rossing and Rohde 
(2014) simply reviewed transfer pricing literature and Oguttu (2017) critiqued some OECD 
action plans from an African perspective. Although transfer pricing is not a new concept, 
researchers are at the nascent stages of narrowing it down to specifics such as the nature of the 
intra-group transfers, for example intangible transfers (Lagarden, 2014; Taylor Richardson and 
Lanis, 2015). Maya (2015:14) believes that transfer pricing is greatly misunderstood and Cazacu 
(2017:20) emphasises that it is complex for both tax authorities and for MNEs. This is an 
emerging area to which this study aims to contribute. 
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Murphy (2012) attributes the vulnerability of developing countries to the effects of the secretive 
nature of MNE transactions because of weak legislative frameworks, citing the instance of the 
top transfer pricing abuse case, Unilever Kenya Ltd vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kenya 
Income Tax Appeal 753, 2003. Murphy (2012) stressed the failure by African states to enforce 
their transfer pricing rules, saying in as much as the Kenyan revenue authority had a case, they 
failed to prove the profit-shifting by Unilever because material accounting data of the group was 
not made available to the court, given the requirements of protection of privileged company 
information. 
 
Given that MNEs are faced with the challenge of setting transfer prices that are consistent with 
the host nation’s tax requirements, and that these prices will subsequently be used for 
performance evaluation and rewards (Adams & Drtina, 2010), finding the appropriate price is 
complex and challenging. This dilemma provides the opportunity for transfer prices to be 
manipulated by the corporate managers in order to minimise the tax liability (and maximise their 
group profits), which is one of the main objectives in transfer pricing decision making (Ching-
Wen & Hsiao-Chen, 2010). This opportunity makes taxation matters the prime objective for 
transfer pricing decisions (Bernard, Jensen & Schott, 2006). However, Uyanik (2010) argues that 
not every transfer pricing incident results in tax avoidance and is used for substantive private 
sector intentions related to profitability. 
 
2.4 Transfer Pricing as a Policy Issue within Tax Authorities 
This section makes a critical appraisal of transfer pricing as a national and international policy, 
and not as an organisational policy. 
 
De Waegenaere et al (2006:106-107) reveal that there are inconsistencies regarding the treatment 
of transfer pricing related issues among tax authorities. Li (2006:49) acknowledges that tax 
systems are heterogeneous among nations and hints that there is bound to be variations on the 
price to be attached to the same transaction. This creates conflicting information/realities or 
results in double taxation or under taxing. Li (2006:49) further says that even though there are 
double taxation treaties, as long as the transfer pricing systems internationally continue to be un-
harmonised, the total elimination of double taxation and income shifting is not guaranteed. These 
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un-harmonised systems validate that tax authorities continue to increase their tax scrutiny on 
MNEs (Tully, 2012) while the MNEs remain susceptible to double taxation, and are therefore 
motivated to search for more complex transfer pricing schemes and tax avoidance strategies 
(Sikka & Haslam, 2007). As a result of the continuous cycle of tax reforms, the inconsistencies 
and inefficiencies of the transfer pricing system will impact on both the MNE and the tax 
authority, ultimately impeding foreign investment and consequently causing unintended revenue 
losses. Revenue losses impact again on livelihoods and other socio-economic conditions of 
citizens of all affected countries (Sikka & Willmott, 2010). 
 
Ruiz and Romero (2011), drawing on the work of Bagchi, Bird and Das-Gupta (1995:63) listed 
the problems that come with cross-border trade. These problems include inter alia: over/under-
invoicing of goods, abuse of intra-group debt-financing, misclassification of goods and use of tax 
havens. Bagchi et al (1995:64) identified differing tax rates, exchange rate fluctuations and 
information dissonance as other challenges of cross-border transactions. This myriad of factors 
influencing transfer prices provide national tax authorities with distinct challenges around 
determining the appropriate tax liability in a specific country, and downstream accountability of 
taxpayers to tax authorities and the people of a region (Novikovas, 2011). 
 
To counteract these “creative compliance” (Sikka & Willmott, 2010:11) stances by taxpayers, 
governments revise their legislation to reduce or eliminate this behaviour and its repercussions. 
This can be in the form of introducing significant penalties, new documentation requirements, 
and increased audit procedures (Holtzman & Nagel, 2014). Therefore, the appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of legislation should be considered in the light of sophistication and “creative 
non-compliance” schemes employed by taxpayers in the specific country (McBarnet, 2001). It is 
either that the tax authorities come up with transfer pricing rules to minimise the tax avoidance 
activities of MNEs, or MNEs come up with transfer pricing strategies to counter the rules. This 
leads to an adversarial approach as opposed to collaborative and productive synergies, as 
energies get displaced into mutually exclusive behaviours that undermine cohesive co-
determination models of growth and social good (McIntosh & Buckley, 2015). 
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Oguttu (2016:17) iterates that the tax avoidance tendencies by MNEs provide them with an 
unfair competitive advantage over domestic enterprises especially Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs). It also potentially limits countries’ revenues for economic and 
infrastructural development thereby leading to citizen impoverishment (Sikka & Willmott, 
2010:27). Oguttu (2016:18) highlights that though there is no accurate estimate of the magnitude 
of profit shifting, the impact is immense and visible. She also describes profit shifting as an 
outcome of the lack of relevant international tax laws as well as limited tax administrative 
capacity to assess and audit transfer pricing risks that are exploited by MNEs. 
 
The limited administrative capacity of tax authorities includes unskilled and inexperienced staff, 
redundant and out-of-support information technology. Dharmapala and Riedel (2012:3) 
emphasized that African states are victims of the transfer pricing phenomenon as MNEs shift 
profits to developed countries and low tax countries. Oguttu (2017:20) argues that there is no one 
size fits all anti-tax avoidance measure and encourages that each country assesses and evaluates 
its situation in order to come up with sound solutions relevant to it. 
 
The above line of reasoning has established some of the pragmatic and moral conceptions around 
transfer pricing and MNEs/tax authorities’ patterns. As indicated in the introduction, concepts 
have their groundedness in theories. Transfer pricing, as a concept, has its groundedness in many 
theories, such as capitalism, globalisation, economic, agency, organisational, to name but a few 
(Spicer, 1988; Lall, 1973; Collins and Mulligan (2014). Grand theories [see: Wright Mills’s work 
in The Sociological Imagination (1959)] behind transfer pricing include dimensions of economic 
theories (Hirshleifer, 1956; Grubert & Mutti, 1991; Buckley & Casson, 1985). Within the 
dimensions of economic theory, rationality theory (Herring & Longaker, 2014), as argued 
through the scholarly themes below, provides a fitting background for the scholarly 
advancements of this study. Rationality theory assumes compliance and rule following behaviour 
(Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman & Griffiths, 2008:110) which will be explored in this study 
through the data reviewed and obtained. Figure 1 overleaf incorporates these discussions above 
and provides the initial assumptions of the theoretical backdrop to this study, which are later 
refined in the conceptual framework of this chapter. The early thinking around the unit of 
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analysis is presented in the initial position, with the development of the thinking firmed up, after 
the full literature review and then ultimately theorised in Chapter 7. 
 
Figure 1: Initial Theoretical Positions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
The contentions above (and as summarised within the graphic) are discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
2.5 The Theoretical Perspective 
Theories are bundled systems of critical assumptions devised to explain, and understand 
phenomena, and to test and expand existing knowledge (Yin, 2011). To understand the transfer 
pricing phenomenon, the theoretical positions are explored from the lenses of grand theory, mid-
range theory and practice theory. The theoretical views guiding the study are explained in five 
sub-sections below. 
  
2.5.1 Grand Theory 
Grand theory is employed as it provides universal rather than specific knowledge regarding 
world affairs (Vidal, Adler & Delbridge, 2015:407). It functions as a basis for legitimizing or 
Grand: Economic Theory (Inclusive of Capitalism, Globalization, 
etc.) 
Mid- Range: Impression Management & Hypocrisy Applied to 
Transfer Pricing 
Practice Theory: Compliance to Rules as per the Rational 
Framework 
So
cial, Eco
n
o
m
ic, P
o
litical, Legal 
D
iscip
lin
es 
23 
 
challenging existing policy positions (Eriksson, 2014). Globalisation has resulted in corporates 
roaming the world in search of cost-savings and higher profits (Sikka & Haslam, 2007:7). This 
provides MNEs with an opportunity to make policy decisions and develop strategies that could 
pose tax risks to revenue collection. Christensen and Kapoor (No date:5) underline the lack of 
mechanisms and capacity by governments to dissect these complex structures and practices yet 
they rely on tax revenue. This conflict of interest has driven governments into harmful tax 
competition to attract foreign direct investment (Christensen & Kapoor, No date:1). The 
competition is supported by several subsidies and tax incentives. This creates concentrated 
economic power in MNEs which is strengthened by the capitalist ideologies which lead to the 
creation of transfer pricing strategies that take advantage of tax differences in jurisdictions 
(Sikka & Haslam, 2007:9). Sikka & Haslam (2007:9) further emphasise that the vulnerability 
and dependence of developing countries on foreign investment forces them to enter into bilateral 
and multilateral agreements with the MNEs. It is this “give and take” situation that results in a 
transfer pricing tug-of-war between tax authorities and MNEs as explained below.  
 
According to Vidal et al (2015:407), “grand theory is progressive and legitimate when developed 
through the elaboration of mid-range theories..., in a way that expands and enriches the 
overarching theory rather than restricting it via ad hoc stipulations”. They further add that 
grand theory and mid-range theory are complementary with the potential to inform and integrate 
both inductive and deductive positions. Literature reveals that transfer pricing practices are 
human based, with exploitative tendencies, and are coupled with hypocritical and impression 
management disposition by the economic actors (Sikka & Willmott, 2010; Jonge, 2012).  
 
2.5.2 Mid-Range Theory: Hypocrisy and Impression Management  
Mid-range theories are those theories that are intermediate or related to the preliminary working 
propositions and all inclusive assumptions within a master conceptual plan (Vidal et al, 
2015:407).  Hypocrisy and impression management were applied as the mid-range theories. In a 
bid to reduce tax, MNEs are believed to be presenting an impression that does not depict the true 
status of the organisation. Companies faced with norms conflicting with the conditions required 
for efficient action, will come up with two sets of structures and ideologies; one for internal use 
and one for displaying to the outside world (Brunsson, 1993:4). This is referred to as hypocrisy 
24 
 
because the image portrayed to the outside world contradicts with the inner life of the enterprise 
(Williamson, 2013:89; Brunsson, 1993:4).  
 
Brunsson (1982:34) stressed that if the actors are sceptic about the success of a proposed action 
they are less willing to embark on it. This also finds expression in Hooghiemstra (2000) who 
observes that organisations faced with public pressure, for instance failure to meet tax 
obligations or negative publicity, can react by adopting four potential strategies:  
(1) Notify stakeholders about the plans of the company to improve social performance; 
(2) Try to influence stakeholders’ perception concerning certain negative events, but without 
      changing actual behaviour; 
(3) Distract attention away from the legitimacy; or 
(4) Try to influence external or stakeholders’ expectations about its behaviour. 
 
A look at the above strategies exhibits impression management and hypocrisy (Elsbach and 
Sutton, 1992). This behaviour cannot be separated from the self-serving behaviour of MNEs that 
practice corporate social responsibility by constructing roads and clinics while aggressively 
avoiding tax. This kind of behaviour is explained by Bolino (1999) who questions whether such 
organisations are good soldiers or good actors. Bolino (1999) stresses that the decisions and 
actions by some companies are meant to enhance their images and not what they portray to be 
corporate citizens. This was echoed by Elsbach and Sutton (1992) who argue that companies use 
impression management devices to depict structures and actions that grant them support from 
stakeholders even when their core practices conflict with those desired. The two condemn 
behaviour by errant social actors who seek endorsement by adopting designs that divert attention 
from controversial core activities that may be unacceptable. 
 
Whether the quest to protect reputation and legitimacy can be balanced is also challenged by 
Brunsson (2007:9) when he rightly argues that legitimacy is sometimes created by decisions that 
contradict actions for instance when decisions are made without implementation and without 
having any positive practical effect; a behaviour which may be regarded as being hypocritical. 
Whether both parties, taxpayers (MNEs) and tax authorities, make decisions that conform to 
their actions remains a question to be answered.  However, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) reveal that 
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a company’s legitimacy is sanctioned by both internal and external stakeholders, and if major 
stakeholders are dissatisfied with a company’s decisions or actions, they may withdraw 
endorsements of organisational operations. The hypocritical state of affairs can also be witnessed 
by the use of tax havens by MNEs whereby the MNEs say one thing yet there is actually another 
reality (Brunsson, 1993:4). 
 
Brunsson (1982:30) holds that making a best choice given a specific problem, and options 
available is also dependent on the information available. He stresses the dangers of either 
insufficient or too much information. This is critical especially when considering the 
Zimbabwean environment where new tax laws or transfer pricing laws have been introduced. 
The question that then follows would be: Do the taxpayers have enough information regarding 
the new rules? In the case of transfer pricing rules, if the legislation is, for example, not clear on 
the penalties or rewards that come with non-compliance or compliance then that may cause 
challenges especially when the tax authority tries to enforce transfer pricing adjustments or 
penalties on taxpayers (Maya, 2015:25).  
 
Brunsson (1982:30) highlights that sometimes unfavourable information is suppressed in rational 
decision-making which is also a possibility with taxpayers because as rational players they 
would make choices that guard their interests. Batrancea et al (2012) buttress this by saying that 
taxpayers have four basic rules of compliance and that they mostly fail at rule one which is 
reporting the real tax base to the tax authorities. Transfer pricing abuse is among the many 
financial reporting shenanigans that can be found in a tax audit, for example hiding income in 
low tax countries (Nor, Ahmad & Saleh, 2010). 
 
Sections 2.5.3 to 2.5.4 explore the practice theory, as it focuses on compliance to transfer pricing 
rules as per the rational framework.  
 
 2.5.3 Practice Theory: Rationality Theory 
Practice theory is a theory of how social groups (taxpayers, tax authorities) with their diverse 
motives and intentions manipulate their position in relation to social phenomena (Rouse, 2007). 
The formal rationality theory by Weber (1968) is employed as the central theory to solve the 
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transfer pricing puzzle. Weber (1968) describes formal rationality as the decision-making that 
follows rules, regulations and laws without regard for human values. He stresses that it is 
institutionalised in bureaucratic structures and capitalist ideologies where profits are the main 
focus. This reasoning unravels the possible behaviour of taxpayers juxtaposed with those of tax 
authorities. Rational views indicate logic and “rule-based representations” (Goodman et al, 
2008:110).  
 
However, Brunsson (1982:33) argues that rationality is massaging rules in order to get the best 
possible outcomes. In formal logic, therefore, the outcome follows a clear pathway and line of 
reasoning: the outcomes might be immaterial: for good or bad. Rationality, therefore, has many 
faces as this review argues further. Therefore, the decision-making process of taxpayers and the 
revenue authorities sets the criteria for a rational decision. A rational decision is defined as the 
process of determining what options are available and then choosing the most preferred (Levin & 
Milgrom, 2004). Rationality theory assumes that the players will always seek to take the option 
that gives them an advantage (Scott, 2000:3). 
 
The rationality theory is deployed towards an inquiry into the taxpayer behaviour as well as 
reactions that tax authorities can take to counter the avoidance tendencies of taxpayers. It 
captures the human dimensions in transfer pricing decision-making processes which are 
neglected in existing theory (Li, 2005:47). Rationality theory involves making decisions where 
there is at least a choice/two options (Brunsson, 1982:29). Some of the literature on rationality 
theory focussed on individuals, and yet, the behaviour of companies such as MNEs is a 
representation of aggregated behaviours of individuals within the organisation and has not been 
considered. Brunsson (2007:3) says that like human beings, organisations are a type of individual 
who are even referred to by law as ‘legal persons’. Brunsson (1982:30) likens organisations to 
individuals and stresses that they have similar characteristics and business concepts thereby 
making rationality (and irrationality) a characteristic of organisations. 
 
Rational players are faced with choices, and therefore calculate the alternative outcomes (Scott, 
2000:3). Section 1.1 of Chapter 1 has revealed that Zimbabwe moved from anti-avoidance rules 
to specific transfer pricing rules. What was the rationale of legislators to move from general anti-
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avoidance rules to specific transfer pricing rules? The reason points towards the effectiveness of 
these rules. Scott (2000:4-6) says human behaviour is guided by rewards and punishments, and 
questions why players should choose an action that will benefit others more than themselves. 
Jose (2009:6) explains that the rationality concept is useful in resolving the decision-making 
problem. Considering the thrust of rationality theory, making rational decisions and actions 
comes at a cost, Jonge (2012:9) refers to it as the burden of making a rational choice. These may 
include identifying alternatives and weighing up their costs and benefits.  
 
Saunders-Scott (2013) established that increased transfer pricing regulation is associated with 
significant compliance costs for the taxpayer. Eichfelder and Kegels (2012:18) further note that 
compliance costs of taxpayers are not affected by the tax law alone, but by its enforcement 
through the tax authorities as well. Enforcement or maximisation of the tax base by tax 
authorities involves costs such as audit costs. Penalties that come with non-compliance are the 
determining factor in taxpayer behaviour, according to Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008:211). 
The same goes with the rewards for compliance, and rational economic actors do not prioritise 
the interests of others and are, as claimed, exploitative (Scott, 2000:6). So it goes without saying 
that tax authorities can decide to strengthen their tax administrative measures without 
considering the cost implications on the taxpayers which may stifle voluntary compliance. 
 
Jonge (2012:9) notes that rational behaviour is a combination of three factors, namely capacity to 
use the right resources in order to accomplish a set goal, the ability to allocate the scarce 
resources in ways that provides maximum utility, and the ability of the agent to be self-
regarding. Self-regarding entails serving one’s well-being, and this is a fundamental attribute of 
rational players (Jonge, 2012:9). 
 
2.5.4 Transfer Pricing as an Exploitative Mechanism 
Scott (2000:1) emphasizes, that people or businesses are motivated by money and making a 
profit, and therefore all decisions are essentially “rational” in character. Basically people or 
social actors calculate the possible costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do. 
The decisions are said to be value-oriented, and in this case both the taxpayer and the tax 
authority make decisions that give them maximum payoff.  Uyanik (2010) describes the visions 
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of tax authorities and MNEs as diametrical opposites as taxpayers seek to pay the least amount of 
taxes while tax authorities seek to get the most taxes. This was supported by Hai and See (2011) 
who described taxpayers as economic evaders who will always make decisions based on 
weighing the gain of successful noncompliance against the risk of being caught. Ritzer (2007:43) 
stresses that in formal rationality, economic actors use existing laws that predetermine the 
optimum methods to be applied in economic situations.  
 
Scott (2000:3) adds that taxpayers, as social actors, will engage in deliberate calculative 
strategies that give them minimum tax payments while the legislators together with the tax 
authority will calculate measures that will effectively draw maximum tax payments from 
taxpayers. Rationality involves being calculative, and the rationality theory assumes taxpayers 
and tax authorities are rational players who seek to maximise their group profits (by minimising 
their tax liability) and maximise their tax base respectively (Sikka & Willmott, 2010:8). The 
same authors indicated that people within organisations make rational economic decisions to 
exploit many opportunities to ensure their after-tax global income is maximised. Rational 
economic decisions are therefore not value free despite the inherent logics, but are also 
exploitative and self-serving.  
 
Jonge (2012:xii) stresses that because of the rational nature of actors (firms), free riders and 
parasites are inevitable. This means that social actors (firms) with a tendency of taking advantage 
of others exist and their behaviour discourages the honest/compliant firms (Ekstrom et al, 
2014:56). However, Jonge (2012:257) criticises social actors who improve their situation 
through interaction that worsens other actors. He advocates for some kind of win-win situation 
which allows one to achieve one’s legacy without sabotaging other actors or players. This is 
evident in MNEs’ behaviour when they hire tax practitioners to design tax avoidance strategies 
that result in domestic enterprises’ competitive disadvantage while also depriving governments 
of their national revenue (Oguttu, 2016:17). Some of the exploitative tendencies of MNEs are 
briefly revealed through some of their transfer pricing strategies.  
 
Figure 1 (in section 2.4) summarised the initial theoretical understanding of extant literature. The 
literature (within the substantive concept of transfer pricing) is now considered towards 
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providing a refined conceptual framework. This will begin with an overview of the transfer 
pricing strategies used by MNEs followed by the authorities’ reaction to exploitative 
rationalities. 
 
2.6 Transfer Pricing Strategies 
MNEs are economic actors with a prime objective of maximising profit. Their decisions and 
actions become conflicted as a result of statutory obligations to pay tax. Their compliance with 
rules is, however, influenced by the social and political landscapes. Globalisation has provided 
avenues for crafting new transfer pricing strategies/schemes that enable MNEs to avoid tax in 
less developed countries (Asongu, 2015:11). Dean (2014:7) argues that incorrect pricing of cross 
border transactions allows profit manipulation which transpires in numerous ways and for varied 
reasons. Oguttu (2016:13) identified a weak legal system, bureaucracy, corruption and regulatory 
discretion as factors that inhibit citizens’ willingness to comply with tax laws which can lead to 
an erosion of the tax revenue. Looking at the theoretical constructs below, MNEs have to decide 
on the strategy that gives them the highest tax saving which includes, among others, income 
shifting, tax havens and debt shifting. 
 
2.6.1 Income Shifting 
“Income shifting” is the reduction of sales values of a holding company and its associates in high 
tax countries or inflating the price of purchases made in these countries (Uyanik, 2010; Oguttu, 
2006a:140). The working definition of “Income shifting” for the purposes of this study is when 
associated enterprises take advantage of tax differentials to manipulate prices of transactions 
between themselves. According to Olibe and Rezaee (2008) the pricing of intracompany 
transactions affects the distribution of profits and taxable income among associated enterprises, 
and most often across tax jurisdictions (cross-border transactions). 
 
An understanding of how cross-border group transfers affect taxes is important when designing a 
tax policy and transfer pricing regulations (Olibe & Rezaee, 2008). According to Baker (2005), 
virtually every MNE uses transfer pricing to shift income around the globe. Transfer pricing can 
have economic benefits to the companies, but is also open to abuse as companies continue to 
lower their group tax burden by shifting profits from high to low tax jurisdictions by inflating 
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expenses in the higher tax jurisdiction and income in the lower tax jurisdiction (Gupta, 2012; 
Adams and Drtina, 2010 & Uyanik, 2010).  
 
Some MNEs overprice imports and under-price exports of a host country to minimise their tax 
liability, practices which Nitsch (2012) stresses, result in the transfer of financial resources 
abroad without a trace. In a case study of the Zimbabwean mining sector, substantial evidence of 
under/over-invoicing was found following the dominance of mining companies and weak 
regulation (Kwaramba et al, 2015:4).   
 
If approximately 60% of world trade is taking place amongst MNEs as noted in Chapter 1, 
intragroup cross-border transactions create opportunities for MNEs to reduce their overall tax 
burden, by taking advantage of the differences in tax rates and regulations in the trading 
countries. Wang and Wang (2008) and Azemar and Corcos (2009) concur that MNEs manipulate 
their transfer prices in order to shift profits cross-border as transfer pricing is affected by cross-
country tax differences.  
 
Tanzi (2008) established a positive relationship between the tax rate and under-reporting of 
income. Several other studies reported lower tax compliance at higher tax rate levels (Ali, 
Fjeldstad & Sjursen, 2010; Alm, McClelland & Schulze, 1992). However, research by Blackwell 
(2010) found no relationship between the tax rate and tax compliance. Olibe and Rezaee (2008) 
found that the cross-country heterogeneity of tax rates encourages MNEs to engage in transfer 
pricing manipulation to reduce the corporate tax burden. So when the tax rate is high, MNEs tend 
to shun tax and so engage the services of tax consultants (Sikka & Willmott, 2013) to achieve 
their intended objectives. Jones, Temouri and Cobham (2018) found strong evidence of tax 
consultants being paid huge sums of money for aggressive tax avoidance strategies. In fact, 
Addison and Mueller (2016) declare that the big four accountancy firms are engineers of 
unacceptable tax avoidance strategies.  
 
Tax differences in tax jurisdictions increase the risk of tax avoidance through transfer pricing by 
MNEs. According to Borkowski (1997) developing countries are highly susceptible to tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing and capital flight. She advocates for the elimination of tax 
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rate differentials as she argues that it contributes to income shifting. The following court case 
elaborates how income shifting is practiced as a tax avoidance strategy by MNEs. 
 
2.6.1.1 Unilever Kenya Ltd Case 
 
2.6.1.1.1 Facts of the Case 
The appellant, Unilever Kenya Ltd (UKL), was a manufacturing company, part of the Unilever 
Group of companies based in the UK. UKL entered into a contract to manufacture goods for 
Unilever Uganda Ltd (UUL), an associated party according to Section 18 of the Kenyan Income 
Tax Act. UKL charged lower prices for the same goods to UUL than it charged its domestic 
buyers and importers. 
 
2.6.1.1.2 Findings of the Case 
In this case the Kenya Revenue Authority challenged the prices for transactions between UUL 
and UKL, arguing that they were not at arm’s length. To the contrary, UKL proved that they 
applied the cost plus method (see Chapter 4) in accordance with the OECD guidelines. The 
Kenyan transfer pricing reforms started after the Kenya Revenue Authority lost in the Unilever 
transfer pricing case in 2005 (Unilever Kenya Ltd V Commissioner of Income Tax [2005] 
eKLR- Kenya Law Reports). 
 
2.6.1.1.3 Analysis of the Findings 
The presiding judge ruled that Section 18(3) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act was inadequate to 
guide the taxpayer and therefore could not be relied on to enforce transfer pricing rules. The 
judge added that due to the absence of clear transfer pricing rules, the taxpayer acted within its 
rights to apply the OECD guidelines or any other international best practice. Murphy (2012) 
blames the ending of the case on the weak tax system of Kenya and on its inability to uncover 
the associate transactions which facilitated tax avoidance. 
 
Next is a discussion on how tax havens are used as part of MNEs’ transfer pricing strategies. 
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2.6.2 Tax Havens 
Lenssen, Bevan, Fontrodona, and Preuss (2010) indicate that defining a tax haven is not a 
straight forward task. The OECD (1998) describes a tax haven as a country that has no or only 
nominal taxes; lack of effective exchange of information; lack of transparency and no 
requirements for corporate activities. Whilst Christensen (2011) defines them as autonomous or 
semi-autonomous jurisdictions with a combination of lax regulation, low or zero taxation on 
income and capital of non-residents, secret banking facilities or corporate ownership and an 
absence of effective information exchange with the authorities of third party countries. Hearson 
and Brooks (2012:2) define a tax haven as a jurisdiction that creates attractive rules, systems of 
regulation and veils of secrecy in order to benefit non-resident individuals and companies. Just as 
there is no unified definition of a tax haven, there is no agreed-upon list of tax havens (GAO, 
2008). 
 
It would be unjust to talk about transfer pricing schemes without discussing low tax jurisdictions 
and or tax havens, as their zero or low tax rates is the reason why MNEs invest in them. 
According to Murphy (2012), 60% of global trade is routed via tax havens. In a study by 
Christian Aid (2013), findings showed that MNEs that are connected to tax havens are involved 
in intensive profit shifting more than those with no links. A study by Davies et al (2014) found 
close to zero evidence of tax avoidance if exports to tax havens are disregarded. However, a 
significant percentage of losses of revenue through transfer pricing emanating from exports to 
tax havens was evident.  
 
In 2000, the OECD blacklisted some tax havens expecting a reduction in investor’s confidence to 
use the tax haven and withdraw funds. However, Kudrle (2009) found no substantial impact of 
this blacklisting on the banking system in and out of tax havens across 38 countries. This implies 
continued use of tax havens impacting on international revenue flows as Matei and Pirvu (2011) 
emphasise the significant increase of the use of tax havens in recent years exposing companies to 
unfair competition.  
According to Taylor and Richardson (2014), tax havens are likely to be used together with 
transfer pricing and thin capitalization (higher debt than equity capital) to maximize international 
tax avoidance opportunities. To Murphy (2012), tax havens are essentially ‘secrecy jurisdictions’ 
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that provide a deep enigma that makes it difficult to discover transfer pricing abuse. Tanzi (2000) 
describes tax havens as “fiscal termites”, and Borkowski (1997) argues that as long as tax havens 
continue to exist, income shifting by MNEs will be encouraged and continue unabated. She 
advocates for elimination of tax differentials that contribute to misallocation of tax revenues.  
 
Shaxson (2012) further alludes to the fact that such special taxes and incentives to foreigners to 
attract foreign investment often lead to round tripping. This is a technique which Shaxson (2012) 
describes as the dressing up of domestic capital in offshore secrecy brought back as foreign 
investment. Olivier and Honiball (2011) revealed that taxpayers in developed countries try to 
attain unwarranted treaty benefits often exploiting a tax haven.  
 
Part of the research objectives is to examine the transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs to 
avoid tax. Hence, an analysis of the SABMiller case study, shall illustrate some of the strategies 
applied by MNEs including use of tax havens. The SABMiller case study was selected based on 
its relevance to this study, and was adopted from the articles by Hearson and Brooks (2012) and 
Padmakshan (2009).  
 
2.6.2.1 SABMiller Case Study 
The SABMiller case study demonstrates how tax avoidance through transfer pricing is 
perpetrated. This case was selected on the basis of its relevance to this particular study. 
 
2.6.2.1.1 Facts of the Case Study 
SABMiller is an international brewer and one of the world’s biggest manufacturers of soda 
drinks. SABMiller has business units in more than 75 countries around the globe. Its parent 
company is located in London, United Kingdom (SABMiller, 2014). 
 
2.6.2.1.2 Findings of the Case Study 
SABMiller has been accused of tax dodging (avoidance) over the past few years. In one instance 
it was accused of undertaking transfer pricing schemes when buying intangible assets, for 
example patents, in its Indian branch and the Forster’s brand name from Forster’s Australia [a 
subsidiary of SABMiller] (Padmakshan, 2009).  
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According to a study by Hearson and Brooks (2012:8-9), on “Why SABMiller Should Stop 
Dodging Taxes in Africa”, SABMiller had four ways of avoiding tax. These included: (1) Going 
Dutch (simply taking advantage of the tax system offered by the Netherlands), (2) the Swiss Role 
(transferring management fees from Africa); (3) trip to Mauritius (simply another tax haven) and 
(4) the Thinning Top (where their Ghana subsidiary got a very big loan from their Mauritius 
subsidiary, translating to being excessively thinly capitalized). They also reported that of the four 
strategies; the going Dutch and the Swiss Role were the main culprits for huge tax losses in 
African countries. In all these instances, Hearson and Brooks (2012:9) could not deny that 
SABMiller had not violated any law, but simply minimised its tax liability legally. 
 
The Accra Brewery, a SABMiller subsidiary in Ghana, was reported to have been generating 
£29 million of beer yearly. However, it recorded losses in 2010 and 2011 and only paid 
corporation tax in one of the four years between 2007 and 2010. A small retailer of SABMiller’s 
Club beer in Ghana with £220 in profit monthly paid more income tax than its supplier, 
SABMiller’s subsidiary in Accra, over a two-year period. This demonstrates that something was 
amiss. The major problem that Ghana had was it signed a double taxation agreement with the 
Netherlands (a low tax jurisdiction), leaving the taxpayer, SABMiller with the motivation to 
avoid tax (Hearson & Brooks, 2012:24). The ActionAid report estimates a loss amounting to 
£10 million per year to Africa as a consequence of this agreement (Hearson & Brooks, 2012:24).   
 
2.6.2.1.3 Analysis of the Findings 
SABMiller was avoiding tax by means of various strategies which included the use of tax 
havens, taking advantage of weak tax systems and thin capitalization. This exposed Africa to 
massive revenue losses which could have developed the poor in Africa.  
 
The outcome of the above two cases (Unilever and SABMiller) shows the diametric relationship 
between the taxpayer and the taxman, as well as the importance of effective tax laws and strong 
tax systems.  
The questions that could arise from the above cases would be: 
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 If the tax authority were to look at the company’s transfer pricing, what would be the 
process (for instance audit of the taxpayer)? 
 What would be the areas of concern for the tax authority (for example location of the 
associated enterprise - low tax country or adequacy of documentation)? 
 Which transfer pricing method would likely be accepted by the tax authority and 
why? 
 When would a primary adjustment arise (depends on the national laws)? A primary 
adjustment is a tax adjustment where the taxman determines that the transfer price is 
not at arm’s length (van der Zwan, 2017). 
 Could the company apply for an Advance Pricing Arrangement (depends on national 
laws)? An Advance Pricing Arrangement is an arrangement where the MNE can 
agree on an appropriate transfer pricing method in advance over a fixed period of 
time. 
 
The answers to these questions help identify flaws in the various tax systems (discussed in 
Chapter 3 & 5) and help assess the transfer pricing rules and regulations in order to curb tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing. 
 
Next is an appraisal of how MNEs manipulate prices through intra-company financing (debt 
shifting). 
 
2.6.3 Debt Shifting 
Debt shifting involves having an associated enterprise in a high tax jurisdiction being excessively 
debt financed. The excessive interest payments are channelled to an enterprise in a low tax 
country which attracts taxes at relatively lower rates or it may never be taxed (Oguttu, 2017:8). 
The researcher included debt shifting as a strategy because Schindler and Schjelderup (2013:1) 
found that transfer pricing and debt shifting are intertwined. They further established that the 
stricter regulation of debt shifting/transfer pricing potentially increases the use of transfer 
pricing/debt shifting and thus profit shifting. MNEs have also been accused of manipulating debt 
financing among their associated enterprises. Debt shifting through intra-group loans which is 
often associated with thin capitalization schemes has also been reported as a significant risk 
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which erodes the tax bases of developing countries (Oguttu, 2017:8). The OECD (2015) 
describes debt shifting as the easiest means of tax avoidance schemes by MNEs. Debt shifting 
has, however, been accused of giving MNEs a competitive advantage over domestic business.  
 
The debt to equity restriction like the 3:1 in Zimbabwe is discouraged by paragraph 17 of the 
OECD report citing that MNEs can easily manipulate these by inflating equity values (OECD, 
2015). Debt to equity restrictions provide fixed debt to equity ratios where the taxpayer is taxed 
on the excess. The rigidity of these fixed ratios has also been criticised for being unfairly applied 
to all sectors.  Oguttu (2017) suggests applying withholding taxes on interest to minimise tax 
avoidance through thin capitalization. This means for all interest payments, the associated 
enterprise ‘B’ will have to withhold tax on interest before paying enterprise ‘A’. However, van 
der Zwan (2017) argues that these withholding taxes overlap with transfer pricing. Transfer 
pricing adjustments on excessive interest can result in an excessive tax liability for the group. 
 
After discovering strategies used by MNEs to erode national tax bases, it is imperative to 
understand how authorities react to these exploitative stances. Exploitative rationalities 
(Brunsson, 1993:3) are contradictory to rationality and compliance. 
 
2.7 Authorities’ Reaction to Exploitative Rationalities 
The Government of Zimbabwe, through the Ministry of Finance, develops the transfer pricing 
legislation which is required to be enforced by the tax authority (Tapera & Majachani, 2017). 
Legislation contains the rules on how to calculate the transfer price and the audit system to verify 
compliance, penalties for non-compliance and required documentation for taxpayers to retain in 
order to prove their compliance.  
 
The transfer pricing rules guided by the accepted transfer pricing guideline are meant to dampen 
the efforts by MNEs to avoid/evade tax (Tapera & Majachani, 2017). This results in an 
antagonistic situation. MNEs transfer pricing strategies can therefore influence the compilation 
of the legislation, and in turn the legislation affects the tax planning decisions of MNEs referred 
to here as transfer pricing strategies.  Lohse and Riedel (2012 and 2013) indicate that the tighter 
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the transfer pricing rules are enforced by the respective authorities, the higher the tax compliance 
will be. 
 
Given the above, it is evident that developing countries’ legislators are faced with either 
following international guidelines or designing their own domestic system. Taxpayers too have 
to choose between complying and not complying while the tax authorities are faced with 
choosing between deterrence and persuasive measures (Ariel, 2012). This is mainly because 
taxpayers are considered by theorists to be rational, meaning that they aim to make decisions that 
improve their well-being (Thompson, 2011). Therefore, the ability of the tax authority to detect 
and verify transfer pricing abuse and to punish the taxpayers interweaves with the rationality 
theory as explained previously and as expanded upon below. 
 
The conceptual framework developed in this study is built on the theoretical argument that 
theorists like Scott (2000) have raised concerning decision making by economic actors. Scott 
(2000) believes taxpayers are rational and make decisions that are in their favour. He emphasizes 
that the taxpayers’ ability to achieve all they want is limited and therefore they must not only 
make goals but also the means to attaining those goals. For instance, if the taxpayer’s goal is to 
minimize his tax he must also consider the alternative courses of action to achieve that goal, for 
example, choose to under-declare income or make use of tax havens. Legislators choose to 
follow the anti-avoidance rules or specific transfer pricing rules which will either be based on the 
OECD or UN guidelines. The rationality characteristic in social actors suggests that the goals of 
taxpayers are diametrically opposite to those of the tax authority. The latter reacts either by 
deterrent or persuasive measures while MNEs choose to comply with the rules (or not) 
depending on what gives each taxpayer/MNE the most benefit. 
 
On the one hand, Ariel (2012) states that moral persuasion is premised on the idea that, appealing 
to a taxpayer’s morals increases compliance without necessarily threatening the person with 
detection and punishment. On the other hand, the deterrence model is based on the view that 
threats of detection and punishment for non-compliance encourage tax compliance (Ho and 
Wong, 2008). Leviner (2008:364) and Feld and Frey (2002) argue that if tax authorities solely 
rely on punitive strategies or deterrence, taxpayers tend to avoid more tax.   
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Slemrod (2007) and Ho and Wong (2008) support deterrence while Ariel (2012) argues that 
moral persuasion can be counterproductive resulting in loss of state revenues. These conflicting 
views between the traditional economic theorists and the modern theorists may be the reason 
why Feld and Frey (2002) advocate for a combination of moral persuasion and deterrence. 
Leviner (2008:369) futher argues that a system which relies heavily on deterrence and 
punishment is a short-term approach and instead advocates for a more long-term approach that 
moves from authoritarian deterrence to “responsive regulation”. “Responsive regulation” is 
whereby stringent controls are enforced on the errant taxpayers and allows self-regulation for the 
compliant taxpayers which is why Bagchi et al (1995:40) advocate for a system of penalties for 
non-complying taxpayers and a system of rewards for the complying ones. This proposition 
does, however, pose some practical problems like how will compliance be measured, the nature 
of the reward and the potential cost of such a system?   
 
The issue of how tax authorities and taxpayers react is explained by Kirchler et al’s (2008:211) 
slippery slope framework which is premised on two climates; the antagonistic (where tax 
authorities view taxpayers as robbers always wanting to evade) and the synergistic (a service-
client relationship in which trust exists).  This framework is based on the assertion that tax 
compliance and tax payments can be increased by either increasing trust in tax authorities or 
increasing the deterrence power of tax authorities (Kirchler et al, 2008).  
 
Kirchler et al (2008:212) define the power of authorities as the taxpayers’ perception of the tax 
authorities’ ability to detect and punish errant taxpayers. This is similar to the capacity issues of 
tax authorities, that is, their ability to detect transfer pricing abuse and their authority to punish 
delinquent taxpayers. Powers of authorities include controls and punishments such as audit 
probabilities, audit rates, fines and tax rates (Kirchler, 2008:217). However, Uyanik (2010) is of 
the view that the audit is limited in that it does not detect all non-compliance and it would not 
detect avoidance mechanisms which are or appear to be legal. Furthermore, Bagchi et al 
(1995:83) stress that the success of an audit depends on the tax officials’ efforts and the quality 
of information gathered from the taxpayer and third parties.  
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The question that arises is how much power is vested in the tax authority to detect transfer 
pricing abuse, and is it enough? Oguttu (2016:13) hints that the discretionary powers often 
possessed by tax authorities promote corruption which also inhibits taxpayers’ willingness to 
comply. Kirchler et al (2008:212) reveal that the power of authorities highly depends on tax 
legislation and the budget allocated to them by government, but is not limited to this. They 
further explain that capacity issues also include financial resources at the disposal of the 
authority, the transfer pricing knowledge levels of the officers, the experience and the skills of 
the staff regarding transfer pricing matters.  
 
Brunsson (1993:2) says an organisation that fails to train its staff would be limited. Saunders-
Scott (2013) found it more costly to shift profits from a country with skilled tax agents and high 
penalties for transfer pricing abuse than where the tax authority has limited resources. This 
implies that the ability of a transfer pricing regime to successfully inhibit tax avoidance through 
transfer pricing will depend not only on whether the tax authorities believe in deterrence or 
moral persuasion, but also in the power vested in them through legislation, and resources availed 
to them. 
 
However, Gupta (2012) established that MNEs continue to shift income to minimise taxes even 
with increased governmental regulations. Therefore, the ability of Government regulations to 
minimise tax avoidance would be debatable considering the MNEs’ capacity to hire professional 
tax accountants who search for, discover and craft other tax planning strategies (Sikka & 
Willmott, 2013) despite increased transfer pricing rules. Specific to transfer pricing, tax 
authorities may react, for example, by adjusting the transfer prices used by corporates (Sikka & 
Willmott, 2010:5). Behrens, Peralta, and Picard (2014) argue that although tax authorities can 
increase tax revenue collection, their interference with transfer prices may distort consumer 
prices and the MNEs’ organisational goals. There are several ways in which authorities could 
react to MNEs’ transfer pricing strategies either by way of moral persuasion, deterrence or a 
combination of both, but a tax administration system with a combination of an omniscient judge 
(Bagchi et al, 1995:29) and an omniscient tax agency would have been ideal to address the issues 
of tax avoidance. However, Bagchi et al (1995) argue that no tax authority can detect all 
delinquent taxpayers, hence the best is to find ways to prevent or minimise non-compliance. 
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In the next section, the transfer pricing conceptual framework as informed by literature review 
that underpins this study is discussed. 
 
2.8 Conceptual Framework 
As indicated, at the initial framework discussion, the researcher derived from the overview of 
theories seminal to this study, a conceptual framework that draws together the contextual and the 
theoretical lenses as a working proposition for the advancement of the novel contribution of this 
study. The conceptual framework explains the different concepts as they all play a role in the 
effectiveness of a transfer pricing regime. It is therefore important to understand each concept 
and also the interaction between these. This is a summation of the theoretical arguments derived 
from the literature review.  
 
The researcher considered the four conscious social players identified in literature namely: 
MNEs, the tax authority, the legislators and the tax consultants, as well as the options available 
to them to calculate their maximum utility. Figure 2 shows how legislators are faced with a 
decision-making dilemma which cascades down to the enforcers, and how the decisions and 
actions by these two will ultimately affect the tax planning activities of the MNEs. The decision-
making processes of the three players (MNEs, tax authority and legislators) are well placed in the 
rationality elements of these economic actors. These include the legal rationalities as prescribed 
by the legislators and the implementation rationalities at all levels in a bid to counter the 
exploitative tendencies of the MNEs.  
 
The big picture framework (Figure 1), has become modulated by the implementation and 
exploitative concepts that emerged from the literature review into a more refined conceptual 
framework (Figure 2). The aggressiveness of the transfer pricing rules affects the MNEs’ 
decisions which will also affect the MNEs compliance or tax avoidance activities (Lohse and 
Riedel, 2013). It is important to note that the introduction of the rules is one thing while, their 
enforcement is another and that the aggressiveness of the enforcement of these rules is a function 
of the capacity of the tax authority. Therefore, a transfer pricing regime requires careful planning 
taking into account its effects which can either be positive or detrimental to the economic 
development of the respective country.  
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The economic actors are faced with various choices. For instance, an MNE can decide to choose 
to avoid tax through debt-shifting or use of tax havens as shown in the Figure 2. Exploitative 
areas are the concept that the researcher postulates and is confirmed in Chapter 7, which is the 
data analysis. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework 
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Based on the above theoretical framework, it is evident that the economic actors are faced with a 
decision-making problem and they most likely make decisions that are in their favour (rationality 
theory). On the one hand, tax authorities seek to maximise their tax base, while on the other 
hand, taxpayers seek to minimise their tax liability. Errant taxpayers exist, and minimising tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing also depends on the soundness of the legislation together with 
the capacity of the revenue authority (Oguttu, 2016:15) as well as the attitude of the taxpayers. 
The rationality theory served as a seminal lens which inspired different concepts which need to 
be both aggregated (analysing and interpreting the data) and disaggregated throughout the 
research (coding). The conceptual framework showed the existence of rationality as a rules-
based concept juxtaposed to the lived and livable reality of people exploiting the system for 
profit which has been described in this research as exploitative rationalisation of MNEs. The 
exploitative tendencies of MNEs influence the legal rationalisation systems and vice-versa, and 
the strength of these legal systems are not only dependent on the legislative frameworks but the 
administrative/implementation models which will be discussed further in Chapter 7.  
 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter described transfer pricing as a phenomenon by expounding on transfer pricing as a 
concept. An initial theoretical outline provided the grand, mid-range and practice theories that 
oriented the study. Impression management and hypocrisy (exploitative rationalities) were 
subsidiary theories that complemented the theoretical perspectives of the study. The refined 
conceptual framework was then postulated. Additionally, the rationality theory revealed that 
economic actors such as the tax authorities and the MNEs are rational in that they make self-
serving decisions that give them maximum benefit. It was also postulated that rationality can 
become exploitative. It was also discovered that in making decisions the social actors can make 
decisions that are socially acceptable but contrary to their actions creating a hypocritical 
environment for the sake of protecting their image. There is no consensus as to whether tax 
authorities should use the deterrence model or moral persuasion model to promote compliance of 
MNEs, thus, scholars have advocated for a combination of the two.  
 
Based on the theoretical underpinnings, a conceptual framework was constructed as presented in 
Section 2.8. It was discovered that apart from the existence of transfer pricing legislation, MNEs 
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continuously search for loopholes in the tax system, and therefore, the onus is on the respective 
government to relinquish powers and resources that are enough for the tax authority to detect and 
deter transfer pricing abuse. The chapter has also uncovered some transfer pricing strategies 
which MNEs apply to avoid tax. Income shifting, tax havens and debt shifting have been 
identified inter alia as major transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs to avoid tax. Furthermore, 
ineffective legislation coupled with an un-resourceful tax authority makes it easy for profit 
shifting to take place. These deficiencies have imposed challenges on the tax authorities 
especially those in the developing economies, making it difficult for them to uncover transfer 
pricing abuse.  
 
Having explored the various strategies used by MNEs to avoid tax through transfer pricing, the 
following chapter explores the Zimbabwean transfer pricing legislation as set out in objective 2. 
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CHAPTER 3: ZIMBABWE’s TRANSFER PRICING RULES 
 
“A person, who never made a mistake, never tried anything new”- Albert Einstein 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter described transfer pricing as a tax avoidance tool, and presented the 
theoretical framework that guides this study. The chapter discusses the background of transfer 
pricing in Zimbabwe together with the transfer pricing provisions within the Zimbabwean 
legislation (Section 3.2) in order to effectively assess them. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs in Zimbabwe (Section 3.3) in order to 
make informed recommendations that could solve the transfer pricing problem.  
 
3.2 Tax Authority and Legislation 
In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) is the government’s arm which 
assesses, collects and manages revenue on its behalf. The Income Tax Act is interpreted and 
administered by the Commissioner-General of ZIMRA (Hore & Mangoro, 2006). Taxpayers 
have an obligation to abide by the existing laws, and failure to comply results in penalties and 
interest. Zimbabwe was one of the African nations that heavily relied on general anti-avoidance 
rules which awarded the Commissioner powers to dispute the taxpayer’s transfer prices on the 
grounds that they were not at arm’s length. The general anti-avoidance rules had limitations and 
the basis for disregarding a taxpayer’s transfer prices was not clear (Section 98 of the 
Zimbabwean Income Tax Act (Chapter 23:06)). 
 
The anti-avoidance provisions [Sections 98, 16q, 19 & 23 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) Chapter 
23:06 (1996)] gave the Commissioner power to disregard any transaction which he/she deems to 
be outside arm’s length provisions and has been solely for avoiding tax. Section 16q deals with 
thin capitalization issues, 19 and 23 deal with business beyond Zimbabwean borders. In January 
2014, section 98 was split into section 98A (income splitting) and section 98B (anti-avoidance). 
Effective 1 January 2016, Section 98B of the Income Tax Act (Chapter 23:06) was repealed and 
amended by the insertion of the 35th schedule which are discussed below. 
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3.2.1 Section 98B of the Income Tax Act Chapter (23:06) 
The Zimbabwean transfer pricing rules require that the income of any person who engages in a 
controlled transaction (transaction between associates) with an associated person be consistent 
with the arm’s length principle (ALP) – that means the transfer price should not differ from that 
of an uncontrolled transaction (Subsection 1 of Section 98B). 
 
According to the ITA [Chapter 23:06], “person” includes a company, body of persons corporate 
or unincorporate (not being a partnership), local or like authority, deceased or insolvent estate 
and, in relation to income the subject of a trust to which no beneficiary is entitled, the trust; while 
an “associate” is defined as: 
“A person, other than an employee, acting in accordance with the directions, requests, 
suggestions or wishes of another person, whether or not the persons are in a business 
relationship and whether or not those directions, requests, suggestions or wishes are 
communicated to the first-mentioned person, both persons shall be treated as 
associates of each other for the purposes of this Act” (Sub-section 1 of Section 2A of 
the ITA).  
This includes near relative, trustee, company controlled by the person and partners or 
partnerships. 
 
Sub-section 3 then refers taxpayers to the 35th schedule of the ITA for the determination of 
whether the conditions of a controlled transaction between associated persons are consistent with 
the ALP. Sub-section 5 places the burden of proof on the taxpayer to keep transfer pricing 
documentation which the Commissioner will use to establish if a transaction was at arm’s length 
or not. Sub-section 6 informs the public that the rules may be amended by the Minister, after 
consultation with the Commissioner-General, by notice in a statutory instrument. 
 
Unlike the old Section 98, which placed the burden of proof on the Commissioner to prove that a 
transaction by a taxpayer has been done solely for purposes of postponement, avoidance, or 
reduction of the liability to tax, the new rules have brought in a new dispensation. The 
implications are that taxpayers currently transacting with associates, trading with foreign 
46 
 
enterprises or planning on entering into contracts with such, must comply with the requirements 
of the new legislation. This also means the affected taxpayers should: 
1. Apply the arm’s length principle on all transactions with associated enterprises. 
2. Develop a transfer pricing policy that conforms to the new legislative requirements. 
3. Review and align any existing policies to the new legislation. 
4. Review affected contracts and evaluate the impact of the new legislation, and ensure all  
    intercompany transfer prices are within the arm’s length range. 
5. Develop and maintain relevant transfer pricing documentation (35th schedule of the ITA). 
 
3.2.2 The 35th Schedule  
This schedule prescribes the transfer pricing methods to be used, and these are borrowed from 
the OECD guidelines.  
 
3.2.3 Transfer Pricing on Domestic Transactions 
Paragraph 11 of the 35th schedule refers to possible transfer pricing adjustments for domestic 
transactions by the Commissioner which applies to the income of both parties involved in the 
transaction. ZELA (2016:16) revealed that the scope of the new transfer pricing laws extends to 
both domestic and cross-border transactions. This implies that all the enterprises (local/foreign) 
should comply with all the requirements for transfer pricing purposes. ZELA (2016) 
acknowledges that the new provisions adopt the OECD transfer pricing principles and recognise 
the OECD and UN transfer pricing guidelines for developing countries as relevant sources for 
transfer pricing issues. 
 
3.2.4 Management Fees 
Section 16 (1) (r) of the ITA (23:06) also restricts amounts deductible pertaining to 
administrative and management fees incurred after the commencement of trade or the production 
of income, to an amount not exceeding 1% of the management fees. General administration and 
management expenses incurred by a subsidiary or local branch of a foreign company are 
deductible against taxable income, subject to a formula based limit (National Budget Statement, 
2017). The Financial Gazette (2016) reported that the Minerals Marketing Corporation of 
Zimbabwe (MMCZ) had become a conduit for transfer pricing by large mining enterprises. 
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Transfer pricing has been alleged to be “milking” mining revenue through the manipulation of 
management fees and the use of jurisdictions with favourable tax regimes as shared in The New 
Examiner (No date). 
 
3.2.5 Definition of Related Party 
The schedule does not define a related party but Section 2A and 2B define persons deemed to be 
associates and persons deemed to control a company. According to Section 2A of the Income 
Tax Act (Chapter 23:06) a person is deemed to be an associate: 
“Where a person, other than an employee, acts in accordance with the directions, 
requests, suggestions or wishes of another person, whether or not the persons are in a 
business relationship and whether or not those directions, requests, suggestions or 
wishes are communicated to the first-mentioned person, both persons shall be treated 
as associates of each other for the purposes of this Act”. 
 
This section further defined an associate to refer to a near relative of the person, a partner, a 
trustee of a trust, a partnership in which the person is a partner and controls at least 50% of the 
rights to the partnership’s income or capital, and a company controlled by the person alone or 
with other associates. 
 
Section 2B states that: 
“a person is deemed to control the company if the person alone or together with 
associates or nominees controls the majority of the voting rights attaching to all 
classes of shares of the company, whether directly or indirectly or has direct or 
indirect influence which if exercised results in him or his associates or nominees 
factually controlling the company”. 
 
3.2.6 Thin Capitalization 
A thinly capitalized enterprise is one that has exclusively higher debt than equity. Zimbabwe still 
maintains its thin capitalization rule prescribed in Section 16 (1) (q) of the Income Tax Act. The 
section disallows the deduction of “any expenditure incurred by a local branch or subsidiary of a 
foreign company or by a local company or subsidiary of a local company, in servicing any debts 
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or debts contracted in connection with the production of income to the extent that such debt(s) 
cause the person to exceed a debt to equity ratio of 3:1” (Income Tax Act, chapter 23:06).  
 
The section restricts debt between associated enterprises to a maximum of 3:1. The excess debt is 
reclassified as equity and the interest component treated as a dividend and taxed as such. Even 
though the section has recently been amended to only apply to foreign associates, the 
enforcement of this section by ZIMRA has not been as aggressive as expected (PWC, 2015). The 
OECD discourages the application of fixed debt-to-equity ratios in dealing with intra-group loans 
arguing that it is manipulated by MNEs, and that the ratios are rigid and so are unfair if applied 
in all sectors (OECD, 2015). Having a formulary based approach (ratio 3:1) contradicts the arm’s 
length principle since financial assistance terms should also be determined by the arm’s length 
principle like all the other transactions (van der Zwan, 2017). Some countries like South Africa 
have repealed the thin capitalization rules in order to apply the open market principle in relation 
to the amount being borrowed and the rate charged (Dachs, 2014). Though this is commendable, 
practically the application of the arm’s length principle to thin capitalization may pose 
challenges (van der Zwan, 2017). 
 
The National Budget Statement (2018) highlighted that due to the prevailing liquidity challenges, 
an increasing number of company shareholders are resorting to raising capital to finance business 
operations through borrowing in place of equity financing.  It also indicated that companies are 
exceeding the Income Tax Act prescribed debt to equity ratio of 3:1 for companies that claim 
interest on loans as a tax deduction. Consequently, interest on the portion of the loan that results 
in the company exceeding the prescribed ratio is disallowed as a deduction against taxable 
income. This limits MNEs from avoiding tax through high interest deductions. 
 
ZELA (2016:22) argues that authorities have fears that transfer pricing is benefiting MNEs rather 
than host countries and that profits are being shifted by associated enterprises from subsidiaries 
in Zimbabwe to parent companies domiciled in tax havens.  
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3.2.7 Transfer Pricing Methods and Comparables 
Zimbabwe accepts the five methods contained in the OECD guidelines and allows any other 
method apart from the five to be used provided the five could not be reasonably applied (Finance 
Act, 2016). Though flexible, the use of unspecified methods, leaves room for numerous and 
assorted applications and methods (may include formulary apportionment) which may be 
difficult to reconcile. Zimbabwean legislation does not suggest any preferred methods. 
 
Taxpayers are not required to apply more than one method to determine an arm’s length price, 
and so the Commissioner is restricted to the method selected by the taxpayer as long as the 
taxpayer has acted within the confines of the law (Ernst & Young, 2016b). 
 
Zimbabwe has no local databases with readily available company information as the availability 
of information of public companies is limited to published financial statements. Private 
companies’ information is unavailable (PWC, 2015). However, the rules (35th Schedule of the 
Income Tax Act) state that:  
“In the absence of information on uncontrolled transactions from the same geographic 
market as the controlled transaction, comparable uncontrolled transactions from other 
geographic markets may be accepted by the Commissioner (Paragraph 7 sub-
paragraph (4). A determination of whether comparables from other geographic 
markets are reliable has to be made on a case-by-case basis and by reference to the 
extent to which they satisfy paragraph 4 of this Schedule (Paragraph 7 sub-paragraph 
(5)). Taxpayers using such comparables would be expected to assess the expected 
impact of geographic differences and other factors on the price and profitability” 
(Paragraph 7 sub-paragraph (6)). 
 
3.2.8 Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) 
An APA is an arrangement where the MNE can agree on an appropriate transfer pricing method 
in advance over a fixed period of time (Lohse and Riedel, 2013:8). Though Zimbabwe has 
entered into double tax treaties (DTTs) with 12 countries, it has no Advance Price Agreement 
program in place (PWC, 2015). The UN (2017) indicates that tax rulings are almost similar to 
APAs, but there is a subtle difference between them since a tax ruling can be applied on any tax 
issue, while APAs relate only to the application of transfer pricing rules. Both APAs and tax 
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rulings bring legal certainty by determining in advance a tax rate or tax base by considering a 
taxpayer’s unique situation (Oguttu, 2006b).  
 
3.2.9 Documentation Requirements 
The 35th schedule does not prescribe the documentation requirements in spite of Section 98 
referring taxpayers to the 35th schedule. This leaves the taxpayers with the burden of preparing 
something that they don’t know is acceptable or not. Preparing documentation would be 
advantageous to the taxpayer especially in cases of dispute. While the international guidelines 
prescribe the preparation of three tier documentation, the local file, master file and country by 
country reporting (CbC), ZIMRA hasn’t provided any specific documentation requirements nor 
documentation deadlines yet, therefore, the absence of a guide on how the documentation should 
be prepared is an ambiguity for both the taxpayer and the tax authority.  
 
According to the OECD (2017) contemporaneous documentation means that the documentation 
would be prepared at the time of the transaction, or in any event, no later than the time of 
completing and filing the tax return for the fiscal year in which the transaction takes place. 
ZELA (2016:17) says applying the transfer pricing rules to the mining sector proves to be a 
challenge for ZIMRA and there is a need to make an explicit clause that makes reference to the 
application of transfer pricing rules in all legal documents. 
 
The subjective nature of determining a transfer price (the taxpayer applying his commercial 
judgement) could lead to major tax adjustments (UN, 2013:412). To reduce the possible impact 
of this, the UN (2013:412) recommends that a tax authority prescribe the minimum 
documentation required as part of the burden of proof. The UN does, however, note that 
taxpayers could argue that it places a higher compliance cost burden on them.  
 
3.2.10 Audit procedures 
ZIMRA has not provided any specific audit procedures for auditing transfer pricing. Although it 
has conducted a few audits, no specific industry or sector has been the focus (PWC, 2015). 
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3.2.11 Penalties 
There are no penalties specific to transfer pricing, so the general corporate tax penalties of 100% 
for non-compliance apply (Ernst and Young, 2016a).  
 
3.2.12 Dispute Resolution 
According to Section 62 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the following are the steps to be 
taken for resolving disputes between the taxpayer and ZIMRA: 
1. Where a taxpayer is dissatisfied with decisions made or assessments raised by the 
Commissioner, an objection can be made by writing a letter to ZIMRA.  
2. The letter must state the grounds of objection and should be submitted within 30 days of 
the decision or assessment. 
3. The Commissioner will consider the objection and is required by law to respond within 
90 days.  
4. The response will be either to agree with the taxpayer or to disallow the grounds of 
objection. 
5. Where the objection is disallowed, the client can appeal to the Fiscal Appeals Court or 
High Court. 
 
The sections above have presented the transfer pricing legislative and administrative policies that 
exist within Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s harsh economy exposes MNEs to a unique tax 
environment, while the lack of comprehensive transfer pricing related legislation in Zimbabwe 
grants MNEs an opportunity to avoid tax. This is buttressed by Ching-Wen and Hsiao-Chen 
(2010) who state that a country’s tax environment is an important factor when selecting an 
investment location. In order to effectively assess the adequacy of Zimbabwean rules, a look at 
the transfer pricing strategies (used by MNEs) that it seeks to address, are considered next. 
 
3.3 Transfer Pricing Strategies used by MNEs in Zimbabwe 
The following paragraphs discuss three main transfer pricing strategies (tax havens, over/under-
pricing, manipulation of legislative loopholes) identified in literature and are buttressed by some 
cases deemed relevant to these strategies. 
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3.3.1 Tax Havens 
Tax havens are described as jurisdictions which do not only provide low tax rates, but also 
provide conducive environments for profit shifting through transfer pricing (Davies et al, 2014). 
ZELA (2016:21) raises concerns over the use of tax havens for tax avoidance purposes in 
Zimbabwe, citing some mining companies in Zimbabwe that are registered in tax havens such as 
the New Dawn Mine that is registered in the Cayman Islands and Zimplats that is registered in 
Guernsey. Cayman Islands and Guernsey are believed to be among the international list of tax 
havens (Jones, Temouri & Cobham, 2018).  ZELA (2016:21) indicates that tax havens facilitate 
tax avoidance by allowing income to flow out of the country secretly and untaxed. Davies et al 
(2014) found 90% of tax avoidance to transfer pricing of exports to tax havens. Klassen et al 
(2017) emphasize how tax havens play a major role in the transfer pricing strategies of MNEs. 
 
3.3.2 Over pricing/under pricing 
A Sunday News article by Chakanyuka (2015) disclosed high transfer mis-pricing in Zimbabwe 
especially in the platinum mining business which was widening the trade deficit. It also reported 
that Zimbabwe has lost approximately $239million through export under-invoicing in the mining 
sector. Musarurwa (2013) reported that according to AFDB and GFI, Zimbabwe has lost $12 
billion over the last three decades through over-pricing or mis-pricing of transactions. An article 
by Newsday (2017) reported that ZIMRA was losing sleep over transfer pricing. Econet (a MNE 
in Zimbabwe) was also implicated in a transfer pricing scandal through over-invoicing to its 
sister company in Mauritius to the amount of $300 million (Chitemba, 2017). What was 
intriguing in this article is that some ZIMRA top officials were also implicated in the scandal.  
 
3.3.3 Manipulating legislative loopholes 
The researcher also reviewed a court case and Zimbabwe’s fiscal appeal court took a lengthy 
time to conclude on the only transfer pricing case before it. This case was submitted to the courts 
in 2014 and only finalised four years later, that is, in February 2018. This was the case of CF 
(Pvt) Ltd vs ZIMRA FA 22/2014. The appellant (CF) objected to the decision by ZIMRA of a 
tax adjustment by invoking Section 24 of the ITA and applying functional analysis. The 
appellant argued that ZIMRA had no right to do that as Zimbabwe had no specific transfer 
pricing provisions in its legislation until January 2016 (the transactions in question took place 
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before then), and that functional analysis was an international practice. The appellant called in 
evidence of two witnesses, the independent tax consultant and chief investigations officer. The 
engagement of the tax consultant as a witness ratifies the role played by tax professionals in the 
compliance decisions of taxpayers as alluded to by Sikka and Willmott (2010:7). Though the 
court decision was not in favour of the appellant, the argument raised by CF (Pvt) Ltd 
emphasises the need for effective legislative frameworks, failure of which generates conflicts 
and consumes resources that could be channelled towards productive sectors than spent in 
litigation processes. Cazacu (2017:22) also castigates uncoordinated tax administration systems 
arguing that they exacerbate revenue losses. 
 
ZIMRA took the position that the two parties involved were associated enterprises, and the 
Commissioner was dissatisfied by their transactions which were deemed not to be at arm’s 
length. The case ended with ZIMRA declaring that it had no obligation to prove that its opinion 
was correct, but rather the onus lied with the taxpayer (appellant) to show that the 
Commissioner’s opinion was incorrect. 
 
The case above shows that tax avoidance through transfer pricing is a possibility in Zimbabwe, 
and that it is highly likely that much of it goes undetected as Sikka and Haslam (2007:10) stress 
that developing countries are poorly equipped to detect transfer pricing abuse. The contents of 
the case and the arguments presented by the appellant also show the importance of a strong 
legislative framework which can help to minimise potential disputes, and that a functional fiscal 
court would also provide taxpayers with confidence in the tax and legal system. 
 
The finality of the case enlightens the taxpayers to the realities of preparing and maintaining 
proper transfer pricing documentation to prevent avoidable disputes. An APA arrangement in 
this case would have also helped to prevent such a dispute from having to go as far as the courts. 
Such arrangements could save both ZIMRA and the taxpayers from avoidable costs of litigation 
and court procedures. The other weakness is that while the court takes at least four years to 
conclude on a matter, the Zimbabwean legislation (Section 36 of the ITA) requires that the 
taxpayer pays the additional tax prior to the passing of the court judgement. 
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3.4 Summary 
The background to Zimbabwe’s tax laws relevant to transfer pricing were reviewed in this 
chapter. An overview of the transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs in Zimbabwe were also 
discussed to provide context to the study before the Zimbabwean transfer pricing rules are 
considered in relation to the international transfer pricing guidelines that will be presented in the 
next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES 
 
“The government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases: If it 
moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it, and if it stops moving, subsidise it” - Ronald 
Reagan 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented Zimbabwe’s existing transfer pricing rules in order to compare 
them against the international transfer pricing guidelines that are discussed in this chapter. The 
intention of this chapter is to provide a review of the transfer pricing phenomenon as depicted in 
the literature particularly the prescriptions of international transfer pricing guidelines. The 
chapter focuses on the OECD and the UN that have taken a leading role in developing the 
guiding principles, and non-binding mechanisms for transfer pricing at an international level. 
Evaluating the OECD and UN guidelines addresses objective 1 which focuses on the transfer 
pricing methods in a bid to recommend what would be appropriate for Zimbabwe. The OECD’s 
Arm’s Length principle as well as how to achieve the arm’s length price using the five methods 
as prescribed by the OECD are discussed in Section 4.2.1, while the specific transfer pricing 
methods are discussed in Section 4.3. This chapter also evaluates the United Nations transfer 
pricing guidelines in Section 4.4. A comparative analysis of the two sets of transfer pricing 
guideline is conducted to inform policy in Section 4.5.  
 
4.2 The OECD Principles 
The OECD’s work on transfer pricing was first published in 1963, updated in 1979 and another 
model was issued in 1992. In 1995 transfer pricing guidelines were approved, and were 
progressively updated and major changes were done in 2010 (Lehner, No date). Reviews of these 
guidelines have been done since 2012 and were supplemented by other reports such as the BEPS 
report of 2016. The latest revision of these guidelines was done in 2017 (OECD, 2017). It is 
apparent that transfer pricing continues to be a global issue and the measures and guidelines 
intended to mitigate tax avoidance through transfer pricing are continuously being revised and 
progressively changing. 
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The OECD’s ALP has been accepted worldwide (by both OECD and non-OECD countries) (UN, 
2013:14). Despite this wide adoption, it has been critiqued by Martin Hearson, the tax analyst of 
Action Aid (International tax review, 2011). He argues that the OECD transfer pricing rules are 
too complicated to ever serve the best interests of Africa and that these countries need more 
flexibility and guidance in order to apply the rules. Furthermore, some castigate the OECD 
principles as unworkable for developing countries (Durst, 2015b). The UN has also developed 
transfer pricing guidelines for developing economies (UN, 2017), but they are also primarily 
based on the OECD guidelines which follow the arm’s length principle. The following section 
focuses on the Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) to examine the extent to which it is applicable in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
4.2.1 The Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) 
When independent enterprises transact with each other, usually the conditions for the sale, 
including the price, are determined by the market forces (demand and supply). When associated 
enterprises transact the conditions and price of the transaction may not be a reflection of the 
market forces, thereby distorting the equilibrium and probably resulting in unfair competitive 
advantage against other stakeholders such as domestic enterprises. As such a technique called the 
Arm’s Length Principle has been adopted to address transfer pricing disputes and protect 
national tax bases (Keuschnigg and Devereux, 2012). It is used to reflect a price that would have 
been set between independent enterprises in an uncontrolled transaction (World Bank, 2013). 
The OECD (2010a:32) stresses that transactions between associated enterprises may not always 
deviate from the market forces, as some of these enterprises have some degree of autonomy 
which allows them to negotiate with each other as if they were independent enterprises. 
However, evidence has shown that most of these MNE transactions are priced mainly for tax 
reasons thereby granting a tax advantage to the group (Fuest et al, 2013).  
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model provides that: 
“Where conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, 
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have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so 
accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” 
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model clearly advocates for the adjustment of profits of associated 
enterprises to reflect profits that would have accrued if the transaction was between independent 
enterprises for tax purposes. The adjustment is on the assumption that the MNEs are separate 
enterprises rather than inseparable parts of a unified corporate (OECD, 2010a:33).  
OECD countries and other non-OECD countries with transfer pricing rules have unanimously 
adopted the Arm’s Length Principle arguing that it promotes international trade and foreign 
investment as it seeks to eradicate the competitive disadvantages that non-arm’s length prices 
would pose and therefore leaving both associated and independent enterprises at a more equal 
standing (OECD, 2010a:34; Adams & Drtina, 2010; Li, 2006). According to Adams and Drtina 
(2010), the ALP creates a benchmark that firms can usually fulfil by adopting the market price as 
their price. The ALP has also proved to be useful in many cases and was first adopted by the 
United States in the early 1920s and transfer pricing guidelines were issued in 1968 (Hammer, 
1996). Nonetheless, with all these advantages, ALP still has its own flaws which are explained 
next. In the next section the study looks at the criticisms of the OECD and its Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan. 
 
4.2.2 Criticism of the OECD, the ALP and the BEPS Action Plan 
Although the ALP is defended by the OECD, the OECD admits that the ALP may be difficult to 
apply since associated enterprises may engage in transactions that do not exist between 
independent enterprises, making it difficult for both tax authorities and taxpayers to obtain data 
(OECD, 2010a:35). Durst (2015b:18) also criticises the “arm’s length” transfer pricing approach 
which requires that transfer pricing transactions reflect “comparable” prices. Durst (2015b:18) 
argues that it is not feasible for multinationals to operate businesses that are not integrated.  For 
example, where manufacturers and distributors are separately owned, such business could not 
compete with an integrated multinational. So the “comparable” prices simply do not exist 
because all the players in the market are integrated and there is no trade between independent 
enterprises. The World Bank (2013:17) also stressed that the ALP’s heavy dependence on 
comparable data is disadvantageous and can increase the tax authority’s administrative burden 
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and compliance burden for the taxpayer. Bhat (2009:14) further notes that if comparable 
uncontrolled prices really existed, no MNE would choose transfer pricing manipulation.  
 
Conversely, Oguttu (2006b:468) argues that the ALP yields good results and rejecting it would 
destabilise international consensus and promote double taxation. Oguttu (2016:9) criticises the 
OECD for failing to acknowledge that their member countries had dealings with tax havens (see 
section 3.3.1 for more details on tax havens) and that the OECD was benefiting from such 
transactions. She further criticises the OECD for promoting the interests of the developed 
countries and not developing countries as the developing countries were never consulted in the 
development of the 15-point BEPS Action Plan. She blames the BEPS Action plan for failing to 
address the specific needs of developing countries and magnifying global inequality. Baker 
(2013) describes BEPS as an agenda launched by the OECD in favour of the OECD member 
states. 
 
Oguttu (2016) criticised the OECD for failing to address the elementary deep-seated 
international tax reforms that are critical in addressing BEPS such as disparities in residence and 
source based tax systems. Oguttu (2016:20) chastises the OECD for giving nations unrealistic 
deadlines (two-year period) to achieve the BEPS 15-point Action plan without considering the 
legislative, economic and administrative challenges faced by developing countries. 
 
From the literature, it appears that the arm’s length principle championed by the OECD is the 
gold standard of the moment. However, certain commentators argue that it is flawed by the 
treatment of MNEs’ interrelated transactions as if they are unrelated. Further, they state that the 
OECD’s BEPS Action Plan fails to capture the specific needs of developing tax jurisdictions – 
such as Zimbabwe.  
 
The following is an examination of the five transfer pricing methods delineated by the OECD. 
4.3 Transfer Pricing Methods 
There are two broad categories of determining the ALP, namely the traditional transaction 
methods category and the transactional profit methods category (OECD, 2010a:59). The 
traditional transaction methods are more traditional and the transfer price is calculated and 
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analysed for each transaction separately. Even though they are more objective, they are limited 
by the complexities of business transactions or unavailability of the required information for an 
objective comparison (OECD, 2017:98). The OECD lists five transfer pricing methods for 
computing the arm’s length based prices. These are Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP), 
Resale Price Method (RPM), Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), Profit Split Method 
(PSM) and Cost Plus Method (CPM). These methods each have their own limitations depending 
on the nature of the transactions and circumstances surrounding them. As a result, transactional 
profit methods were created, but they call for a detailed functional analysis (Loncar, Zrinka and 
Mves, 2011). The OECD previously favoured the traditional transactional methods (CUP, RPM, 
and CPM) and treats the transactional profit methods (TNMM, PSM) as the last resort (OECD, 
1995; Silberztein, 2009). However, Silberztein (2009) argues that “No method is perfect, and the 
inherent risks for disputes are not hard to spot”.  
 
The two categories are explained in more detail in the following section. 
 
4.3.1 Traditional Transaction Methods 
Developing countries have argued that these traditional methods are more supportive of 
developed countries (Oguttu, 2016). The traditional transaction methods that rely most on 
comparable data include the CUP, RPM and the CPM (OECD, 2017:101). Each of these 
methods shall be discussed below. 
 
4.3.1.1 Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) Method 
The CUP method compares prices of goods or services rendered in controlled transactions 
(between associated enterprises) with the prices of goods or services of a similar nature in 
uncontrolled transactions (OECD, 2010a:63). However, to ascertain the price of similar products 
under the same circumstances in an uncontrolled transaction the comparison maybe a challenge 
(OECD, 2010a:63; PWC, 2009:25). The CUP method is suitable where an independent 
enterprise sells the same product under similar conditions as between two associated enterprises 
(OECD, 2010a:64). Furthermore, if differences exist between the controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions, it has to be determined whether the differences have a material effect on the price 
and if so reasonably accurate adjustments have to be made to eliminate that effect. However, the 
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OECD (2010a) argued that an adjustment may influence reliability of this method making its 
applicability and the results questionable, but these difficulties must not disqualify the 
application of the method. Oguttu (2006b:464) added that finding such similar transactions with 
no material differences between independent enterprises is not possible in normal business 
transactions, as there are bound to be variations for instance in quantity. 
 
The UN (2013:197) separates comparables into internal and external comparables. Internal 
comparables are transactions between the tested associated party and an 
uncontrolled/independent party. External comparables are transactions between two enterprises 
neither of which is an associate enterprise. The UN model states that differences, for example, in 
delivery and insurance costs as well as geographical factors such as, differences in inflation, also 
have to be adjusted for. However, it may be impossible to make reasonable accurate adjustments 
for unique intangible assets (e.g. trademarks) and where there are fundamental differences in the 
products using the CUP method (UN, 2013:200). 
 
According to the UN (2013:201) the CUP method is a two-sided analysis as the price reflects the 
price agreed between two unrelated enterprises. It does not specify who of the related enterprises 
involved in the controlled transaction must be treated as the tested party. The CUP method is less 
susceptible to differences in non-transfer pricing factors. The UN further highlights that the main 
weakness of CUP is in the difficulty of finding comparable uncontrolled transactions. This has 
also been echoed by PWC (2011) which observed that this is a big challenge especially for 
developing economies. In cases where the CUP may not be applicable, the resale price method 
may be used.  
 
4.3.1.2 Resale Price Method (RPM) 
The resale price is the price at which a product that has been purchased from an associated 
enterprise is resold to an independent enterprise (OECD, 2010a:65). The Resale Price Method 
(RPM) compares the captive distributor’s gross margin on the product sourced from associated 
enterprises with the gross margin that the same reseller earns on items sourced in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction (internal comparable) (OECD, 2010a:65; King, 2009; PWC, 2009:26).  
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It is most useful for buy and sell operations (OECD, 2010a:65; Silberztein, 2009).  The RPM 
also depends on comparability of functions performed just like the CUP method. However, 
compared to the CUP method, fewer adjustments are normally needed to account for product 
differences as the differences are less likely to be material on the profit margin than price 
(OECD, 2010a:66). According to the OECD (2010a:68), a RPM is more accurate where it is 
realised within a short time of the reseller’s purchase of the goods. Tax authorities are 
encouraged to look beyond the resale price in cases where there is a chain distribution through an 
intermediate company, as well as consider whether the reseller has exclusive rights to resell the 
goods (OECD, 2010a:69).  
 
According to the UN (2013:205), the transfer price for the sale of products between the 
associated enterprises can be described by the formula: 
TP = RSP x (1 – GPM) 
Where: 
TP = the Transfer Price of a product sold between a sales company and a related company. 
RSP = the Resale Price at which the product is sold by a sales company to unrelated customers. 
GPM = the Gross Profit Margin that a specific sales company must earn. 
 
Accounting consistency (for example inventory valuation method) is critical in applying the 
RPM method. The UN (2017) further states that there are two ways of determining the gross 
profit margin namely; the transactional and functional comparisons. The UN (2017) also noted 
that the transactional comparisons are more likely to achieve broad product and accounting 
consistency than the functional comparisons, though the RPM method is more typically applied 
on a functional than a transactional basis. 
 
The RPM is based on the market price, and in cases where demand is inelastic, the RPM method 
may be more reliable. The RPM method is most suitable for the manufacturing industry, where 
the CUP method is unreliable. However, the reliability of RPM method can be affected by 
factors such as composition of “cost of goods sold”. Finding comparable data on gross margins 
may be difficult because of accounting inconsistencies (UN, 2013:211). Oguttu (2006b:464) 
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emphasizes that it may be difficult to compare the cost structures and functions between 
enterprises as these usually differ from firm to firm.  
 
Loncar et al (2011) notes that the RPM method is one sided, in that only the distributor’s gross 
profit margin is controlled whereas the manufacturer’s is not adjusted nor analysed. According to 
Eden (2009:606) the implementation of RPM method tends to overestimate the transfer price 
assigning the total unallocated profits to the manufacturer. Cools, Emmanuel and Jorissen (2008) 
added that one-sided methods are not always the most appropriate to use in transfer pricing 
analysis. The following is a discussion on the Cost Plus Method. 
 
4.3.1.3 Cost Plus Method (CPM) 
The Cost Plus Method (CPM) starts from the costs incurred by the supplier in a controlled 
transaction. Thereafter an appropriate mark-up is then added to these costs (OECD, 2010a:71; 
Silberztein, 2009; Oguttu, 2006b:464). It compares the gross profit mark-up earned by the tested 
party for manufacturing the product or providing the service to the gross profit mark-ups earned 
by comparable companies (UN, 2013:216) and is most useful in the manufacturing and service 
industries. It is almost similar to the RPM method concept, but the comparisons are on gross 
profit mark-ups rather than gross profit margins.  
 
Contrary to the RPM method, CPM presents the risk to underestimate the transfer price and all 
unallocated profits are given to the buyer (Eden 2009:607). Valid comparison is only possible 
when the cost definitions are identical and this poses a challenge as there may be no clear link 
between the costs incurred and the market price (OECD, 2010a:72). According to Loncar et al 
(2011) both the cost plus and RPM methods operate under the presumption that there is a 
competitive market ensuring an equal level of similar enterprises’ gross profit. 
 
With the CPM, the tested party is the related party manufacturer/service provider and focus is on 
the gross profit mark-up in costs incurred by the supplier of property/service. With this method, 
the historical cost basis is normally used to determine the costs and one can use either budgeted 
or actual cost, though the method is based on actual cost (UN, 2013:222-223).   
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The UN provides three classes of costs namely; direct, indirect and operating expenses. CPM is a 
profit margin and a net margin analysis would take operating expenses into consideration. In 
such instances, suitable adjustments need to be made (UN, 2013:218). CPM is based on internal 
costs for which information is readily available. However, since the method is based on actual 
cost, there may be no incentive for the controlled manufacturer to control costs (UN, 2013:223). 
 
Furthermore, of all the above mentioned methods, if the differences between the controlled and 
the uncontrolled transactions to be compared are material, reasonable adjustments must be made 
(OECD, 2010a). Apparently, transactional methods are affected mainly by cost structures and 
functions performed, hence the OECD came up with transactional profit methods that are less 
affected by these factors and these are the TNMM and the TPSM. 
 
4.3.2 Transactional Profit Methods (TPM) 
The TPM examine the profits that arise from particular controlled transactions (OECD, 
2010a:77). According to the OECD there is the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) and 
the Transactional Profit Split Method (TPSM). Unlike traditional transaction methods, the 
analysis of which is based on particular comparable uncontrolled transaction involving similar 
products, here the analysis is based on the net return [Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, 
(EBIT)].  These methods can also be applied in situations involving valuable intangible assets. 
They are very useful especially where traditional transactions methods have proved to be 
unreliable (for instance when comparables are not available) (Cools et al, 2008). 
 
4.3.2.1 Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) 
The Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) examines the net profit relative to an 
appropriate base (such as costs, sales and assets) that a taxpayer realises from a controlled 
transaction (OECD, 2010a:77). Unlike traditional transaction methods, TNMM is based on the 
net profit (Loncar et al, 2011) and is less affected by transactional differences than is the case 
with price as used in the CUP method (OECD, 2010a:78). In cases where one of the parties is 
complex, TNMM is advantageous in that it focuses on the tested party, and thus does not require 
the books and records of all parties (OECD, 2010a:79). 
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According to OECD (2010b) TNMM can be applied by weighting the net profit to, but not 
limited to, sales, costs or assets, number of employees and distance. It is commonly used by 
taxpayers and is easier to find comparables with this method (UN, 2013:226). TNMM is also 
used by tax authorities to identify companies for audit by analysing their net profit margins, and 
it is also used to confirm the results of traditional transaction methods (UN, 2013:249). With 
TNMM less complex functional analysis is necessary, and its results are similar to the results of 
a modified RPM or CPM (UN, 2013:245). 
 
Factors such as threat of new entrants, substitutes and management efficiency may influence the 
net profit indicator, thus making accuracy and reliability of determination of the arm’s length net 
profit indicators difficult (OECD, 2010a:82). For comparability purposes, measurement 
consistency is very important and differences in treatment for expenses like depreciation and 
provisions need to be adjusted (OECD, 2010a:83). Except in exceptional cases, non-operating 
expenses such as income taxes must be excluded from calculating the net profit indicator. In 
addition, it is one-sided in nature (OECD, 2010a:80).  
 
According to Durst (2015b:16) this method is less reliable than the first three of the four methods 
above because of its use of net margins which are sensitive to the cost structures of companies. 
The other alternative TPM that can be used is the TPSM. 
 
4.3.2.2 Transactional Profit Split Method (TPSM) 
The TPSM seeks to eliminate the effect on profits of special conditions in a controlled 
transaction. TPSM is a two-sided approach (OECD, 2010a:94) which splits the combined profits 
between associated enterprises on an economically valid basis to reflect profits that would have 
been made in an arm’s length transaction (OECD, 2010a:93). Loncar et al (2011) added that the 
TPSM is not one sided as the evaluation is done bilaterally and therefore there is no danger of 
underestimation.  
 
Though it involves the splitting of profits, it is not limited to the contribution analysis approach 
and the residual profit split approach (OECD, 2010a:96). Under the contribution analysis 
method, the combined operating profit before interest is divided between the companies on the 
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basis of their relative contribution to the combined gross profit. While under the residual profit 
split method, each of the companies is assigned a portion of the profit according to the basic 
function it performs. The residual analysis is normally applied to cases where both sides of the 
controlled transaction contribute valuable intangible property to the transaction (UN, 2013:251). 
In practice the residual profit split method is used more than the contribution analysis method 
(UN, 2013:253). 
 
The residual profit or loss is then allocated between the companies on the basis of their economic 
contribution in relation to the amount to be allocated (OECD, 2010a:97). In addition, accounting 
standards must be selected in advance of applying the method in order to achieve a common 
accounting basis. 
 
TPSM is more useful where the one-sided methods are inappropriate, and offers flexibility 
considering the unique features of the associated enterprises (OECD, 2010b; UN 2013:254). 
Access to information from foreign affiliates maybe a challenge for tax authorities and MNEs, 
making the applicability of TPSM difficult. Furthermore, it may also be difficult to calculate 
combined revenue and identify the appropriate operating expenses for a certain transaction when 
determining the operating profit (OECD, 2010a:95; UN, 2013:253).  
 
However, Durst (2015b) argues that the “comparable” prices do not exist because all the players 
in the market are integrated and there is no trade between independent enterprises. Silberztein 
(2009) argues that there is no perfect method and the inherent risks for disputes are evident. In 
addition, economists (such as King, 2009) have fervently criticised the above methods, arguing 
that they are not based on sound economic principles. The future of the arm’s length principle 
remains a mystery with mounting opposition from various sectors and Tax Justice Network 
(TJN) (2017) having predicted its end with a report entitled “Beginning of the end for the ALP”.  
 
The following table provides a closer look at the five transfer pricing arm’s length methods. It is 
important to consider the methods that have been largely accepted and have dominated the globe 
(Heggmair, Boehlke and Ali-Nakyea, 2013:2). These methods are presented in Table 2 below.
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Table 2: Summary of Transfer Pricing Methods 
Method Description Where it is used Advantages Criticisms 
CUP Compares intra-group prices 
to comparable uncontrolled 
transactions (OECD, 2010b). 
Suitable where an independent 
enterprise sells the same product 
under similar conditions as 
between two associated 
enterprises (OECD, 2010a:64). 
Direct and reliable (OECD, 
2010b). 
Impossible where there is a lack of 
comparable data (PWC, 2011). 
Comparables are a challenge especially 
in developing countries. 
RPM Compares intra-group gross 
margin to resale margin in 
comparable uncontrolled 
transactions (OECD, 2010b). 
Most suitable for the distributors 
and resellers or manufacturing 
industry (OECD, 2010a). 
Fewer adjustments are normally 
needed to account for product 
differences as the differences are 
less likely to be material on 
profit margin than on price 
(OECD, 2010a:66). 
It is a one-sided method. Cools et al 
(2008) argues that these are not always 
the most appropriate methods to use in 
transfer pricing analysis. 
CPM Compares mark-up costs of 
the controlled party to the 
mark-up earned on 
comparable uncontrolled 
transactions (UN, 2013:216). 
Is most useful in the 
manufacturing and service 
industries (UN, 2013:216). 
Simple and easy to apply.  
It is based on internal costs and 
information is readily available 
(UN, 2013).  
The method is based on actual cost. 
There may be no incentive for the 
controlled manufacturer to control costs 
(UN, 2013:223). 
 TNMM Examines the net profit 
relative to an appropriate 
base (such as costs, sales and 
assets) that a taxpayer 
realises from a controlled 
transaction (OECD, 
2010a:77). 
Commonly applied in transactions 
that involve provision of services 
between associated enterprises 
(OECD, 2010a).  
Most used method by taxpayers 
and is easier to find comparables 
with this method. TNMM is also 
used by tax authorities to 
identify companies for audit by 
analysing their net profit 
margins (UN, 2013:226). 
Is a one-sided method and is less 
reliable than the first 3 methods above 
because of its use of net margins which 
are sensitive to the cost structures of 
companies [(SARS, Practice Note 7 
(1999)]. 
 TPSM Splits the profits between 
associated companies to 
match arm’s length price. 
More useful where the one-sided 
methods are inappropriate 
(OECD, 2010b). 
No danger of underestimation as 
TPSM is a two-sided method 
(Loncar et al, 2011), 
Offers flexibility considering the 
unique features of the associated 
enterprises (OECD, 2010b). 
Access to information from foreign 
affiliates maybe a challenge for tax 
authorities, making the applicability of 
TPSM difficult (OECD, 2010b). 
Source: Own Compilation 
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The next section provides an examination of the United Nations transfer pricing guidelines in a 
bid to establish whether they are appropriate for Zimbabwe. 
 
4.4 The United Nations Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
The United Nations (UN) guidelines, launched in 2013, guide nations on how to set up transfer 
pricing policies from scratch (UN, 2013). This is mainly presented in the capacity building 
chapter (Chapter 4) of the guidelines. These guidelines also review the transfer pricing systems 
in the BRICS countries. Even though the UN transfer pricing guidelines are specifically for the 
developing countries, the guidelines retain most of the OECD fundamental principles. The 
question is - Are there any significant differences between the two sets of guidelines? If so, why 
have most developing countries adopted the OECD guidelines? Though efforts by the UN are 
vital, their adequacy still remains a mystery. Like any other model the ALP has its own flaws, 
and whether the UN has to reinvent the wheel or not is also a question for debate. Baker and 
Mckenzie (2006) report that developing countries refute the importation of OECD guidelines 
into the UN, arguing that the OECD is a reflection of interests that serve the developed world.  
 
The next section explores the fundamental differences between the OECD and the UN 
guidelines. 
 
4.5 Comparison of OECD guidelines and UN guidelines on Transfer Pricing 
A detailed account of the differences between the two will provide insight into the applicability 
of the guidelines to Zimbabwe. The document review has revealed that the type of tax systems, 
and the nature of the user economies are the main differences between the OECD and the UN 
guidelines. The similarities between the OECD and the UN are discussed in this section as well. 
 
4.5.1 Differences between OECD and UN guidelines 
4.5.1.1 Tax system (Source/Resident based) 
The Zimbabwean tax system is source based (Tapera & Majachani, 2017). The OECD guidelines 
represent the interests of the resident country whereas the UN guidelines give more attention to 
source jurisdiction. A source jurisdiction taxes all income earned within its borders. For instance, 
a South African citizen temporarily residing in Zimbabwe and who sells a house in Zimbabwe 
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will pay taxes to the Zimbabwean Government on this sale. A resident based jurisdiction will tax 
all domestic and foreign income earned by a “resident”. A country cannot take a unilateral 
approach to the OECD’s BEPS action points without considering the global environment and 
other countries’ responses to the concerns. So OECD member states need to reach consensus on 
measures to address BEPS and clear guidance needs to be provided before policies can be 
considered. Therefore, a country’ alignment to OECD guidelines is an important factor for 
consideration 
 
4.5.1.2 Beneficiaries (Developed/Developing Countries) 
The OECD guidelines are mainly for developed countries while the UN model convention is 
more devoted to developing countries’ needs (Oguttu, 2016:25). Databases relied on in transfer 
pricing analyses tend to focus on developed country data that may not be relevant to developing 
country markets (at least without resource and information‐intensive adjustments), and in any 
event are usually very costly to access. UN guidelines aim to reduce the group transactions that 
negatively affect domestic revenues thereby affecting foreign direct investment and national 
development. The use of OECD guidelines is a consensus among the 36 OECD countries while 
only 43 out of the 193 UN countries (22%) have adopted the UN transfer pricing guidelines (UN, 
2017). Though there is consistency between the OECD and the UN the guidelines are not 
identical, and as such the following differences are visible. 
  
4.5.1.3 Transfer Pricing Methods 
The UN borrows the OECD’s five transfer pricing methods; however, it adds an additional 
method termed “Commodity Rule” method (UN, 2017). The commodity rule method uses the 
quoted prices of the commodity market to price the transactions between associated enterprises 
(UN, 2017). The method is used in Latin American countries, but the UN manual neither 
approves nor disapproves the commodity rule method. Grondona (2018) explains that the 
commodity rule method provides clarity and objectivity in the determination of the price, 
however, it is limited by challenges such as finding a suitable benchmark and variations in the 
date of the quote to be applied (for example shipping date or delivery date). It is important to 
note that, to minimize disputes, both the OECD and the UN encourage tax authorities to 
administer Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs). 
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4.5.2 Similarities between the OECD and UN Guidelines 
The similarities between the two guidelines include following the arm’s length principle and 
adopting the same methods. The similarities are mainly in the application of the guidelines 
including the treatment of intangibles and treaties. Lack of comparable data and preparation of 
transfer pricing documentation are also common in the application of the two, and are discussed 
next. 
 
4.5.2.1 Requirements for Documentation 
Both the OECD and the UN require taxpayers to prepare a three-tier documentation from MNEs 
which include the master file, local file and the Country-by-Country (CbC) report (OECD, 2017: 
Chapter V); UN (2017: Chapter 7). The master file provides an overview of the MNE group 
business lines, including a list of important agreements, controlled transactions and intangibles. 
The local file provides information on the specific intercompany transactions as well as the 
justification for the choice of transfer pricing method. The CbC report provides jurisdiction-wide 
information on the allocation of income, taxes paid and core business activities of each 
constituent entity. This documentation is widely used by tax authorities to assess transfer pricing 
risk and check for compliance (OECD, 2017:230) 
 
4.5.2.2 Lack of Comparable Data 
Both the OECD and the UN encourage the use of domestic databases by national tax authorities. 
However, developing countries have particular difficulty in obtaining reliable comparable data 
for the purposes of determining transfer prices and since Zimbabwe is still developing, measures 
to regulate MNEs transactions in a developing country set-up is crucial. Thus, it is often 
extremely difficult, in practice, especially in some developing countries, to obtain adequate 
information to apply the arm’s length principle for the following reasons: 
 
 In developing countries there tend to be fewer organized players in any given sector than 
in developed countries. As a consequence, finding proper comparable data can be very 
difficult; 
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 In developing countries, the comparable information may be incomplete and in a form 
which is difficult to analyze because the resources and processes are not available. In the 
worst case scenario, information about an independent enterprise may simply not exist.  
 In many developing countries, whose economies have just opened up or are in the 
process of opening up, there are many “first movers” who have come into existence in 
many of the sectors and areas hitherto unexploited or unexplored; in such cases there 
would be an inevitable lack of comparables.” 
 
The above discussion explains the diverse transfer pricing methods that are available, and when 
they are most appropriate. The findings show that the traditional transaction methods are easier 
to apply than transactional profit methods, but are limited by availability of comparable data. 
Further, the OECD and the UN are largely consistent, but not identical, and the UN guidelines 
focus on adressing developing countries’ administrative needs. The challenges faced by 
developing countries in applying these guidelines are more or less the same. Next is a summary 
of the international transfer pricing guidelines to enable a comparison with the Zimbabwean 
transfer pricing rules.  
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Table 3: Summary of International Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ITEM 
 
International Guidelines 
OECD UN  
Documentation Chapter V of the OECD guidlines 
prescribes a three-tier structure consisting of 
(i) a master file containing standardised information relevant for all MNE 
group members;  
(ii) a local file referring specifically to material transactions 
of the local taxpayer; and  
(iii) a Country-by-Country (CbC) report containing certain information 
relating to the global allocation of the MNE’s income and taxes paid. 
The guidelines require that the transfer pricing analysis be based on full 
functional analysis and a full comparability analysis 
However, the OECD/G20 Final Documentation Report, Annex IV 
recommends only MNEs with at least income of €750mil to be required 
to file the CbC report. 
This code was in line with BEPS’ Action 13 which is centred on re-
examining transfer pricing documentation (Ernst and Young, 2015). 
The UN follows the OECD documentation requirements but 
recommends that guidance on the content of the local file 
should include specific materiality thresholds that consider 
the size and nature of the MNE. It suggests that the 
materiality levels be customised to the local legislation as a 
fixed amount or revenue/cost thresholds (B1.8.10). It also 
encourages SMEs to be exempted from maintaining 
documentation or giving them thresholds based on volume 
of transactions (C2.4.4). 
Deadlines The OECD leaves the prescription of these to domestic law.  The UN also leaves this decision to the domestic law. 
(Advanced Pricing 
Agreements (APAs)  
The OECD encourages APAs under the Mutual Agreement Procedure 
(MAP APA). The main objective of the MAP APA process is to 
eliminate potential double taxation. The OECD acknowledges that 
unilateral APAs have several concerns resulting in countries preferring 
bilateral or multilateral APAs 
 
The UN also supports both bilateral and multilateral APAs, 
however, it indicates that they are resource intensive 
(C.4.4.2.2). 
Penalties The OECD states that for tax authorities to encourage compliance, they 
should establish transfer pricing penalty regimes that reward timely and 
accurate preparation of transfer pricing documentation.  
 
The OECD encourages document specific penalties as they ensure 
efficiency in transfer pricing documentation requirements and hamper 
non-compliance (D7 para 5.40).  
The UN indicates penalties can either be for failure to pay 
tax or failure to comply with documentation requirements 
(C.2.4.3). 
Dispute resolution BEPS Action 14 encourages countries to make dispute resolution 
mechanisms effective (Ernst and Young, 2015). 
The UN advocates for an independent judicial system that 
gives impartial attention to (tax) cases and that can boost 
investor confidence. 
 
Databases/ 
Comparable data 
Paragraph A4.3 supports the use of non-domestic databases only if 
internal ones are unavailable, but discourages application by tax 
authorities of transfer pricing methods based on information undisclosed 
to taxpayers.   
 
The UN also encourages the use of internal databases first 
before consulting external databases (C5.6.4). 
Domestic TP The OECD does not cover transfer pricing of domestic transactions. The UN is also silent on transfer pricing relating to domestic 
transactions. 
 
TP methods Prescribes 5 TP methods that are classified into two broad categories - 
traditional and profit methods. 
 
Borrows 5 TP methods from the OECD. 
72 
 
Set out below is Table 4 which summarises the extent to which Zimbabwe complies with the 
international transfer pricing guidelines in a bid to assess the Zimbabwean rules. 
4.6 The extent to which Zimbabwe has complied with international guidelines 
Although Zimbabwe has made strides to enhance its transfer pricing rules, their effectiveness 
is marred by the following issues stated in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Zimbabwe’s Compliance with International Guidelines 
ITEM Zimbabwe Rules 
Documentation While the OECD nad the UN outline the documentation requirements, Section 98 
requires that taxpayers maintain transfer pricing documentation which is prescribed 
in the 35th schedule, however, the schedule does not prescribe any requirements. The 
country has, to date, not legislated CbC reports. 
Deadlines It is not clear whether the documentation should be contemporaneous or filed with 
the tax returns. 
APAs While the international guidelines encourage APAs, the Act has no provisions for 
APAs, but rather advance tax rulings. 
Penalties The international guidelines recommend that penalties be specified. Penalties 
specific to non-compliance of transfer pricing rules are not defined in Zimbabwe. 
Dispute resolution Normal dispute resolution procedures seem to apply for all tax disputes, including 
those relating to transfer pricing. 
Databases/ Comparable data The Act acknowledges that the internal databases maybe unavailable and so other 
sources are permissible. Reliability thereof is considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Domestic transfer pricing The rules apply to domestic transactions yet the international guidelines do not cover 
them  
Transfer pricing methods Zimbabwe complies with the OECD transfer pricing methods as the 35
th schedule 
prescribes the OECD’s five methods. 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
The above table compares the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe against the transfer pricing 
provisions as per the international guidelines. Although Zimbabwe has aligned its rules with 
the OECD guidelines, disparities – such as transfer pricing legislation incorporating 
transactions at a domestic level in Zimbabwe – exist. Furthermore, the OECD explicitly 
prescribes the documentation requirements while Zimbabwe is not explicit on that. The 
OECD and the UN also encourage three-tier reporting including the Country-by-Country 
(CbC) reporting, but Zimbabwe is silent on the specifics of the documentation. Reports have 
shown that many countries are legislating CbC reports with the most recent one being Nigeria 
(KPMG, 2018). However, Bruce (2011) warns that providing disclosures such as the CbC 
reporting is a challenge as it is not supported by policy makers in some countries and would 
be costly and difficult to understand for both the preparers and users of the information.  
73 
 
 
The UN guidelines are torn between maintaining consistency with the OECD guidelines and 
reflecting on the realities of developing countries. The Zimbabwean legislation also differs 
from international practice by incorporating transfer pricing rules to domestic transactions, a 
system which was previously applied by India (Section 92 of the Indian ITA) but recently 
repealed because of the burden imposed on domestic enterprises (Sachin, 2017; PWC, 2017). 
Sachin (2017) reports that transactions between related Indian enterprises are now exempted 
from transfer pricing provisions thereby reducing the tax burden of domestic enterprises, but 
this also means that such transactions are not required to meet the arm’s length criteria.  
 
Furthermore, APAs would minimise tax disputes, but Zimbabwe only has advance tax 
rulings, and in cases of a transfer price adjustment, the traditional penalties are applied with 
no specific penalty regime for transfer pricing offences. Though the OECD encourages 
countries to use effective dispute resolution mechanisms specifically for transfer pricing 
matters, Zimbabwe has general dispute resolution procedures for all tax related matters 
including transfer pricing. Both the OECD and the UN encourage the use of internal sources 
for comparable data, but Zimbabwe does not maintain any databases for comparable data. 
The new legislation strengthens the transfer pricing rules, but these have still not addressed 
some of the pertinent issues such as those highlighted above.  
 
4.7 Summary 
For a deeper understanding of transfer pricing, the chapter started off with exploring the 
OECD guidelines which are widely applied in the world. The OECD guidelines were found 
to be applied in most international transfer pricing issues, which has resulted in the 
formulation of five arm’s length transfer pricing methods (Section 4.3) which can help 
harmonise transfer pricing disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities. The OECD’s 
arm’s length principle has been described as an important tool in minimising transfer pricing 
abuse, though it comes with its own limitations. The UN guidelines were also considered and 
it has been noted that although it focuses on addressing the interests of the developing 
countries, it has retained the majority of the OECD guidelines, and its adoption in the 
developing world remains low. Similarities and differences between these international 
guidelines and Zimbabwean laws provided invalueable insights into where Zimbabwe can 
improve its transfer pricing regime. 
 
74 
 
Assessing the adequacy of the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe would have been 
incomplete without exploring the possible transfer pricing methods available for use, and thus 
objective 1 & 2 have been met. The following chapter is a review of transfer pricing practices 
by other countries and how they could be applied in Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 5: TRANSFER PRICING BEST PRACTICES 
 
“No government can exist without taxation. This money must necessarily be levied on the 
people; and the grand art consists of levying so as not to oppress” - Frederick the Great 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the prescriptions of international transfer pricing standards, 
and compared them against the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. This chapter reviews how 
other countries have applied these guidelines and the challenges and experiences that they 
have had in doing so and considers how they have overcome these challenges.  
 
As set out in objective 3 (section 1.5), this chapter focuses on how different countries have 
dealt with transfer pricing in order to reduce their risk of revenue losses. Zimbabwe’s major 
trading partners are South Africa (Section 5.2), Kenya (Section 5.3), China (Section 5.4) and 
the United Kingdom (5.5) – all of which have already introduced transfer pricing 
(Regfollower, 2017a) and are considered in this chapter. The countries reviewed were chosen 
based on the principles outlined above. This chapter narrates the transfer pricing rules and 
experiences of these countries to draw lessons from them, and to help assess the adequacy of 
Zimbabwe’s transfer pricing rules (discussed in Chapter 3) in minimising tax leakages 
through transfer pricing.  
 
For each of the countries, the following issues were explored to allow for a comparison; 
transfer pricing legislation, tax authority, and definition of related party, thin capitalization, 
and acceptable transfer pricing methods, Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs, comparable 
databases, documentation, audit procedures, penalties and dispute resolution provisions. 
However, primary references for the transfer pricing rules of some of these countries were 
limited because of language and access challenges. 
 
5.2 South Africa 
 
5.2.1 Tax Authority and Legislation 
 In Africa, South Africa is the most active country in legislating on transfer pricing issues 
(Kruger, 2012). It first introduced transfer pricing legislation in 1995, in terms of section 
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31(2) of the South African Income Tax Act (1962). The section requires connected 
persons/associate enterprises to deal at arm’s length in respect of cross-border transactions. 
The rules and its interpretation were continuously being refined leading to the introduction of 
Practice Note 7 in 1999 (which provided taxpayers with guidance on how transfer pricing 
legislation would be applied by the South African Revenue Service (SARS)). South Africa 
was the first out of 52 African States to implement transfer pricing legislation in 1995, 
followed by Kenya in 2006 (PWC, 2012). South Africa is not a member country of the 
OECD (Oguttu, 2016). The Commentary on its Model Tax Convention are not legally 
binding, however South African courts have recognised OECD principles.  
 
5.2.2 Definition of Related (Connected) Party 
According to South African rules, a connected/associated party in relation to a company is 
defined as a company where shareholding is more than 50% or a company with at least 20% 
share capital holding and voting rights and there is no other majority shareholder (paragraph 
(1)(f) of the ITA 58 of 1962). 
 
5.2.3 Thin Capitalization 
The continuous reviews by South Africa have also resulted in the country’s thin capitalization 
rules being replaced by the arm’s length principle (Siwele, 2011). South Africa repealed its 
3:1 thin capitalization ratio and since then all transactions are required to be at arm’s length 
(Siwele, 2011). However, by virtue of complying with the arm’s length principle, Section 31 
(2) of the ITA implies that any interest which is not similar to what would have been charged 
between independent enterprises will be disallowed as a deduction.  
 
The primary adjustment of Section 31(2), effectively disallows a portion of the deduction of 
interest incurred in the hands of the borrower. A further transfer pricing related adjustment is 
required in terms of Section 31(3) that attracts dividends tax at 20% for any dividend paid on 
or after 22 February 2017 unless an exemption or reduced rate is applicable. Since 1 January 
2015, the amount of the adjustment is deemed a dividend consisting of a distribution of an 
asset in specie declared and paid by that resident to that other party to the affected 
transaction. Dividends tax payable by a company on a dividend in specie or a deemed 
dividend falls outside the ambit of the dividends article of a tax treaty and therefore cannot be 
reduced in terms of the dividend article of a treaty (van der Zwan, 2017). 
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5.2.4 Transfer Pricing Methods and Comparables 
The South African rules explicitly state that the OECD guidelines are followed if their 
legislation is silent. Though not a member of the OECD, SARS accepts the OECD’s five 
transfer pricing methods; CUP, RPM, CPM as well as PSM and TNMM, and has no priority 
method (Deloitte, 2016).  
 
Like most of the African countries, comparable data for South African private companies is 
not publicly available. Therefore, Pan-European comparables are mostly used in South Africa 
(Deloitte, 2016), specifically the Bureau van DijkOrbis database (KPMG, 2016). However, 
comparables from other regions may be acceptable if the reasons to use them are explained in 
the policy document (Deloitte, 2016).  
 
The Davis Tax Committee (DTC) (2014), appointed by the South African government to 
assesss the South African tax policy framework and its role in supporting the objectives of 
inclusive growth, employment, development and fiscal sustainability, recommended that 
South Africa does not attempt to issue its own guidelines regarding the Transactional Profit 
Split Method (TPSM) but waits for the outcome of the OECD work still to be performed. The 
absence of local South African comparables is not the determinant that the TPSM is the most 
appropriate method. However, the availability of all data should first be assessed as failure to 
do so will lead to all countries that have no data adopting the TPSM, which will potentially 
give rise to corresponding double taxation and transfer pricing dispute risks. 
 
Regarding low value added services (which are head office expenses such as management, 
technical and service fees), MNEs claim deductions for various services often leaving little or 
no profit in the paying country. South Africa adopts the simplified approach based on the 
actual cost of the services (with a pre-determined suitable allocation key) plus a standard 
mark-up, recommended to be 5%, as proposed by the OECD, but also implements a suitable 
threshold for the amount of such services, to which this method can be applied (SARS 
Practice Note No. 7 (1999); DTC (2014)). 
 
For pricing commodities, the OECD recommends the application of the CUP method and 
advises that this may be determined using quoted prices with suitable comparability 
adjustments. South Africa follows the OECD Guidelines on commodities.  
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5.2.5 Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs) 
As mentioned previously, an APA is an arrangement where the MNE can agree on an 
appropriate transfer pricing method in advance over a fixed period of time (Lohse and Riedel, 
2013:8).  South Africa still has no APAs or any advance rulings that cater specifically for 
transfer pricing even after Oguttu (2006b:473) advocated for their adoption in South Africa.  
The DTC recommended that at least one legally Binding General Ruling (BGR), as provided 
for in Section 89 of the Tax Administration Act, 2011, be enacted in respect of Section 31. 
Without departing from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the suggested General Ruling 
should include a set of principles reflecting the South African reality e.g. to define the 
method for converting the threshold amount to SA Rands. The DTC (2014) also 
recommended “the implementation of an Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) regime, which 
would also provide certainty for investors. In order to introduce the option for APAs to be 
obtained in South Africa, SARS would need to be given the resources to build an APA unit.”  
 
5.2.6 Documentation 
Documentation supporting a tax return (including transfer pricing documentation) is due 
within 12 months from the end of the relevant financial year. The South African Revenue 
Service’s Practice Note No. 7 (1999) paragraph 10.2 recommends the preparation of transfer 
pricing documentation. However, the practice note is outdated, and additional documentation 
requirements are governed by Notice 1334 of the Government Gazette 40375 volume 616 
(South Africa Government Gazette, 2016). This notice has revised the documentation 
requirements and now requires a master file, local file and the CbC reporting file for MNEs 
in South Africa to be submitted to SARS 12 months after year end. Section 25 of the Tax 
Administration Act No 28 of 2011 (TAA) requires the completion of a CbC report. Section 
29 of the Tax Administration Act No 28 of 2011 (TAA) has been extended to include 
document retention requirements for transfer pricing. These are onerous and go beyond the 
requirements proposed by the OECD under BEPS Action Plan 13 (Oguttu, 2016). South 
Africa has also set thresholds for companies with cross-border transactions exceeding R100 
million to comply with the documentation requirements (Regfollower, 2017a). According to 
Section 210 of the TAA South Africa’s documentation requirements have been revamped 
with a penalty of R16 000 per month of delay for non-compliance with the duty to submit the 
CbC report, master and local files.  
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SARS recommends that the documentation be contemporaneous meaning that “it continues to 
reflect the taxpayer’s transactions and circumstances, and be prepared at the time the 
transaction is entered into” (Deloitte, 2016: 234). When SARS requests the documentation it 
must be submitted within 30 days although an extension can be applied for (KPMG, 2016). 
The UN (2017) emphasizes the need for SARS to build a specialised transfer pricing team, 
and annually update the CbC report, local and master files as recommended by the OECD.  
 
The DTC (2014) recommends that Section 31 of the ITA refers to the OECD guidelines, on 
the basis that it is obligatory to apply these guidelines for companies that are part of a group 
that falls above the threshold (EU750mn) requiring CbC reporting, but also recommended it 
for smaller companies. Thus, as part of the mandatory application for groups above the 
threshold, it is recommended that all the documentation requirements should also be 
compulsory in terms of the legislation. This will ensure global consistency of application and 
documentation for such groups, as is recommended by the OECD, and foster a system on 
which foreign investors can rely (in line with the National Development Plan).  
 
5.2.7 Audit Procedures 
According to PWC (2015:923), “SARS follows the OECD guidelines in conducting transfer 
pricing investigations, however, it is likely to consider the guidance from the UN practical 
manual on transfer pricing for developing countries”. All MNEs are targets for a SARS audit, 
with greater scrutiny on MNEs with associated enterprises in low-tax jurisdictions (PWC, 
2015). 
 
5.2.8 Penalties 
SARS assesses the intra-group transactions and if they lack commercial justification and 
reasonableness, the prices are disregarded (UN, 2013:413). Ordinary penalties of up to 200% 
of unpaid tax apply on material non-disclosures and tax evasion (South African Tax 
Administration Act 2011, Chapter 15). Furthermore, interest is charged on outstanding taxes 
and penalties at a rate linked to the South African Reserve Bank’s repurchase rate (Deloitte, 
2014). Deloitte (2014) stressed that the changes to South Africa’s tax laws have placed a 
greater compliance burden on taxpayers, making transfer pricing an area that requires careful 
planning in the country. If a transfer pricing adjustment is imposed, the taxpayers have the 
right to dispute the proposed changes with various options available (South African Tax 
Administration Act 2011, Chapter 9). South Africa has also introduced fixed penalties per 
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month for failure to comply with submission of transfer pricing documentation (Regfollower, 
2018).  
 
The DTC (2014) recommends that SARS considers coming up with additional measures to 
encourage compliance. Apart from imposing penalties on taxpayers, the OECD recommends 
that another way for countries to encourage taxpayers to fulfil transfer pricing documentation 
requirements is by designing compliance incentives. For example, where the documentation 
meets the requirements and is timely submitted, the taxpayer could be exempted from tax 
penalties or subject to a lower penalty rate if a transfer pricing adjustment is made and 
sustained, notwithstanding the provision of documentation. 
 
5.2.9 Dispute Resolution 
In South Africa, taxpayers can invoke Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAPs) or enter into a 
unilateral agreement with SARS or take the dispute to court (PWC, 2015). However, it is 
important to note that most South African disputes have been settled by unilateral settlement 
procedures (PWC, 2015). The lack of court cases may mean few advocates and judges have 
knowledge of transfer pricing and if the matter is brought to court, the courts are bound to 
consider international precedent (foreign case law) as local precedent is unlikely to be 
available (PWC, 2015). Furthermore, foreign case law is only persuasive and not binding on 
South African courts (PWC, 2015). 
 
5.2.10 Transfer Pricing Challenges 
Though the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have been useful in providing guidance on 
the application of the arm’s length principle, it has its own flaws which impact on its practical 
application (UN, 2017). These include challenges in determining perfect comparables in the 
country, especially given that neither the country nor the African continent has databases 
containing comparable data. This poses challenges for both the taxpayer and the tax 
authority. South Africa has tried to overcome this by utilising European databases to 
determine arm’s length prices (PWC, 2015). 
 
Though these databases do provide valuable information, there are a number of challenges in 
developing comparability adjustments to account for geographical differences (for example 
market size and political differences) (OECD, 2010a; Deloitte, 2014). In order to provide 
more comparable data, SARS has accepted comparable adjustments based on the country risk 
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ratings and risk-free rates (UN, 2013:411). In establishing an arm’s length level SARS has 
effectively adopted a holistic approach which not only considers comparable data, but also 
other relevant economic factors (UN, 2013:411). 
 
PWC (2015) further alludes to resource constraints faced by SARS causing a delay in 
concluding audits. The absence of a transfer pricing regime or Double Taxation Agreement 
(DTA) with certain African countries trading with South Africa poses problems as the Mutual 
Agreement Procedures (MAPs) are not available (SARS, 2018). 
  
5.3 Kenya 
 
5.3.1 Tax Authority and Legislation 
Transfer pricing in Kenya was introduced in 2006, and is contained in Section 18(3) of the 
Kenyan Income Tax Act [Chapter 470]. Kenya distinguishes between transfer pricing issues 
and anti-avoidance issues. Section 18(3) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act eliminates the need 
for tax administrators to demonstrate a tax-avoidance motive as a pre-condition for making 
adjustments to related party transactions. The Act places the responsibility to substantiate the 
arm’s length transaction on the taxpayer. The Kenyan Revenue Authority (KRA) established 
a transfer pricing unit called the Kenyan Revenue Training Institute (KRATI) in Mombasa, to 
educate its tax officials on transfer pricing issues (TPA Global, 2013).  
 
5.3.2 Definition of Related Party  
According to Section 18 (3) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act [Chapter 470], related party 
means those corporates with at least 25% voting power in the enterprise, and was expanded to 
include relationships with natural persons. The section further states that related party 
includes persons who participate directly or indirectly in the control, managment or capital of 
the company. 
 
5.3.3 Thin Capitalization 
Section 16(2) (j) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act [Chapter 470] restricts the deductible debt to 
equity ratio of foreign companies to 3:1 and the excess is taxed. 
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5.3.4 Transfer Pricing Methods and Comparables 
The Kenyan government accepts the five methods plus any other method as may be 
prescribed by the Commissioner where the arm’s length price cannot be determined using the 
five methods according to the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules (2006). The OECD 
guidelines will be accepted in the absence of specific guidance in the Kenyan transfer pricing 
rules (TPA Global, 2013). Local comparables are preferred, but unfortunately data in Africa 
is insufficiently published.  
 
Due to a lack of local data sets most Kenyan taxpayers rely on European databases such as 
Amadeus and SMART to calculate comparable values to be used as basis for transfer prices 
(Deloitte, 2016). As stated above, foreign databases may not reflect actual circumstances in 
Kenya (TPA Global, 2013).  
 
5.3.5 Advance Pricing Agreements  
Like South Africa, Kenya has no Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) programme in place 
since it is believed that APAs tie up key resources by diverting tax authority’s attention from 
key transfer pricing risks to attending to APAs negotiations (Jomo, 2012).  
 
5.3.6 Documentation 
The onus of proof is on the taxpayer who must provide documentation within 30 days, upon 
request (Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules (2006)). There is no prescribed content or 
format of the transfer pricing documentation in the Kenyan legislation. Kenya has not yet 
implemented CbC reporting. 
 
5.3.7 Audit Procedures 
Deloitte (2014) reports that the KRA is aggressive in carrying out transfer pricing audits, 
challenging transfer pricing arrangements by taxpayers who report losses for several years 
and those who transact with associated enterprises located in tax havens. KRA has resorted to 
carrying out upfront risk-profiling before a full audit is conducted (PWC, 2015). These risk-
based audits together with specialist transfer pricing audits are performed by KRA’s large 
taxpayers’ office specialist team. Although there are no supporting statistics, transfer pricing 
reforms are believed to have increased revenue in Kenya (PWC, 2012). 
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5.3.8 Penalties 
Penalties are applied at the rate of 20% on unpaid taxes (Section 84(2)(b) of the Tax 
Procedures Act) and an extra 1% per month on the principal tax outstanding for the period it 
remains unpaid (Section 38(1) of the Tax Procedures Act), and if the taxpayer acted 
negligently, the penalty will be equal to double the amount that would have been avoided 
(Section 85 of the Tax Procedures Act). From June 2010 no interest will be charged on 
penalties (Section 85 of the Tax Procedures Act). There are no specified penalties for for 
failure to have transfer pricing documentation. 
  
5.3.9 Dispute resolution 
Aggrieved taxpayers have recourse through an appeal procedure provided for in the Income 
Tax Act. The first port of call is to provide a notice in writing to the local committee within 
30 days, if not satisfied then the High Court of Kenya followed by the Court of Appeal and 
lastly by the Supreme Court of Kenya (Section 84 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 470]). 
Alternatively, the taxpayer and revenue authority can enter into arbitration (Section 84 of the 
Income Tax Act [Chapter 470]). 
 
5.3.10 Transfer pricing challenges 
Revenue losses have compelled the Kenya Revenue Authority to introduce legislative, 
administrative and capacity-development initiatives to improve transfer pricing risk 
management (PWC, 2012). PWC (2012) highlights that these rules may not achieve its goals 
as the Kenyan Revenue Authority staff are not skilled in handling transfer pricing 
administration and identify instances of abusive transfer pricing. It further notes that the 
effective application of the rules is also frustrated by a lack of financial information on the 
performance and profitability of some MNEs associates outside Kenya and the unavailability 
of company comparable data.  
 
This limitation results in difficulties to properly apply and monitor arm’s length transactions. 
Even though the Kenyan Revenue Authority introduced a requirement for additional related 
party disclosures, lack of capacity cripples the tax authority’s ability to review all the transfer 
pricing documents. It was reported that the lack of access to information on MNE operations, 
and the unavailability of local comparables erode the gains anticipated from transfer pricing 
reforms (PWC, 2012). Though Kenya also encourages arbitration, PWC (2012) indicated that 
84 
 
the lack of transfer pricing arbitrators and statutory enshrinement specific for transfer pricing 
dispute resolution in the country is hampering the effectiveness of efforts to resolve disputes. 
 
5.4 China 
 
5.4.1 Tax Authority and Legislation 
China has become the second largest economy in the world after the US, with foreign 
companies investing in China being the driving force for this expansion (DezanShira and 
Associates, 2011). Its tax authority, State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is becoming 
increasingly sophisticated in transfer pricing, and is actively involved in the OECD’s Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative (KPMG, 2016). China is ranked third as the 
world’s strictest transfer pricing country after Japan and India (Cant, 2012). The 
promulgation of the Corporate Income Tax (CIT) law expands and provides specific guidance 
on the transfer pricing provisions, for instance clarifying contemporaneous transfer pricing 
documentation requirements (Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s republic of China 
No 63). SAT offers interpretation notes in China by issuing circulars (designated as GuoShui 
Fa) which are in some instances replies to specific tax issues raised. 
 
The growth of international trade has compelled China to reconsider its transfer pricing 
policies resulting in many reforms. It started in 1991, with Section 13 of the Enterprise Tax 
Law of the People’s republic of China No 63 which gave the tax authority the right to make 
reasonable adjustments where transactions between associated enterprises were not at arm’s 
length. 
 
In 1998, China’s tax authority (SAT) issued transfer pricing regulations for transactions 
between associated enterprises in SAT Circular No 59, and were later amended in GuoShui 
Fa [2004] No. 143 (DezanShira and Associates, 2011).   
 
Rules for APAs in China were issued in 2004 in GuoShui Fa No 118. In 2007, the 1991 
Section 13 was repealed by CITL state council order No 63 which was effective 2008 
(DezanShira and Associates, 2011). This was a comprehensive regulation which addressed 
numerous transfer pricing issues including thin capitalization. 
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Then GuoShui Han [2007] No. 363 was issued prescribing the documentation requirements 
and information to be submitted by taxpayers to SAT. Tax law in China on transfer pricing 
includes the Articles 36 and 51 of the Tax collection and Administration Law; Articles 41-48 
of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s republic of China (Chapter 6, Special Tax 
Adjustments) that came into effect on 1 January 2008 (Deloitte, 2014). There was another 
instrument issued, GuoShui Fa 2008 No 114, and then a more comprehensive piece of 
legislation was issued in 2009, GuoShui Fa [2009] No. 2 [China Transfer Pricing 
Regulations]. The regulation repealed GuoShui Fa [2004] No. 143 and GuoShui Fa [2004] 
No. 118. The legislation clearly provided guidance on conducting transfer pricing audits and 
investigations, APAs and thin capitalization (DezanShira and Associates, 2011). 
 
China has been continuously revising its transfer pricing guidelines and the following SAT 
documents released recently form the framework for transfer pricing enforcement in China: 
• Bulletin Gonggao [2017] No. 6 (Bulletin 6) — Bulletin on Supervisory Measures for 
Special Tax Investigation Adjustments and Mutual Agreement Procedures 
• Bulletin Gonggao [2016] No. 64 (Bulletin 64) — Bulletin on Issues Related to Improving 
the Administration of Advance Pricing Arrangements 
• Bulletin Gonggao [2016] No. 42 (Bulletin 42) — Bulletin on Improving Administration of 
Related Party Transaction Reporting and Contemporaneous Documentation (Ernst & Young, 
2018). 
 
5.4.2 Definition of Related Party 
According to Bulletin 42, China defines a related party as an enterprise or directly or 
indirectly owns 25% or more of the shares of the other enterprise; or a third party with 
significant control (25%) over the taxpayer’s senior management, purchases, sales, 
production, capital financing and the intangibles and technologies required for the business. 
 
5.4.3 Thin Capitalization 
China also stipulates the thin capitalization rules in Circular Gaishui [2008] No. 121 which 
prescribes a debt to equity ratio of 2:1 for non-financial entities and 5:1 for financial 
institutions (PWC, 2015). Generally, any excess would be non-deductible, however, circular 
121 further stresses that the excess interest “may still be deductible if the enterprise can 
provide documentation that the intercompany financing arrangements comply with the arm’s 
length principle or if the effective tax burden of the Chinese borrowing company is not higher 
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than that of the Chinese lending company” (PWC, 2015:319). The question then is whether to 
use an arm’s length approach or the formula based approach to determine the ratio to assess 
deductibility. Therefore, further guidance on how to apply capitalization rules may be 
required [DezanShira and Associates (2011)].  
 
5.4.4 Transfer Pricing Methods and Comparables  
China follows the OECD guidelines, its five transfer pricing methods and accepts other 
methods consistent with the arm’s length principle. Furthermore, SAT Bulletin 6 prefers the 
TNMM method which is not appropriate in transactions where the tested party has substantial 
intangible assets, and that the profit split method be applied by high and new technology 
enterprises (Regfollower, 2017a).  
 
SAT requires the use of Chinese comparable companies (listed on the Shanghai & Shenzhen 
stock markets), but foreign comparable companies may be accepted (Deloitte, 2016). It also 
recommends the use of the Bureau van Dijk Osiris database (Deloitte, 2014). 
 
5.4.5 Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) 
APAs were first introduced in China in 1998 in Circular 59, which, however, had a number 
of deficiencies and was replaced by GuoShui Fa 2004 No 118 (DezanShira and Associates, 
2011). By 2009 APAs were available under Chapter 6 of GuoShui Fa 2009 No 2. From that 
date the Chinese tax authorities have concluded and signed a considerable number of both 
unilateral and bilateral APAs. It is reported that the majority of these were negotiated and 
finalised in less than a year, and statistics show that TNMM had the highest usage, followed 
by CPM, and then CUP and the rest of the other methods (SATAPA report 31/12/2010 as 
cited in DezanShira and Associates, 2011). To qualify for an APA in China, one would need 
annual related party transactions worth over Ren Min Bi (RMB) 40 million for the last three 
years prior to the application (UN, 2017). China has the three APAs; unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral APAs and the application procedures for mutual agreement procedures are 
prescribed in SAT Bulletin 6. 
 
5.4.6 Documentation 
China requires contemporary documentation but exempts those enterprises that have annual 
amounts from related party tangible goods transactions being lower than RMB 1 billion (UN, 
2017). Chinadocumentation requirements also exempt transactions that are covered by an 
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APA as well as for an enterprise that only transacts with domestic associated enterprises or if 
the foreign shareholding is below 50% (DezanShira and Associates, 2011). The 
documentation requirements have specified thresholds (UN, 2017). The required 
documentation has to be completed by May 31 of the following tax year, has to be written in 
Chinese, must be provided within 20 days of a request, and must be retained for 10 years 
from 1 June following the relevant tax year (Ernst and Young, 2016a). China has also 
introduced CbC reporting regulations (Public Notice 42) which outlines the requirements for 
master file and the CbC report.  
 
5.4.7 Audit Procedure 
China has specific audit procedures for taxpayers with related party transactions which are 
not at arm’s length. The audit procedures are clearly outlined in Circular 2 (DezanShira and 
Associates, 2011). According to Cant (2012) the audit procedure starts with the initial inquiry 
followed by a preliminary information request, a formal audit notice, field interview and 
investigation, a preliminary audit opinion and negotiating a transfer pricing adjustment to 
appeal. According to Wang (2016), “As suggested by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
a comparability analysis is also provided for in the Circular 2”.  
 
5.4.8 Penalties 
The income tax return has nine related party transaction disclosure forms, and failure to file 
these forms attracts penalties ranging from RMB 2,000 to RMB 10,000 (Deloitte, 2016) 
(Equivalent to US$313-US$1,565 using the 23/5/2018 exchange rate of 1RMB=0.16USD). 
For failing to provide contemporaneous documentation or providing incomplete or false 
information, taxpayers will be penalised from RMB10,000 to RMB50,000 (Deloitte, 2016). 
 
Furthermore, transfer pricing adjustments are subject to interest (imposed on the tax 
underpayment) based on the RMB benchmark lending rate published by the People’s Bank of 
China plus penalty interest of 5% if the taxpayer has not complied with the contemporaneous 
documentation requirements (Deloitte, 2016). However, the 5% penalty may be waived if the 
contemporaneous documentation is prepared and provided on time (Deloitte, 2016). 
 
5.4.9 Dispute Resolution 
Chinese tax legislation gives broad discretionary powers to tax authorities, therefore a 
friendly working relationship is advantageous to the taxpayer (PWC, 2015). That means if an 
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MNE disagrees with its initial tax assessment from the tax authority, it can provide written 
explanations and documents justifying the reasonableness of their transfer prices. Further 
discussions and negotiations may continue until the tax authority reaches a conclusion and 
issues a written notice of audit assessment referred to as a “Special Tax Adjustment Notice”. 
After this notice, the decision is final and no further negotiations are allowed. 
If the taxpayer disagrees with the adjustment, it can appeal to the tax authority at the next 
higher level within 60 days and the decision of the appeal must be made within 60 days 
(PWC, 2015). However, before proceeding with the appeal process the taxpayer is required to 
pay the taxes, interest levy, fine and any surcharge (PWC, 2015). If the taxpayer is not happy 
with the decision, it may start legal proceedings in China’s People’s court within 15 days 
upon receiving the written decision. However, there have been very few cases brought to the 
People’s court (PWC, 2015). 
 
5.4.10 Transfer Pricing Challenges 
China initially had ten members as part of the transfer pricing staff team, and this has been 
causing a lot of inconsistencies in the application and interpretation of the transfer pricing 
principles in a big economy like China, so SAT was working on developing 500 transfer 
pricing specialists to curtail the challenges encountered (DezanShira and Associates, 2011). 
Only ten staff members would be inadequate considering China’s volume of international 
trade transactions, and so more specialists would be needed. 
 
According to Wang (2016) like most developing countries, China faces transfer pricing 
challenges with the arm’s length principle. He emphasises that even after developing 
countries overcome issues of sound legal transfer pricing framework they are often faced 
with the issue of a lack of sufficient transfer pricing specialists to carry out the analysis as 
well as reliable comparables for the analysis.  Wang (2016) further explains that because in 
China, private companies are not compelled by law to disclose their financial information, 
this leaves limited comparable information resulting in foreign companies being used as 
alternative to domestic comparables. Wang (2016) stresses that finding a comparable 
transaction is hard, and usually countries that perform similar functions, assume similar risk 
and own similar assets are used instead. He highlights that though widely used, the short-
comings of arm’s length principle should be acknowledged. 
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5.5 United Kingdom 
 
5.5.1 Tax Authority and Legislation 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a member of the OECD and its tax authority, Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC), supports the OECD’s development on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting. For years ending before 1 April 2010, Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988 was in use, 
then it was replaced by Part 4 of the Taxation International and Other Provisions Act 2010 
(TIOPA, 2010) (PWC, 2015). Effective 1 April 2015, the UK also introduced new anti-
avoidance provisions, the diverted profits tax of 25% which applies to arrangements designed 
to divert profit from the UK and involve transactions or enterprises that lack economic 
substance (Deloitte, 2016). 
 
Deloitte (2016) indicated that HMRC publishes guidance on the interpretation of its transfer 
pricing legislation in the International manual at INT M410000. This should serve to 
minimise misinterpretations and disputes. The researcher used secondary sources as the 
manual is not accessible on the public domain.  
 
5.5.2 Definition of Related Party 
The United Kingdom (UK) defines a related party generally as when there is 51% control of a 
company and 40% in the case of joint ventures based on voting power and share capital, as 
well as any persons acting together to control financing arrangements (Section 148 of the 
TIOPA 2010)). 
 
5.5.3 Thin Capitalization 
Taxation International and Other Provisions Act (TIOPA) 2010 Part 4 includes provisions for 
financial transactions where HMRC can challenge the deductibility of interest by a UK 
company on a loan from a related party for which either the interest rate or loan itself is 
excessive. The basis for determining whether the amount of loan or interest rate is excessive 
is the arm’s length principle (PWC, 2015). The UK strengthened its interest restriction rules 
in 2017 by enacting Finance (No.2) Act 2017 leaving the accepted debt to equity ratio at 1:1 
and the interest cover at 3:1.  
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5.5.4 Transfer Pricing Methods and Databases 
The United Kingdom incorporated the OECD guidelines in its transfer pricing legislation and 
accepts the five transfer pricing methods together with other methods which conform to the 
arm’s length principle. In these methods, there is no priority method (KPMG, 2013). In the 
United Kingdom comparative data is readily available with HMRC preferring the UK 
comparables though other European Union comparables can be used only if the UK data is 
unavailable (Deloitte, 2016). 
 
5.5.5 Advance Pricing Agreements 
The United Kingdom also has mutual agreement procedures which are set out in part 2 of 
TIOPA 2010 (ss124-125) and the statement of practice SP 1/11 provides guidance on 
arbitration and mutual agreement procedures. It also has Advance Pricing Agreements 
(APAs) which are prescribed in part 5 of TIOPA 2010 (s218 etseq). Practice SP2/10 sets out 
best practices on advance rulings and the statement of practices SP 1/12 also has details on 
advancing thin capitalization agreements.  
 
5.5.6 Documentation 
The United Kingdom’s legislation requires contemporaneous transfer pricing documentation 
to be prepared annually and must be made available upon request. Guidance on the 
preparation of documentation is provided in the International manual 483030 . The manual 
does not prescribe a format, but rather lists the minimum required documentation, for 
example, evidence to demonstrate an arm’s length price and records of transactions with 
associated enterprises. Generally, documentation must be provided within 30 days of request 
and failure to do so attracts a penalty of £3 000 per tax return (Finance Act 1998, schedule 18 
para 23 (1). The transfer pricing rules exempt SMEs from applying the documentation 
requirements. 
 
5.5.7 Audit Procedures 
The probability of a tax audit is low given that HMRC operates a risk assessment approach to 
audits. Only those MNEs deemed to be of high risk in transfer pricing issues will be subject 
to an audit (PWC, 2015). HMRC has a centralised specialist transfer pricing unit which is 
part of HMRC’s corporate tax, international and anti-avoidance directorate involved in the 
transfer pricing enquiries into large MNEs (PWC, 2015). 
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5.5.8 Penalties 
The HRMC can make an adjustment and penalties are based on the taxpayer’s behaviour that 
caused the error; no penalties if reasonable care was taken; up to 30% for careless behaviour; 
up to 70% for deliberate careless behaviour and as high as 100% for deliberate and concealed 
error (Schedule 24 of Finance Act 2007). 
 
5.5.9 Dispute Resolution 
The taxpayer can appeal against a transfer pricing adjustment, and this will be heard by the 
Tribunals Service (KPMG, 2013). The UK has specific commissioners deciding on transfer 
pricing cases (PWC, 2015). 
 
5.5.10 Transfer Pricing Challenges 
HMRC periodically updates its manuals which are prepared for internal use by the tax 
authority as well as publicly available and accessible on the HMRC website. These manuals 
provide a detailed description of how the tax authority interprets the existing legislation and 
explanations of its developments (PWC, 2015). According to PWC (2015) “the HMRC does 
not have power to directly obtain information on non-UK-resident parents of UK companies, 
nor on fellow subsidiaries (in non-UK-controlled groups) that are not UK-resident”. 
However, the UK has an extensive Double Tax Treaty (DTT) network so is able to request 
such information under the Exchange of Information article (PWC, 2015).  
 
The next section summarises the key points discovered from the various tax jurisdictions 
examined in this thesis, and discusses the possible categories that they fit in. 
 
5.6 Transfer Pricing Categories 
All the countries discussed above have adopted the arm’s length route, and follow the five 
methods suggested by the OECD. All have no preferred method, and do not accept the global 
formulary apportionment method. Lohse et al (2012) conducted a study in which they 
examined 44 countries over a period of nine years to analyse the stringency and impact of 
differing transfer pricing regulations, and came up with six categories of transfer pricing 
regulations. The results of the study revealed greater importance of transfer pricing 
regulations. Six categories were presented with category ‘0’ being the least strict category 
(with no general anti-avoidance rule/no transfer pricing rules and no documentation 
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requirements) and ‘5’ the strictest. Category 1 is ALP in national law with no documentation 
requirements, category 2 is ALP at national law, but documentation requirements not in 
national law, but expected to exist in practice (audit). Category 4 is ALP and short disclosure 
of documentation in national law. In 2009, China was identified in category 5 (with arm’s 
length principle and long disclosure of documentation in national law) while the UK was also 
identified in category ‘5’ (Lohse et al, 2012). From the analysis of this chapter, South Africa, 
China and the UK would be in category ‘5’, while Kenya would match category ‘3’ which 
has documentation requirements in their tax laws but has to be provided upon request. 
Zimbabwe which follows the arm’s length principle, but with no clear documentation 
requirements in national tax law, but required to exist in practice (audit) would match 
category ‘2’. 
 
After having examined transfer pricing practices in other tax jurisdictions, the following table 
summarises the rules in these countries against the Zimbabwean rules and the lessons drawn 
from these follow.   
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Table 5: Country Summary 
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China Yes No Yes OECD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
5 
Kenya Yes No Yes OECD No No Yes Yes Yes No 
 
3 
South 
Africa Yes No No OECD No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
3 
United 
Kingdom Yes No Yes OECD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
5 
Zimbabwe Yes No Yes OECD No No No No No No 
 
2 
Source: Own Compilation 
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From the above analysis, it is apparent that addressing transfer pricing problems is not a 
once-off thing, but rather progressive, and as such requires careful planning.  It has also been 
revealed that Zimbabwe, like most developing economies, lacks capacity and that setting up 
an effective transfer pricing regime is costly and requires careful planning. Zimbabwe’s 
unique environment poses challenges to both the tax authority and taxpayers, and missing 
guidance on some prime issues is a matter of concern. Therefore, Zimbabwe should consider 
introducing APAs, clear documentation requirements, providing interpretation notes, and a 
specific penalty regime as is the practice in other countries. Zimbabwe ought to keep up with 
the transfer pricing measures adopted by other jurisdictions to strengthen its rules, however, 
Oguttu (2016:9) warns that the cycle of continuously amending legislation to close the 
loopholes poses the risk of tax provisions becoming complex. Next is a discussion of the 
lessons that could be drawn for Zimbabwe from the other tax jurisdictions. 
 
5.7 Lessons to learn for Zimbabwe from other nations’ best practices  
This section explores the transfer pricing challenges in Zimbabwe, and identifies lessons that 
could be drawn from its trading partners. Unlike the other countries, Zimbabwe is still 
lagging behind in a number of issues such as documentation, interpretations, penalties and 
APAs as discussed below.  
 
Though Zimbabwe makes reference to the OECD guidelines, as well as the United Nations 
transfer pricing guidelines for developing countries, the country’s transfer pricing rules lack 
clear guidance on the documentation requirements as there is no list of the minimum 
requirements or a deadline for submission. Unlike South Africa, the UK and China which 
provide guidance on the minimum requirements of the contents of the documentation, MNEs 
in Zimbabwe have no idea as to how the documentation should be prepared. All the other 
four countries provide deadlines for the submission of the documentation save for Zimbabwe. 
 
Zimbabwe has specified its acceptable transfer pricing methods which makes it better when 
settling a dispute; however, how and when an audit arises is not clear. Countries such as 
Kenya and China have also set up a team specifically for transfer pricing and have the audit 
procedures well set. In Zimbabwe the Investigations Department of ZIMRA focuses on 
transfer pricing issues together with all other tax investigations.  
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Conclusively, four of the countries (South Africa, Kenya, UK and China) with specific 
transfer pricing legislation, impose penalties specifically on transfer pricing non-compliance. 
Normally it is a certain percentage (ranging from 10% - 200%) on the tax adjustment except 
in China (RMB 2,000 - RMB50,000) where the penalties are absolute figures. While most of 
the Zimbabwean counterparts specify the penalties and interest rates, the Zimbabwean 
legislation remains unclear on the punishment for failure to use an arm’s length price or 
produce transfer pricing documentation. In the event of a tax adjustment, the decision as to 
whether the penalties will be imposed or if the taxpayer can negotiate with the Commissioner 
to waive the penalties is not clear. This ambiguity implies varied applications resulting in 
possible disputes between taxpayers and the tax authority as confirmed in the (CF (Pvt) Ltd 
Vs ZIMRA FA 22/2014) case.  
 
While the use of APAs is critical, it has not received much support especially in Africa 
despite China and the UK having legislated these. APAs help prevent tax adjustments and 
disputes, and unlike China and the UK, Zimbabwe lacks mechanisms such as Advance Price 
Agreements, for transfer pricing purposes. This could be because of the costs and time 
consumed in the process of establishing APAs (OECD, 2010a:177). This is a setback since 
Oguttu (2006b) has commended them for bringing certainty because of the predetermined 
price. 
 
Of the five countries, South Africa has repealed its thin capitalization rule, while the UK uses 
thin capitalisation agreements. However, van der Zwan (2017) has revealed that in practice, 
the use of the debt to equity rule contradicts the arm’s length principle. 
 
In defining a related party, Kenya and China expect control of at least 25%, South Africa 
20% while the UK requires at least 40%. In Zimbabwe they consider any form of control 
which allows one to take directives and requests, but at least 50% in case of partnerships. It is 
clear that Zimbabwe has made attempts to address issues of tax avoidance by promulgating 
transfer pricing rules. However, the challenges that come with the application of the arm’s 
length principle cannot be overstated especially in developing countries as explained in the 
preceding chapter. An arm’s length price would require comparables, and Zimbabwean law 
does not state where the data can be extracted from. Considering the Zimbabwean economy, 
it would be difficult to have such databases. 
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How an arm’s length price can be achieved demands significant resources for the tax 
authority and awareness on the part of the taxpayers (Durst, 2015a). Legislation is one step 
forward, but enforcement is another issue and given the capacity of ZIMRA and the 
availability of resources to execute their mandate it is questionable. As already alluded to, 
taxpayers make their decisions based on the decisions of their fellow taxpayers as well as the 
tax authority itself. If the tax authority is incapacitated, tax avoidance becomes the dominant 
strategy. Beuselinck et al (2014:1) found more income shifting by MNEs when the local tax 
enforcement is weak. 
 
In light of the above, is the arm’s length approach the way to go or should Zimbabwe settle 
for the alternative termed Global Formulary Apportionment (GFA) (Avi-Yonah, 2015). Jomo 
(2012:6) argues that GFA is not the solution since it is not adequately worked out in practice 
at the international level to replace the arm’s length approach. More so, it has been unearthed 
that the country’s major trading partners (China and South Africa) (European Commission, 
2014) have adopted the arm’s length principle, and it would only be advantageous for 
Zimbabwe to use a common basis with its trading partners.   
  
Zimbabwe could, however, embrace other successful measures taken by other countries - for 
instance introducing APAs, clarifying transfer pricing documentation requirements such as 
the type of documentation (local/master/CbC) to be provided, timing of preparation and filing 
of the documentation and setting thresholds for such requirements. The solutions to deter debt 
financing are not yet clear as to whether fixed ratios work or not. Capacitating its tax 
authority through both legislative and administrative resources would also help deter tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing. A specialised transfer pricing team would strengthen 
ZIMRA’s ability to detect transfer pricing abuse. 
 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter scrutinised the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe’s major trading partner 
countries which include South Africa, Kenya, the UK and China in order to draw lessons 
from their experiences. In conclusion, it was discovered that of all the countries examined, 
have their transfer pricing rules based on the OECD guidelines. Despite its inherent flaws, the 
OECD’s arm’s length principle has turned out to be the more widely accepted model than the 
UN’s transfer pricing guidelines. South Africa and Kenya have transfer pricing rules running 
in their countries, but they have had their fair share of challenges, the main one being 
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availability of comparable data, which presently seems to be far from being resolved. 
Differences between Zimbabwe’s tax system and those of other countries that could be used 
by Zimbabwe to improve its system were also revealed. Therefore, recommendations were 
made from best practices in other countries reviewed. The next chapter presents the 
methodological choices and processes employed in this study in order to reach the 
conclusions of the study.  
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
“In levying taxes and in shearing sheep it is well to stop when you get down to the skin” -
Austin O’Malley 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The journey through the literature and the theoretical perspectives of this study revealed that 
the antagonistic relationship between tax authorities and the MNEs results in rational 
decision-making that is rules based and exploitative. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 have revealed some 
of the measures employed by various tax jurisdictions in order to counter the exploitative 
tendencies of MNEs. This chapter expounds on the methodological choices employed in this 
study in respect of the research paradigm (Section 6.2), research design (Section 6.3), 
research approach (Section 6.4) population and sampling (Section 6.5), data gathering 
methods (Section 6.6), data analysis (Section 6.7), methodological norms (Section 6.8) and 
the ethical considerations (Section 6.9) applied in the study to assess the effectiveness of the 
transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe.  
 
The quest to minimise tax avoidance through transfer pricing by assessing the adequacy of 
the Zimbabwean transfer pricing regime influenced the following research strategy as shown 
in the research map in Table 6. A detailed explanation of the selected research strategy which 
guided the research in order to accomplish the research objectives follows. 
Table 6: Research Map 
Research Paradigm Interpretivism (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) 
Research Design The study was exploratory (Babbie and Mouton, 1998:80). It was conducted using a 
combination of both primary and secondary data. The interview data were analysed by the 
researcher, qualitatively, aided by Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS) called ATLAS.ti 8™. 
Research Approach Qualitative Approach (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) 
Population and Sampling MNEs, MOF, ZIMRA officers, Tax Consultants appointed by MNEs as suggested by 
Hasseldine, Holland, and van der Rijt (2012) and Collins and Mulligan (2014:9). Purposive 
sampling and snowball sampling were applied to obtain information-rich participants. 
Research Methods - Data Gathering Document review (Bowen, 2009) was performed to obtain information specifically on 
transfer pricing such as court cases, legislation, and international transfer pricing guidelines, 
national budget statements and media. 
In-depth interviews (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009) performed face to face with all the four 
groups, MOF, ZIMRA, MNEs and Tax Consultants used by MNEs were conducted.  
Research Method - Data Analysis Content analysis was performed applying the deductive and inductive approach 
(Brinkmann, and Kvale, 2015) for both interview and document review data. The tool used 
to integrate and systemise the interview data analysis was ATLAS.ti 8™ guided by Braun 
and Clarke (2014). 
Methodological Norms (credibility, 
dependability, conformability, 
transferability) 
The study followed the methodological norms of qualitative inquiries and observed all 
ethical issues (Moon et al, 2016). 
Source: Own Compilation 
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6.2 Research Paradigm 
Tracy (2013:38) refers to paradigms as “ways of understanding reality, building knowledge 
and gathering information about the world”. According to Creswell (2014:35) a paradigm or 
worldview is "a basic set of beliefs that guide action, they are philosophical assumptions, 
epistemologies, and ontologies broadly conceived research methodologies, and alternative 
knowledge claims,” as explained below. 
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) identify three research philosophical assumptions, 
namely ontological, epistemological and axiological which inform the approach and 
paradigm. Ontology is a position taken on the nature of reality and what can be known about 
it, while epistemology deals with the nature of knowledge and how it can be acquired and 
axiology illuminates judgements about values (Saunders et al, 2012). The ontological views 
of this study as influenced by Tracy (2013) are that the social phenomenon (transfer pricing) 
is created from the rational economic decisions and consequent actions of social actors 
[MNEs (and their consultants), ZIMRA; MOF]. This study believes that social actors such as 
taxpayers (MNEs) may place different interpretations on the situations in which they find 
themselves because of their own views of the transfer pricing rules (Tracy, 2013:58). These 
different interpretations are likely to affect their actions (for instance how much tax they pay) 
therefore this study seeks to understand the subjective reality (epistemology) of MNEs in 
order to be cognisant of their differentiated motives, actions and intentions in a meaningful 
way. The axiological view is that the human-infused dimensions around transfer pricing have 
knowledge value (Tracy, 2013:61). Therefore, this study is premised on the view that 
regarding the same phenomenon, (transfer pricing), both the taxpayers and the tax authority 
may interpret transfer pricing rules in different ways, which may not necessarily be within the 
original intention of the policy makers.  
 
Creswell (2009:5) mentions four worldviews on which a study can be based; namely 
post/positivism, social constructivism also known as interpretivism, advocacy/participatory as 
well as pragmatism. Post/positive assumptions are more suitable for objective research while 
pragmatism is a realist view which suits mixed methods research (Creswell, 2014:36-40). The 
advocacy/participatory worldview was not considered in this study because of its 
philosophical underpinnings of collaborating with research participants. While 
post/positivism focuses on measuring behaviour objectively, interpretivism seeks to make 
100 
 
sense of the situation by examining not only the behaviour but also intentions and emotions 
(Creswell, 2014).  
 
This study followed the interpretive philosophy as the researcher sought to interpret and 
construe the transfer pricing policy in Zimbabwe as well as the subjective perspectives of 
MNEs (and their tax consultants) regarding transfer pricing. It also considered the intentions 
of the lawmakers versus the motives of taxpayers who are the MNEs and the rationale of the 
legislators to enact new transfer pricing laws. 
 
Though understanding the world of research subjects from their viewpoint is the challenge 
with interpretivism, post/positivism assumes singular true reality which Saunders et al (2009) 
discards as impossible. This made interpretivism adept for this particular study as it is 
socially constructed (Tracy, 2013:41) in considering that taxpayers interpret legislation 
differently.  
 
This study is problem-centred and is concerned with what works and what provides solutions 
to the transfer pricing phenomenon. The study attempts to find acceptable answers to the real 
world problem (transfer pricing) and the theoretical puzzle of tax compliance using the 
interpretive paradigm in the qualitative research tradition.  The following section provides an 
outline of the research design adopted in this study. 
 
6.3 Research Design 
A research design outlines the procedures for each research activity in order to fulfil the 
research objectives (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). Given that the research questions and the 
intent of this study refer to human decision-making and the navigation of legislative systems 
in a conscious manner, this study followed the approaches, design and methods that helped 
assess the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe. An exploratory empirical approach (Babbie 
& Mouton, 1998:80) was followed because this research strategy assists in understanding the 
transfer pricing phenomenon (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007) addressing questions such 
as who, what, where, when and how with respect to transfer pricing rules and practices 
(Creswell, 2009:51). 
 
According to Saunders et al (2009), non-statistical approaches fit in qualitative research as 
they involve data gathering tools such as interviews and data analysis procedures that use 
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non-statistical data. This study employed in-depth interviews and a document review 
(Bowen, 2009:28) to gather data that helped assess the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. In-
depth interviews helped to find out how the MOF as drafters of the legislation, ZIMRA as the 
enforcing authority, and MNEs/Tax consultants as the taxpayers think or behave in relation to 
transfer pricing (Saunders et al, 2012). The document review helped with the navigation of 
legislative systems, theoretical views as well as understanding the transfer pricing strategies 
used by MNEs. A combination of both primary and secondary data helped strengthen the 
results, and foster credible assessment (Bowen, 2009:28). 
 
To answer the question on the effectiveness of the transfer pricing framework in Zimbabwe, 
the researcher reflected on the rich data obtained from the interviews as guided by the 
research objectives and the theoretical positions of the study. The theoretical contributions 
were both inductively and deductively drawn (Hossein, 2015:60). Inductive analysis involved 
deriving themes from the researcher’s careful examination of the data while deductive 
analysis entailed starting with the broad theory and testing its implications as described by 
Hossein (2015:60). The researcher worked more inductively with the interview data and more 
deductively with the document review. Qualitative paradigms focus on interpretation, 
practices and meanings (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). Interpretivism (Thorpe & Holt, 2008) 
helped the researcher to draw meaning from the narratives, practical examples and 
experiences of the participants. Interpretive research also helped uncover the meanings 
derived by the four economic actors in interpreting pieces of legislation in context and in 
practice. 
 
The researcher sought to provide an account of the transfer pricing phenomenon and its 
representations within multiple realities as suggested by Ellingson (2014:3). The 
methodological choices of this study are a departure from what has predominated research 
approaches for transfer pricing studies such as those by Nielsen et al (2014); Fuest and Riedel 
(2010); and Lohse, Riedel and Spengel (2012). This study adds to qualitative accounting 
research, contrary to much of the tax compliance research, which has used quantitative 
inquiries. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, little research has followed this 
particular context within these particular lenses. Having identified the suitable design for the 
study, the research approach is explained next. 
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6.4 Research Approach 
Though there is quantitative and qualitative research (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009:13), 
the latter was adopted in this particular study because this is a legislation and policy-oriented 
study which is non-numeric in nature, and quantitative/statistical approaches would not bring 
coherence with the research objectives of the study. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) state that a 
qualitative descriptive methodology suits an interpretive worldview and the present research 
seeks to interpret a phenomenon. The above authors further describe qualitative researchers 
as those that “make the world visible, and transform the world and attempt to make sense of, 
or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings participants attach to them”. 
 
The qualitative approach was chosen based on the research problem, objectives and the 
theoretical gaps revealed in literature. Qualitative methods are selected for their ability to 
provide a detailed analysis of change (Kohlbacher, 2006). This characteristic was relevant 
when analysing the possible changes from using the general anti-avoidance rules to specific 
transfer pricing rules. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) further acknowledge that qualitative 
methods have exceptional abilities to cut across disciplines and subject matters, which once 
again is relevant to the transfer pricing construct in that it includes accounting, governance 
(auditing) and taxation matters.  
 
The nature of this study instigated a shift from traditional ways of inquiry to the post-modern 
ways of inquiry to produce knowledge regarding transfer pricing without strict adherence to 
structural laws and theories that limit research processes (Pollock, 2012:9) and consequently, 
conventional quantitative methods could be departed from. This allowed multiple realities, as 
guided by crystallisation (Ellingson, 2009) to be embraced.  
 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) note that one function of qualitative research is appraising the 
effectiveness of what exists, thereby confirming its suitability for this study, which sought to 
assess the adequacy of the transfer pricing policy in Zimbabwe to minimise tax avoidance. 
The flexibility of qualitative methods (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) as inspired by Collins and 
Mulligan (2014) assists in enhancing the understanding of the transfer pricing phenomenon in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
To achieve the research objectives, the following section defines the population and sample 
sizes used in this study. 
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6.5 Population and Sampling 
According to Howitt and Cramer (2011) the study population entails the gathering of all 
fundamentals which are of importance to the researcher, and Cooper and Schindler (2011) 
hold the view that a target population is the total elements on which the researcher wants to 
make some inferences. This study sought to influence policy and improve transfer pricing 
practice, therefore the population comprised of policy makers (MOF), enforcers of the policy 
(ZIMRA) and taxpayers (MNEs and/or their tax consultants). These four groups constituted 
the population of this study (as explained below) and were deemed knowledgeable on the 
subject matter. 
  
The study also aimed to crystallise (Ellingson, 2014) the results with the use of both 
interviews and a document review. The targeted documents considered in the document 
review included Acts of Parliament, budget statements and court cases. Below is an 
explanation of the sampling strategy used for the document review and the interviews. 
 
6.5.1 Document Analysis 
Document analysis is defined as the process of reviewing or appraising documents whether 
printed or electronic (Bowen, 2009:27). The study purposefully selected relevant documents 
from academic to non-academic literature in order to achieve the research objectives. The 
sample documents were not selected based on quantity but rather, on the quality of the 
documents as emphasised by Bowen (2009:33) and given the objectives of the study.  All the 
documents reviewed were taken from sources deemed to be authentic and from reputable 
sources and all of them ranged from national to international documents, available on public 
domains, such as Acts of Parliament. No confidential documents were used. International 
guidelines and national budget statements were reviewed to meet the study’s objectives. 
Relevant court cases (Bowen, 2009:29) were also used to supplement these documents in 
order to provide insight as to the transfer pricing complexities and strategies used by MNEs 
(see Annexure 5). Libraries and the internet were the main sources of published information 
reviewed (Ekstrom et al, 2014:13). 
 
Through the review of existing literature, the transfer pricing rules of selected regional and 
global jurisdictions were considered in order to draw lessons from them. Findings from these 
were compared with Zimbabwe and were used to assess the Zimbabwean rules (Chapter 5). 
Documents were examined, and interpreted to gain a rich understanding and empirical 
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knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) of the transfer pricing phenomenon and the rules that 
seek to address it. 
 
An analysis of the documents helped to inform the interview questions. This analysis was 
supplemented with the data obtained from the interviews, and the findings contributed to the 
rigour of the study. Using a combination of the two data gathering methods as suggested by 
Bowen (2009:28) is a process referred to by Ellingson (2009) as crystallisation. 
Crystallisation underlines the view that many truths will avail themselves through more than 
one form of inquiry (Ellingson, 2009) in line with qualitative research assumptions. 
Compared to traditional triangulation (validation of data through two or more sources), the 
researcher through crystallisation, exercised flexibility in the interpretative epistemological 
processes under subjective ontological lenses (Ellingson, 2014:2). This allowed the 
researcher to go beyond mere confirmation of findings but rather achieve completeness 
(Tobin & Bergley, 2004:394) by embracing multiple realities (Cugno and Thomas, 
2009:113), consulting multiple data sources and communicating non-academic accounts to 
various stakeholders including practitioners (tax consultants) (Ellingson, 2014:6).  
 
6.5.2 Interviews 
The sampling process was intended to locate participants who had knowledge and experience 
with transfer pricing. Sampling allowed the researcher to draw information from information-
rich participants as the thrust was not on achieving large numbers (Brinkmann and Kvale, 
2015) but on the depth and richness of the data obtained from the participants as discussed 
below.  
 
In order to obtain insights into the transfer pricing phenomenon in an interpretivist paradigm 
the researcher purposefully selected four groups that enhanced the understanding of the 
subject (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007:242). Each group was composed of homogeneous 
elements, which according to Cooper and Schindler (2011) is critical to ensure that the 
sample is an accurate version of the population. The strength of purposive sampling in 
primary data gathering lies in selecting “information-rich” participants for in-depth analysis 
related to the transfer pricing issues being studied (Richardson, 2009). 
 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was undertaken. Stage one comprised the selection of the 
three participating organisations (ZIMRA, MOF, MNEs). These organisations were 
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purposefully selected because of their relevance to the study. Stage two entailed selecting 
participating individuals from the respective organisations.  
 
During stage one, the Revenue and Tax Policy Department in the MOF, was purposefully 
selected because it is the department responsible for the drafting of the transfer pricing rules 
in Zimbabwe. The department had a staff complement of eight people, but only three 
specialised in transfer pricing. During stage two, all three specialists participated in the 
interviews. 
 
ZIMRA is a large organisation, and for the purposes of achieving the objectives of this study, 
ZIMRA’s Head Office Investigations and International Affairs department was purposely 
selected as it is the one responsible for handling transfer pricing issues in Zimbabwe (stage 
one sampling). During stage two, a sample of ten (10) ZIMRA officers were purposefully 
selected to better understand the tax behaviour of MNEs, as well as to obtain the convergence 
or divergence to the responses from the MNEs, and the transfer pricing practices in the 
country as encountered by them.  
 
In respect of the MNEs, no reliable database exists in Zimbabwe (at the time of the study) to 
allow selection of the desired participants. The unavailability of a reliable database of MNEs 
in Zimbabwe as well as the sensitivity of the subject (transfer pricing) made snowball 
sampling suitable for this particular study (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). Snowball sampling, also 
referred to as network sampling (Latham, 2007), was applied in identifying the possible MNE 
interviewees. Cohen and Arieli, (2011) described snowball sampling as the most effective 
technique available for hidden or hard-to-find populations or where adequate lists are not 
readily available as is the case with the MNEs. The first identified MNEs (through peer 
references) were requested to refer the researcher to other potential MNE participants; these 
were approached and added to the respondents list based on their cooperation. The majority 
of the MNEs referred the researcher to their tax consultants who were also interviewed until 
the sample size was large enough to understand the transfer pricing phenomenon. Brock and 
Pogge (2014) supports this referral by MNEs to their tax consultants as they believe that 
MNEs have a plethora of power and influence to hire external accountants that help devise 
sophisticated structures that enable MNEs to avoid tax.  
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Though sampling bias is naturally inevitable in both purposive and snowball sampling, these 
sampling techniques provide richer data than random sampling (Marshall, 1996). Snowball 
sampling facilitates accessibility of participants, and the fact that other participants nominate 
potential participants reduces researcher bias as the researcher relinquishes some control over 
the sampling process to the respondents (Noy, 2008).  
  
A summary of the sampling frame for the document review and the list of interviewees is 
provided in Table 7 overleaf. 
107 
 
Table 7: Sampling Frame Summary – Interviews and Document Analysis 
Group/Category 
1st stage of multi-stage 
sampling 
Population Sampling method Sample size 
2nd stage of multi-
stage sampling 
Justification for sample selection  
Interviews  
ZIMRA ZIMRA is the enforcing tax agent in the country and 
therefore is knowledgeable on the transfer pricing rules 
that they seek to enforce and challenge when MNEs use 
transfer pricing to circumvent tax. The department had 22 
members including investigating officers and 
management at the time of the study. 
Purposeful sampling: ZIMRA Department 
of Investigations and International Affairs 
were targeted. 
10 officers They have first-hand information regarding transfer     
pricing practices since they are the ones who audit MNEs. 
According to Creswell (2014:239) qualitative studies are 
characterised by small sample sizes of between 3-10 
respondents. The sample size was therefore sufficient to 
provide reliable results. 
 
MOF The MOF is responsible for drafting the transfer pricing 
legislation, and therefore becomes a relevant participant 
as the policy maker. The Department had 8 members at 
the time of the study. 
Purposeful sampling: The Revenue and Tax 
Policy Department is responsible for the 
drafting of the transfer pricing rules in 
Zimbabwe. 
3 specialists They are the relevant participants who are involved in the 
drafting of the transfer pricing legislation. According to 
Creswell (2014:239) qualitative studies are characterised 
by small sample sizes of between 3-10 respondents. The 
sample size was therefore sufficient to provide reliable 
results. 
MNE/TCs MNEs were purposefully included as they are the centre 
of the study. However, no reliable database currently 
exists of MNEs in Zimbabwe from which to select the 
desired respondents. Participants were identified from 
MNEs’ Head Offices which were situated in Zimbabwe’s 
three major cities; Harare, Bulawayo and Gweru. 
Since there is no defined population as well 
as the sensitivity of the subject matter, the 
snowball sampling method was used to 
identify MNEs. Initially the study targeted 
10 MNEs, who later referred the researcher 
to their tax consultants. Only those 
identified and willing to participate were 
recruited. 
10 MNEs/ Tax 
Consultants 
According to Creswell (2014:239) qualitative studies are 
characterised by small sample sizes of between 3-10 
respondents. The sample size was therefore sufficient to 
provide reliable results. 
Document Review 
Legislation 2 Purposive sampling 2 The study focused on the Zimbabwean legislation that 
deals with transfer pricing. 
International  Guidelines 2 Purposive sampling 2 The study focused on the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines and the United Nations transfer pricing 
guidelines. 
Court cases 3 Purposive sampling 3 The transfer pricing case first published in Zimbabwe was 
identified and included in the study. Other additional 
cases were reviewed as they could provide valuable 
insight into the transfer pricing concerns in Zimbabwe. 
Budget Statements 2 Purposive  sampling 2 National budget statements were consulted to help assess 
the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
Source: Own Compilation
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6.6 Methods: Data Gathering 
In order to appraise the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe, both primary data sources and 
secondary data sources were utilized in the study as indicated above and as discussed below.  
 
6.6.1 Document Review 
A total of nine (9) documents (see Annexure 5) were reviewed to assist in reaching the 
conclusions of this study. Document review is a stronghold for policy-oriented research 
(Bowen, 2009). After identifying the relevant documents, the researcher started by selecting 
the units of analysis (for instance chapters, sections or paragraphs), as guided by the research 
objectives because of the impracticability of analysing long documents (Bowen, 2009) and its 
usefulness in identifying subtle differences (GAO, 1989). 
 
However, primary data sources were also applied in this study to counteract the weaknesses 
inherent with the use of secondary data particularly not offering current and up-to-date 
information as supported by Owen (2014). Essentially the study used different data gathering 
tools (Ellingson, 2014:5) to check the integrity of the data, and to give a deeper 
understanding of the transfer pricing phenomenon. This strengthens the research findings 
(Saunders et al, 2009) and provides a foundation for informed conclusions regarding transfer 
pricing in Zimbabwe.  
 
6.6.2 In-depth Interviews 
Since qualitative methods provide an enhanced understanding of the transfer pricing problem, 
interviews were used and this allowed researcher-participant interaction (Brinkmann & 
Kvale, 2015). In-depth interviews (Hossein, 2015:61) were used in this study because they 
enhance understanding of intricate phenomena (Saunders et al, 2009) such as transfer pricing. 
They enabled the researcher to probe answers where the researcher wanted the interviewee to 
clarify their responses. Kothari (2004) believes this unlocks new dimensions of the research 
phenomenon. The interviews also enabled the collection of rich and detailed data which 
helped address the research objectives (Saunders et al, 2009). The interviews also enabled the 
collection of rich and detailed data which helped address the research objectives (Saunders et 
al, 2009). The use of in-depth interviews is imperative where interpretivist epistemologies are 
being applied as is the case in this study where it will be used to enhance the understanding of 
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the meanings that the participants ascribed (Saunders et al, 2009) to transfer pricing in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
Interviews proved very useful as they allowed for the collection of rich data as opposed to the 
filling in of questionnaires. Saunders et al (2009) also believe that people in managerial 
positions prefer to be interviewed rather than complete a questionnaire which requires writing 
down their responses. The interviews gave the researcher flexibility, allowed the researcher to 
rephrase the question when it was misunderstood by the interviewee and allowed the 
researcher to assess the instrument after each interview. For example, more questions could 
be added in the next interview shedule where critical issues had emerged in the previous 
interview(s). 
 
The interviews were face-to-face and audio recorded for post-interview referencing as well as 
data analysis. Audio recording permitted the researcher to concentrate more and listen 
carefully to the interviewee as well as observe the non-verbal cues (Saunders et al, 2009). 
The non-verbal cues helped the researcher to understand whether the interviewee understood 
what the researcher was talking about. The researcher was also note-taking simultaneously 
with the recording (where permitted) for back-up, as some interviewees were not comfortable 
with audio recording particularly the MNEs. Though Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) believe 
that note-taking motivates the interviewee to say more as it is associated with giving the 
impression that what they’re saying is very important. Although the researcher did not obtain 
much information from the MNEs, substantial data was collected from their tax consultants 
(referred to by MNEs).   
 
Given the objective of this study which was to assess the transfer pricing policy of 
Zimbabwe, questions were constructed to establish the following: Firstly, what do the current 
transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe stipulate? Secondly, what comprises the transfer pricing 
strategies used by the MNEs? Thirdly, what is the applicability of international transfer 
pricing guidelines to Zimbabwe?  Lastly, what are the views of the participants in relation to 
the power and capacity of the tax authority (ZIMRA) to detect and punish errant taxpayers? 
Studies centred on tax issues are usually considered as intimidating. Therefore, all questions, 
especially those for the MNEs, were drafted with sensitivity to mitigate potential 
intimidation.  This was done following advice by Smith and Osborn (2007) that a good 
interview instrument should be gentle rather than explicit.  
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The interviews comprised of questions considered to help answer the research objectives. The 
interview items were stratified into current rules, current rule challenges, ZIMRA authority 
and capacity, transfer pricing strategies and international principles (as shown in Annexure 4) 
based on the guidelines below. The interview items were derived as explained in detail 
below: 
 Available transfer pricing guidelines (OECD and UN guidelines and their 
applicability in Zimbabwe) – The answers to these questions were expected to 
address objective number 1 on the transfer pricing methods delineated by the OECD 
and the UN. 
 The transfer pricing rules in place (the prescribed transfer pricing methods, 
documentation, Advance Pricing Agreements, penalties) – The answers to these 
questions were expected to help address objective number 2 (Zimbabwe rules) on 
laws and measures taken to regulate transfer pricing in Zimbabwe so that ultimately 
their effectiveness can be assessed. These questions were derived from the 
Zimbabwean Income Tax Act (Chapter 23:06) Section 98 and the 35th Schedule as it 
currently reads (see Chapter 5). 
 Transfer Pricing strategies (the transfer pricing schemes used by MNEs to avoid 
tax, transfer pricing adjustments, and others) – The answers to these questions were 
expected to address objective 4 on transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs to 
manipulate transfer pricing rules. These questions were mainly drawn from Chapter 2 
where McBarnet (2001) said the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of 
legislation should be considered in light of sophisticated schemes employed by 
taxpayers in a specific country.  
 Assessment of the transfer pricing rules (participants’ views on their 
implementation, their impact on tax avoidance/national revenue, their shortcomings, 
administrative capacity of ZIMRA, and others). The questions emerged from the 
main objective of assessing the effectiveness of the current transfer pricing rules in 
addressing tax avoidance. They were drawn mainly from the international guidelines 
(Chapter 4) and the best practices (Chapter 5) where the study was also expected to 
draw lessons from the other countries (objective 3) in order to make informed 
recommendations to improve transfer pricing policies and practices in Zimbabwe. 
 
Similar questions were structured for all groups in order to check for consistency and 
conformability. The researcher had an interview guide (Annexure 4) which provided the 
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researcher with the basics or minimum areas to be covered as indicated by Howitt and 
Cramer (2011). It served as a checklist for the researcher, and helped ensure that all research 
objectives were covered in the interview questions to enable the accomplishment of the 
research objectives. The interview guide was divided into two sections (see Annexure 4) for 
all the groups. Section A provided respondents with specific questions to which they could 
respond in terms of factual and substantive areas of transfer pricing. The section required 
participants’ factual responses to the more formal, legalistic and compliance requirements of 
the new rules to help assess these new rules. Section B allowed more time in the interview to 
discuss issues in a more open-ended and exploratory manner and for the participants to relate 
to any specific examples or experiences, narratives and views that would give deeper and 
richer data to add value to the topic under discussion. This created the opportunity to assess 
and improve, where necessary, the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Though interviews have their own flaws (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015), gathering data through 
in-depth interviews provided the richness and quality of data that was required to meet the 
objectives of the study. This was especially the case in respect of the Section B questions. 
Most participants gave very practical examples which added value to the conclusions of this 
study. 
 
6.6.2.1 Interview Debriefing 
The researcher initially conducted an interview debriefing with two respondents, one from 
ZIMRA and the other one from MNEs, in order to formatively evaluate the interview 
questions. This was undertaken to ensure that the research instruments were harmonised with 
the research objectives and in so doing minimise potential errors (Sreejesh, Mohapatra & 
Anusree, 2014) in the data gathering plan. It also allowed for sufficient time to rectify errors 
prior to conducting the research. Some questions were revised and others totally removed 
with new questions being added to ensure the instrument adequately captured the research 
objectives.  
 
From this exercise, the researcher also discovered that MNEs accountants were not as 
receptive as expected. This could be either because of their limited knowledge of the subject 
or their fear of potential victimisation because of divulging sensitive information that could 
bring the company into disrepute. Where the targeted participant was not forthcoming, the 
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researcher regarded this as a withdrawal. Consistent with voluntary participation, the 
researcher chose not to pursue nor coerce participants. This was done to uphold research 
ethics and not stifle the research domain because of the sensitivity of the subject as suggested 
by Pollock (2012:1). As a consequence of this potential risk, the researcher relied on 
information from tax consultants (TCs). This meant an adjustment in the initial sampling 
strategy. Given the fact that the over-riding sampling strategy was purposive (namely 
purposefully to interview those who are able to respond to the research puzzle with in-depth 
knowledge), the inclusion of the TCs as part of the purposive sample again confirms good 
qualitative sampling norms. In most countries, including Zimbabwe, the TCs are the 
knowledge experts on the intricacies of transfer pricing (see Chapter 2).  
 
In respect of ZIMRA, the researcher also established that officers who work from other 
stations or regional offices are not so conversant with the subject since all transfer pricing 
cases are handled by the head office. After revising the instruments as informed by the 
interview debriefing, the researcher gained confidence that the research instrument was now 
complete and conducted the actual data gathering process. 
 
The researcher successfully interviewed ten (10) ZIMRA officials, three MOF specialists and 
seven tax consultants. The MNEs did not have any meaningful responses and as such the 
researcher had to rely on responses from tax consultants appointed by MNEs who were more 
than willing to participate in the research. Pollock (2012:1) hints that people may be willing 
to participate because of altruism, which is a desire to contribute to the social good. The 
researcher had an average of fifty (50) minutes per interview. Table 8 below provides a 
summary of the interviews conducted. 
 
Table 8: Schedule of Interviews (including adjustment to include TCs) 
INTERVIEWEE Means of recording Source Document Consent Form 
 
10 ZIMRA Officials Audio-recorded Refer to ZIMRA Interview 1-10 Signed 
 
3 MOF Specialists Audio-recorded Refer to MOF Interview 1-3 Signed 
 
7 TCs Audio-recorded Refer to TC Interview 1-7 Signed 
 
Source: Own Compilation 
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Participants were given information sheets and consent forms to read and sign in order to 
acquaint them with the subject matter as well as observe ethical integrity. All the 
interviewees signed their consent forms as indicated above.   
 
6.7 Methods - Data Analysis and Presentation 
Qualitative data analysis involves defining, categorising, explaining and mapping qualitative 
data such as interview transcripts (Owen, 2014). Content analysis was used for its 
unobtrusiveness in studying sensitive research topics (Prasad, No date:2). To summarise the 
data analysis process in this study, Table 9 was created. The questions in the Table gave rise 
to the interview schedule (see Annexure 4). 
 
Table 9: Levels of Analysis 
Level Main Research Question  Method: Data Gathering Method: Data Analysis 
Analytical How can Zimbabwe best regulate 
MNEs cross-border transactions to 
minimise tax avoidance through 
transfer pricing without impeding FDI? 
Literature review as a means to 
establish theoretical 
framework for the data, 
Document review, Interviews 
Deductive and inductive Content Analysis 
Level Sub-question Method: Data Gathering Method: Data Analysis 
Descriptive 1. What are the transfer pricing 
methods available according to the 
OECD and the UN? 
Document review  Deductive and inductive Content Analysis 
Analytical 
and 
Evaluative 
2. How adequate are the Zimbabwe 
transfer pricing rules? 
Literature review, Document 
review, Interviews 
Interpretive analysis of the current transfer 
pricing legislation using the empirical 
themes of content analysis and reviewing 
them against other countries experiences 
Descriptive 3. What are the transfer pricing 
experiences of other countries? 
Document review Deductive and inductive content analysis to 
draw lessons from other jurisdictions 
Descriptive 4. What are the transfer pricing 
strategies used by MNEs to avoid tax 
through transfer pricing? 
Literature review, Document 
review, Interviews 
Deductive and inductive content analysis and 
reviews of court cases 
Analytical How can these findings influence 
transfer pricing policy and practice in 
the future? 
Literature review, Document 
review, Interviews 
Deductive and inductive reasoning: content 
analysis 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
Table 9 above describes the types of analysis used in this study. Content analysis was 
performed for textual data from both transcribed interviews and from document review. 
Below is a detailed explanation of the procedures that were followed during these analyses.  
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6.7.1 Content Analysis of Documents 
Content analysis is defined as “a systematic means of arranging information into categories 
related to the fundamental questions of the research” (Prasad, No date: 2). Deductive and 
inductive content analysis served as the data analysis method. Deductive content analysis 
entails coding the data according to categories, while inductive content analysis involves 
classifying numerous words into smaller categories (Elo & Kyngas, 2008:109). The research 
process started with a preliminary framework based on existing literature and theories. 
According to Bryman and Burgess (1994) research processes are messy with the interaction 
between the empirical and conceptual globe while deduction and induction occur 
simultaneously.  
 
Documents were voluminous and the researcher had to start by identifying relevant texts 
since the documents were not written for the purposes of this study. The researcher came up 
with themes central to the research objectives and created categories (Braun & Clarke, 
2014:58). The researcher grouped the data to reduce the categories and eliminated irrelevant 
data. The categories were created to address the research objectives. The categories also 
informed the interview schedule that was used in this study (see Annexure 4). The findings of 
document review contributed to the rigour of the study.  
 
6.7.2 Content Analysis of Interviews 
As a policy oriented study, the research followed qualitative data analysis methods which 
were interpretive in nature. Consistent with the positionality of the researcher, and the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the study combined with the crystallisation 
approach, data was analysed qualitatively.  
 
The researcher undertook two cycles of coding. During the first cycle of coding, the 
researcher undertook the coding autonomously and formed categories keeping the research 
questions in mind during the analysis process and looked for units of analysis that were 
relevant as suggested by Elo and Kyngas (2008:109). The researcher reviewed a number of 
analytical methods (Saldana, 2009; Friese, 2014) and positioned herself with Braun and 
Clarke (2014) as shown in the following steps and as systematised by ATLAS.ti 8™. The 
CAQDAS, ATLAS.ti 8™ was used to intensify rigour, integrate and manage data and to 
demonstrate transparency of analysis (Tummons, 2014; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007:578). 
The ATLAS.ti 8™ software facilitated the recording and analysis of textual data allowing the 
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researcher to directly enter interview data as presented below. During the second cycle of 
coding, the assistance of the second coder to interweave the data with the theoretical 
perspectives that undergird the study, was secured. It entailed open-coding, grouping, 
categorising and capturing emerging themes as indicated by Nayar and Stanley (2015). Owen 
(2014) emphasises how coding is an interpretive act meant to facilitate progress from data 
gathering to data analysis. The researcher and second coder reviewed the codes and 
quotations, engaged in discussions and reached consensus (Barbour, 2001:1116) in line with 
recommendations by Braun and Clarke (2014) on the steps to follow. The steps initially 
applied are as follows:  
(i) The researcher first created the project in the software. This was simple as ATLAS.ti 
8™ proved to be a user-friendly software. The researcher, made sure that the 
documents were interviewee identity-free and simply named the transcripts TC1, TC2 
and so on. 
(ii) The researcher imported all primary data (transcripts) into the software. The 
researcher first conducted a process of finding relevant text in her data sets (interview 
transcripts). 
(iii) The researcher created group codes/categories as guided by the research objectives. 
The group codes/categories were named and coded using a mix of deductive and 
inductive means (Cho & Lee, 2014:4). Interim coding was done based on Hossein 
(2015:60)’s “directed content analysis”. 
(iv) The researcher created open codes under each theme as guided by the data (Friese, 
2014). 
(v) The researcher repeatedly read the transcripts and began with relevant concepts 
(deductive analysis), but was flexible to allow new concepts to emerge (inductive 
analysis) (Yin, 2011). This was done with special attention to distinctive themes that 
helped to interpret the transfer pricing phenomenon (Hossein, 2015:60). 
(vi) The researcher matched the codes with the data and created prefixes (Friese, 2014). 
This is the stage that the researcher made critical decisions independent of the 
software. The data was repeatedly read (Collins & Mulligan, 2014:10), contingencies 
explored, disagreeing evidence searched for, and competing explanations considered. 
Subsequently the researcher revisited the literature to place the interpretation in the 
bigger theoretical context as suggested by Meadows, Verdi and Crabtree (2003:988). 
During the process, the researcher determined the good or bad codes, and made 
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decisions regarding categories and sub-categories to minimise chances of getting into 
code swamp or too few items (Collins & Mulligan, 2014). 
(vii) The researcher analysed the data which was guided by the research objectives. At 
this stage, the researcher looked at the coded data again particularly to check analogy 
with the research questions. Thereafter, the researcher ran the analysis and wrote 
down the findings and interpretation. As the analysis progressed, the interim codes 
were revised, similar codes merged, and new codes added to cover the data.  
 
Unlike positivist lenses which claim singular truths, crystallisation embodied two 
methods namely; it allowed thick descriptions of the findings and gave room for 
multiple realities as indicated by Ellingson (2014:3). According to Meadows et al 
(2003:986) documents are static as they are written for a specific purpose other than 
the research conducted (Mogalakwe, 2006:222). Given this, the study crystallised the 
document review and interview analysis to achieve completion rather than 
confirmation (Tobin & Bergley, 2004:394). This allowed for a deeper understanding 
of the transfer pricing phenomenon (Stewart, Gapp, & Harwood (2017:6) within the 
qualitative interpretive paradigm. The subsequent steps applied are as follows: 
(i)     After signing a confidentiality agreement as per the ethics of the study, the second 
coder undertook an overview and the codes were discussed with the researcher 
(Barbour, 2001). The second coder is a practitioner expert in qualitative 
methodologies and has done second coding for many studies. This stage assisted 
the researcher in ensuring the dependability and credibility of data. 
(ii) The researcher reached consensus with the second coder (Barbour, 2001:1116). 
After a detailed discussion, the researcher reached consensus with the second 
coder. 
(iii) The researcher conducted theory coding as reviewed by the second coder. At first 
attempt, theoretical coding was difficult for the researcher, but after a couple of 
reviews by the second coder, the researcher then grasped the coding. 
(iv) The researcher reached consensus with the second coder (Barbour 2001:1116). 
 
After all the deliberations, the researcher and the second coder then reached a consensus, for 
which the data is presented in this study. The theoretical gap between legal rationality and 
implementation realities was analysed at length in Chapter 7. Meaningful data portions were 
identified, retrieved, isolated, grouped and regrouped for the purposes of analysis (Friese, 
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2014), from which conclusions were derived.  The use of these methods above simplified, 
integrated and improved the rigour of the research process. 
 
While it is generally accepted that there is no design without flaws, the qualitative inquiry 
greatly helped to attain the knowledge contributions of this study. Findings from both 
primary and secondary data analyses were presented, compared and interpreted in order to 
come up with a robust assessment of the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe. The final 
interview data presentation included the voices of participants, the reflexivity of the 
researcher and a description and interpretation of the problem (Creswell, 2014:45). The data 
was presented in tables and networks that were generated and imported from ATLAS.ti 8™. 
The visual aids (figures and tables - see Chapter 7), helped the researcher to identify patterns 
and predominant codes. The themes and codes that emerged from the transcripts were 
summarised in matrices. The data was interpreted and presented in two parts; ‘thinking 
through objectives’ and ‘thinking with theory’ (Mazzei & Jackson, 2012). This procedure 
assisted in clarifying the contextual positions that provoked the study as well as the 
theoretical perspectives that directed the study. Insights from the integration of these two 
mutual parts were used to describe and assess transfer pricing issues arising from the analysis 
in a coherent manner. It is anticipated that this will expand literature, inform policy and 
indicate a call for action. 
6.8 Qualitative Methodological Norms 
The process of crystallising secondary and primary data assisted to validate the results 
generated from the document review and interviews. Crystallisation of the data sources 
minimised the threats to trustworthiness such as respondent and researcher bias (Ellingson, 
2009). The blending of document analysis with other methodologies was undertaken to 
substantiate the findings as supported by Bowen (2009:28). Member checks as suggested by 
Meadows et al (2003:988) were also undertaken with tax consultants and ZIMRA to validate 
the data. With respect to the latter, this was achieved by providing the ZIMRA management 
with the interview recordings for them to verify the raw data prior to transcription and 
analysis. The researcher also provided the tax consultants with the transcriptions of their 
interviews for them to verify the data.  The researcher did not receive any negative feedback 
from the interviewees nor management. Table 10 summarises how the methodological norms 
were applied in this study. 
 
118 
 
Table 10: Methodological Norms (Moon et al, 2016) 
Norm Measures  
Credibility According to Moon et al (2016) credibility refers to whether the study measured what was intended. To ensure 
credibility the study applied crystallisation of methods, and employed interviews and a document review to 
corroborate the findings. The findings from interviews were audio-recorded, and the documents reviewed were stored 
for reference purposes. In-depth interviews also minimised researcher control. 
Dependability Dependability refers to consistency. To ensure dependability, the researcher clearly outlined the research design as 
well as the methodological limitations, and followed the research strategy. The engagement of the second coder 
helped resolve dependability issues. Member checks (Reilly, 2013) were also conducted to ensure transparency, 
provide an audit trail and to allow for changes. 
Conformability The ideas and experiences of the participants should be represented in the results of the study. The degree to which 
this occurs is referred to as conformability. Conformability is referred to as the objectivity and neutrality criterion. 
The role played by the second coder and her going through the transcriptions and data in ATLAS.ti 8™, also helped 
to minimise researcher bias. Member checks (Reilly, 2013) also allowed inconsistencies to be eliminated. The bias 
that comes with the use of purposive sampling cannot be overlooked, but to minimise the researcher bias the results 
were linked to the conclusions and audio-recordings kept for verification purposes. The use of snowball sampling 
also minimises researcher bias as the sampling phase was respondent-driven. 
Transferability Moon et al (2016) says transferability speaks to the ability of results to be extrapolated to other context. Purposive 
sampling was employed to identify information-rich participants and limit irrelevant data. However, the 
transferability of the data cannot be exaggerated as the study was limited to Zimbabwe. The findings are limited to 
making contributions, mainly, to transfer pricing of cross-border transactions by MNEs in a developing country, 
namely Zimbabwe. However, the methodological accounts provided for in this study can allow a similar study to be 
conducted, though limited by the subjectivity in interpretive research.  
Source: Own Compilation 
 
6.9 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations refer to moral choices affecting decisions, behaviour and principles 
(Greener, 2008). The researcher conducted this study with academic honesty, integrity and 
modesty. Before undertaking the field work, ethical clearance was sought from the University 
of South Africa’s Ethical Committee. After ethical clearance was obtained from the 
university, approval to conduct the study was sought and obtained from the tax authority, 
ZIMRA (Annexure 1) and the relevant ministry, MOF (Annexure 2). Authority was also 
sought from the MNEs and the participating tax consultants, but the letters are not annexed 
for confidentiality reasons as part of the ethical requirements of the study.  
 
After permission to have access to the participants was granted from the relevant 
organisations, information sheets were distributed to the target participants indicating the 
objective of the study, anticipated benefits as well as participant rights to withdraw. Signed 
consent forms were sought (see Annexure 3) and participants were informed of the nature of 
study, its purpose and how they were expected to participate (interviews), the rights of the 
participants, and assurances of anonymity and contact details of the researcher to allow 
participants to clarify any queries. All these were observed to fulfil the academic expectations 
and requirements even though Pollock (2012:3-4) argued that qualitative research is achieved 
through personal engagement and collaboration rather than a contractual relationship. 
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Interviews were only conducted with those who had agreed to participate and no one was 
coerced to participate. The study followed four ethical principles as discussed by Pollock 
(2012:2-6) to ensure no harm would befall the participants. A discussion of these principles is 
as follows. 
 
6.9.1 Principle 1: Autonomy 
The researcher respected the rights and dignity of research participants and all participants 
were advised of their option to withdraw from the research at any time without penalty or 
repercussions. The unwillingness to participate by some of the participants like the MNEs 
was considered as a withdrawal and respected by the researcher as encouraged by Cooper and 
Schindler (2008). Pollock (2012:7) also emphasised that the researcher should exercise 
judgement in qualitative research. The researcher did not attempt to coerce the MNEs that 
were not responsive, as participation was voluntary. 
 
6.9.2 Principle 2: Beneficence 
The researcher aimed to contribute to tax administration by influencing policy and improving 
transfer pricing practices in Zimbabwe by carrying out this study. The study was sponsor-
free, and thus free from sponsor bias, and did not offer gifts or services to participants, but 
rather acknowledged the participants for their time and input. The administration of 
interviews did not result in any participant injuries, pain/physical/psychological 
problems/side-effects, persecution, stigmatisation/negative labelling, but normal discomfort 
was expected on the part of MNEs given that the study was centred on tax matters which are 
of a sensitive nature. The researcher sought to enlighten the taxpayers on what is expected, 
the tax authority on any system deficiencies and the MOF on any legislative gaps to come up 
with a robust transfer pricing system.  
 
6.9.3 Principle 3: Non-maleficence 
The researcher observed the confidentiality principle and did not publish any identifiable or 
personal information or any sensitive information that could be disclosed by participants. 
Private and confidential information was neither recorded nor printed in the study. The paper-
based records were kept in a lockable shelf at the researcher’s house which would be 
accessible only to the researcher. The researcher blacked out names, and used pseudonyms 
like ZIMRA Interview 1 or MNE Interview 2 to number the transcripts, and kept a numbered 
list in a separate lockable location. Access passwords for computer-based records were only 
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available to the researcher. Data was encrypted to ensure security and it will be retained for 
five years. Thereafter, paper-based records will be completely destroyed by fire and computer 
based records will be deleted through the use of a relevant software programme in order to 
permanently de-identify personal information. Back up files will also be permanently deleted. 
Participants were assured of no harm or embarrassment (Saunders et al, 2009) as a result of 
this research. This has been assured through strict adherence to the confidentiality rule.  
 
6.9.4 Principle 4: Justice 
All relevant findings and results were presented as they have been provided for in the 
interviews. There was no falsification of information. ZIMRA investigations office 
management was given the recordings after the interviews to allow them to check if there was 
any material disclosure of information that should not be published. After completing the 
research, principal findings of the study would be distributed to participants by means of a 
written thesis accessible on the internet or by peer-reviewed journals (print and electronic). 
 
6.10 Summary 
The research design was outlined in this chapter explaining the research approach and 
research methods adopted. The study follows a qualitative interpretive research strategy to 
find solutions to the transfer pricing problem. The research method identified and explained 
the research participants, sampling technique, the research procedure and the research 
analysis undertaken. The study’s research participants included MNEs in Zimbabwe, tax 
practitioners, the MOF and ZIMRA officials. In-depth interviews were used to collect 
primary data, and a document review was also conducted. Extensive efforts were made to 
ensure credibility, trustworthiness, consistency and conformity of the results and all ethical 
considerations were observed. Data analysis was performed using an established process, and 
assisted by qualitative data analysis software, ATLAS.ti 8™ as explained in chapter 7 below.  
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CHAPTER 7: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
“A tax loophole is something that benefits the other guy. If it benefits you, it is a tax 
reform” - Russell, B, Long 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter explored the transfer pricing rules of other jurisdictions in order to 
provide possible recommendations in respect of the Zimbabwean transfer pricing rules. 
Guided by both inductive and deductive processes, this chapter provides the presentation, 
interpretation and discussion of the results from both primary and secondary data analyses in 
order to answer the research objectives and to build towards the contribution to the body of 
knowledge created by this study.  
 
This chapter addresses the data and interpretation thereof using two scholarly conventions:  
 How does the researcher meet the research objectives of the study through the data 
and analysis?  
 How does the researcher review the data through the lens of the theoretical and 
conceptual framework? 
 
The researcher therefore has created two parts to this chapter in order to demonstrate the lines 
of argument around the research objectives (which were also reflected as questions) and then 
to review the lines of argument using the mid-range theory and the conceptual framework 
(refer to Figure 1 and 2 in Chapter 2).  
 
The chapter is comprehensive in coverage and length because of this decision and is based on 
the plethora of data that qualitative research generates and that the researcher has analysed 
and interpreted (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). The researcher has orientated the research 
findings (this chapter) on the basis of the commitments set out in Chapter 1 (research 
objectives and research questions driving the study) and the theoretical gaps and propositions 
set out in Chapter 2 (attending to an extension of theory). 
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7.1.1 Overview of Approach to Presentation and Analysis of the Data  
The data was interpreted as guided by the research problematisation, conceptual framework, 
and methodological choices that were discussed in Chapter 6. The researcher undertook 
various cycles of coding when analysing the information obtained from the interviews 
conducted with the MOF, ZIMRA and the MNEs/TCs as explained in the adjusted sampling 
strategy in Chapter 6, Sections 6.5 and 6.6. The transcripts were pre-coded and the data were 
reviewed based on Braun and Clarke’s (2014:65) guidance. This meant getting to know the 
data and asking questions about ‘what was going on in the data?’ Thereafter, the researcher 
started on the formal coding process. The transcripts were categorised into document groups 
in ATLAS.ti 8™ (Annexure 6 – document groups). This enabled the three central 
perspectives to be analysed systematically through coding similar participants together and 
getting a sense of if, and how, the three groups differed. The first cycle of coding was done 
on the basis of what the researcher knew from the literature review and initially looked for 
patterns in line with the central concepts of transfer pricing and the central concepts of the 
relevant research objectives (objectives 1, 2 and 4) and ultimately the main research 
objective. This was descriptive coding which entailed giving a meaningful link to the text 
through assigning a code (Braun and Clarke, 2014:65). 
  
Thereafter, the researcher focussed on more conceptual coding, reviewed the transcript and 
adopted a coding orientation that responded to more integrated concepts of the conceptual 
framework and the objectives. This is a form of structural coding (Saldana, 2009:66) as there 
is a more defined structure guiding the coding. The second coder reviewed a sample of these 
codes, held discussions with the researcher in which consensus was reached (Barbour 
2001:1116). Thereafter the researcher refined the codes, generated an initial code book for 
the research objectives and ‘themed’ the data into seven themes (Braun and Clarke, 2014). 
The themes were then compared to the literature as well as the narratives under the relevant 
research objectives, which were written up as an analysis. 
 
The researcher worked in a similar manner in the ‘Thinking with theory’ section. The second 
coder provided synergistic guidance in terms of orienting the theoretical coding process. The 
discussions between the second coder and the researcher (Barbour, 2001) ensured that 
agreement was reached. The researcher then aggregated the codes into themes that spoke 
more substantively to the theory (Braun and Clarke, 2014:70). Narrative exemplars of the 
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‘Thinking with theory’ section were then written up incorporating themes and aligning the 
themes to the literature (Braun and Clarke, 2014:67). 
 
The Zimbabwean transfer pricing regime state of play (global objective/main research 
question) was thus assessed based on findings from the literature review, document review, 
in-depth interviews as well as theoretical underpinnings. The following reference system was 
used to report the qualitative data: 
Example: ZIMRA 6 (as referred in Annexure 10), where:  
 ZIMRA represents the ZIMRA Participants; 
 6 represents the ZIMRA participant being referred to; and 
 Italics for the verbatim quotations where applicable. 
 
7.1.2 Background Issues 
The ultimate goal of this study has been to assess the effectiveness of the transfer pricing 
rules in Zimbabwe that regulate MNEs cross-border transactions in order to minimise tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing. To achieve the objectives of this study, in-depth 
interviews were conducted with three groups namely, ZIMRA, MOF and TCs (see Annexure 
6 for the document groups). Findings showed that MNEs are abdicating the tax related 
responsibilities to technocrats who happen to be tax consultants. This was observed as the 
researcher failed to get information of substance from the MNEs. Some of the MNEs 
cancelled scheduled interviews belatedly, while other MNE respondents either did not know 
the responses to the questions or simply did not want to talk about the subject, and so ended 
up referring the researcher to their TCs. TCs therefore appear to represent the views of the 
MNEs regarding the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe as the MNEs referred the 
researcher to their tax consultants while the MOF also referred the researcher to ZIMRA for 
the bulk of the questions.   
 
Notwithstanding the characteristics of qualitative methods, the researcher made use of 
supplementary matrices with numeric data (Tables 11 - 17). This provided clear evidence and 
simplified the comparisons amongst the participating groups, and helped identify patterns in 
the interview data. However, this was done without smothering the primary research 
objectives of employing qualitative tools to get rich and thick data from the selected 
participants (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). Hossein (2015:59) acknowledges that such a 
124 
 
practice may seem quantitative at first but its goal is to explore the manifest content in an 
inductive manner. It should also be noted that ethical issues underpinning qualitative studies 
were highly observed, as participation in this study was based on the willingness of the 
participants, their ability to provide the beseeched data and their freedom to withdraw at any 
stage of the data gathering process. Snowball sampling was applied to the MNEs and their tax 
consultants where the researcher was being referred to the MNE’s tax practitioner. The 
researcher successfully interviewed ten ZIMRA officers and a sample of seven TCs was 
achieved. Three transfer pricing specialists were interviewed from the MOF while other staff 
members were said to be ignorant of the subject in question. Therefore, the dependability of 
the data was not based on numbers but rather on the depth of the data gathered. 
 
For more rigorous data analysis and conclusions, document analysis was also employed using 
tax legislation, international transfer pricing guidelines, budget statements and court cases as 
the source of this review. Findings from the content analysis of both the documents and the 
interviews are integrated in this chapter. This chapter is stratified into two parts, with Part 1 
being “Thinking through objectives” (interweaving data with the study objectives) and Part 2 
being “Thinking with theory” (plugging theory with data). 
 
7.2 PART 1: THINKING THROUGH THE OBJECTIVES 
The researcher’s desire to align the study to the research objectives informed the unique title: 
“Thinking through objectives”, and in this section the data from the interview and document 
analysis is interwoven with the study objectives and the data sources, with literature, 
influencing the themes. 
 
In order to extract answers to the research questions, interviews were analysed as 
recommended by Pierre and Jackson (2014), when they uphold interviewing as a leading 
method of data gathering in qualitative research. The researcher audio recorded the 
interviews, transcribed them and then uploaded them on the ATLAS.ti 8™ software for 
integrated and systematic analysis. The interviews provided nuanced accounts of the 
interviewees, and the researcher initially started with six themes (deductive) which were 
informed by the research objectives. The seventh theme was based on other countries’ 
experiences with transfer pricing. Fifty-six codes were used in the interview analysis. 
Through interactive coding and data reduction, the researcher closed the coding stage with 
fifty codes. The themes aggregated the codes with some renamed as the data revealed a 
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certain trend. To emphasise a point and to prevent dilution of data, direct quotes were 
extracted and recorded verbatim from some of the interviews. The results were then aligned 
with the research objectives and presented in Figure 3. The Figure integrates all the themes 
used in this chapter to address the research objectives. 
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Figure 3: Alignment of Themes to Research Objectives 
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Figure 3 above shows the study objectives and how the themes were informed by both the 
study objectives and the primary data. The representations in this Figure were used to discuss 
the findings that follow. In each case, an overview of the objective is provided. This is 
followed by a summary of the findings from the document review as well as the interviews. 
This section therefore links the objectives with the themes found in the data. 
 
7.2 Objective 1: To Describe the Transfer Pricing Methods Outlined in the OECD and 
                            United Nations Guidelines 
To answer this objective, questions were raised on the applicability of the OECD and UN 
transfer pricing guidelines as well as the methods being applied in Zimbabwe. As a result, 
this objective is addressed by two themes discussed below. 
 
7.2.1 THEME 1: Applicability of International Transfer Pricing Guidelines to 
                             Zimbabwe 
Through document analysis, the researcher discovered that the UN and the OECD have come 
up with transfer pricing guidelines and hence, respondents were asked about the applicability 
of these transnational agencies’ guidelines to their circumstances. This was important in order 
to assess whether the Zimbabwean rules are not predisposed to international standards 
without being aligned to the demands of the local environment. The deficiencies experienced 
in applying international standards which, Oguttu (2016:18) postulates, may be inadequate to 
Africa’s fight against BEPS, were uncovered through the document analysis. The comparison 
of the UN and OECD transfer pricing guidelines as an examination of their applicability to 
the Zimbabwean context has not been considered in previous academic research. Another 
body (African Tax Administration Forum, ATAF) emerged from the interview data, and shall 
be discussed as well. 
 
The results of interviews on the applicability of international guidelines to Zimbabwe are 
shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: International Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
 Participant strata Applicability of OECD Applicability of UN Effectiveness of ATAF 
TC (Yes) 100% 29% 0% 
ZIMRA (Yes) 70% 40% 10% 
MOF (Yes) 100% 67% 0% 
Source: Own Compilation 
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The percentages in Table 11 depict the extent of usage of the transfer pricing guidelines by 
each participant strata. The data shows ZIMRA and TCs believe that the OECD is applicable 
to Zimbabwe with 70% and 100% indicating yes, respectively, while the UN had a 40% and 
29% yes response, respectively. This is in line with the literature which has shown that most 
countries have adopted the OECD guidelines despite the UN guidelines being crafted 
specifically for the developing countries (see Section 4.4). According to ZIMRA6, “We are 
not really tied to any but you’ll see that we tilt more to the OECD”. Similar to the ZIMRA 
officials, the tax consultants (TC1-7)  indicated that the use of guidelines is a matter of 
preference and that since the OCED guidelines are more regularly updated, they are 
preferred. Levin and Milgrom (2004) refer to this decision-making as “rational”, a process 
they describe as determining what options are available and thereafter choosing the most 
preferred.  
 
The MOF indicated that there is no preference between the OECD and UN but they naturally 
refer to OECD since they get technical assistance from the OECD on transfer pricing. They 
added that the UN is relevant to developing countries because they cover some things which 
the OECD does not cover. Apart from the OECD and the UN, ATAF emerged from the 
interviews. ZIMRA suggested that ATAF should work on its own guidelines for the African 
continent.  
 
Asked if there were any notable differences between the OECD and the UN guidelines, the 
majority of the respondents (TC1-6, ZIMRA1-10) acknowledged that the UN is based on the 
OECD guidelines and that there is substantial overlap between the OECD and the UN 
guidelines. However, many (both ZIMRA participants and TCs) professed that they have 
never used the UN guidelines. TCs expressed their frustration over the application of transfer 
pricing rules to domestic transactions yet the OECD guidelines do not cover such. This was 
confirmed by the literature of Taxmatrix (2016) which conceded that Zimbabwean rules 
cover both domestic and cross-border transactions. The TCs were advocating for a guideline, 
for example, on the thresholds of who is supposed to comply with the rules. The UN (2017) 
also recommends thresholds for documentation requirements. TCs objected to domestic 
transactions being subjected to transfer pricing when other countries are only subjected to 
cross-border transactions. That is the major difference between Zimbabwe and other 
countries. There is no consensus on the effects of this as Taxmatrix (2016) acknowledges that 
transfer pricing manipulation is very possible within the same country as two associated 
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enterprises can make arrangements to lower their overall tax burden. Oguttu (2006a:139), 
however, argues that there is a limited risk of tax avoidance in transfer pricing between 
related enterprises resident in one country. 
 
In this study, the researcher was interested in understanding the applicability of the existing 
international guidelines to the Zimbabwean context. ZIMRA believed that the OECD 
guidelines were applicable but not in their entirety and they would need “tweaking”. ZIMRA 
explained that these guidelines were a product of the OECD countries which have a different 
environment to Zimbabwe. In this regard, developing countries are considered to be on the 
receiving end, while the developed countries stand to benefit the most from these guidelines 
(confirmed by Section 4.5.2 and echoed by Oguttu, 2016:9). The respondents also noted that 
Zimbabwe has very few MNEs (i.e. companies owned by Zimbabweans but operating in 
other countries) but rather more MNEs owned by developed countries operating in 
Zimbabwe. The dominance of foreign owned enterprises in Zimbabwe particularly in the 
mining sector was confirmed by Kwaramba, Mahonye and Mandishara (2016:53). Such a 
situation exposes the country to high risk of repatriation of profits.  
 
The OECD has also been criticised for being voluminous and difficult to understand, and 
ZIMRA was urged to prepare a guideline in the lay man’s language (TC1-7). The OECD 
guidelines also appear to be more skewed towards the developed countries. These allegations 
are also alluded to by Baker and Mckenzie (2006) when they argue that the UN should not 
import OECD guidelines as these favour developed countries. ZIMRA further added that the 
OECD is not a “one size fits all” so one cannot assume that what applies in Australia applies 
to Zimbabwe. ZIMRA gave the example of management services where the OECD instructs 
the charging of the cost plus method while local taxpayers were charging percentage of sales 
which is incorrect as they have no relationship with the turnover, but the question is: “How 
do you arrive at cost plus for example when it is a company policy that the CEO spends time 
at subsidiary A and subsidiary B?” This is difficult because no-one is able to keep the records 
of how much cost is associated with such a transaction. Moreover, the unavailability of 
comparable local data leads to the use of foreign databases. TCs highlighted that though 
using foreign databases was permissible at law, it did not provide accurate results.  They 
added that Zimbabwe could rely on OECD guidelines to a certain extent, but would need to 
be reviewed for their applicability, suitability and effectiveness which is why Zimbabwe also 
refers to the UN guidelines. 
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Most respondents from ZIMRA (2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9) acknowledged that the use of the OECD 
and UN guidelines is persuasive rather than authoritative/binding. Findings showed that more 
users are aligned to the OECD, but the local legislation takes precedence over the OECD and 
UN guidelines. Both ZIMRA and TCs agreed that Zimbabwe literally adopted the OECD 
guidelines and that while they are applicable, there could be grey areas that would need to be 
customised to the Zimbabwe situation rather than just taking a blue print from the OECD. To 
the contrary, TC1 felt the guidelines needed to be applied uniformly to prevent discrepancies 
since a MNE is resident both in Zimbabwe and outside of Zimbabwe. This concurs with 
Evers, Meier, and Spengel (2014) who advocates for the standardisation of transfer pricing 
rules at international level. Conclusively, while there is no consensus, substantial evidence 
shows that the OECD guidelines are being applied more than the UN guidelines. 
 
7.2.2 THEME 2: Transfer Pricing Methods Applied in Zimbabwe 
The question posed to the respondents with respect to the transfer pricing methods was as 
follows: 
 
Of the five OECD methods (CUP, RPM, CPM, TNNM, PSM) which ones do you prefer 
and why? Have you had problems with applying any of these methods? 
As a means of assessing the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe, the question sought to 
discover the transfer pricing methods applied by the respondents as well as to establish if 
there are any preferences. The methods mentioned above were selected on the basis that they 
are the ones prescribed by both the OECD and the UN.  Information such as the expectations 
of the tax authority will help inform taxpayers on what methods are preferred. Knowing the 
challenges faced in applying these methods aided in finding ways of mitigating the same. The 
results are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Transfer Pricing Methods Used by Participants 
 Participant strata CPM CUP PSM RPM TNNM 
TC (Yes) 57% 57% 0% 0% 
 
43% 
ZIMRA (Yes) 10% 40% 0% 0% 
 
0% 
Source: Own Compilation 
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ZIMRA selected CUP as the most applied method with 40% saying yes while cost plus 
followed with 10% saying yes they used this method and the rest were not mentioned. These 
findings confirmed that traditional transaction methods were preferred to transactional profit 
methods (Taxmatrix, 2016), and the respondents acknowledged that the CUP method was 
easy to apply because one would just be comparing information relating to similar products. 
57% (4/7) of TCs expressed that they apply CPM and the CUP method the most, followed by 
43% (3/7) applying TNMM, with 0% for the profit split and resale price method. They added 
that CPM is mainly applied to services even where one is supplying services to a third party. 
The application of CPM to services is in tandem with the UN (2013) guidelines. Some TCs 
indicated that they also apply TNNM when they struggle with the CUP and CPM. The CUP 
method and CPM seem to be applied the most, with many stressing that both the OECD and 
the Zimbabwean legislation favour the CUP method where all these traditional methods 
produce the same results. These findings confirmed the CUP method as the easy and 
preferred method to the other four methods in Zimbabwe as alluded to by Taxmatrix (2016). 
However, the CUP method is hugely affected by lack of external and internal comparable 
data. The rest of the methods seem to be a bit difficult, and their application should be based 
on whether they are the most appropriate in particular circumstances.  
 
Though the other two methods were not mentioned, it was emphasised that the choice of 
method also depends on the product or service in question. Confirmation of limited or no use 
of the RPM supports Cools et al’s (2008) assertion that it is a one-sided method which is not 
always the most appropriate method to use. ZIMRA and TCs also seem to shun the profit 
split method which is consistent with the OECD’s (2010:95) assertions that its applicability is 
affected by limited access to information from foreign affiliates. It is important to note that 
the domestic law in Zimbabwe (35th schedule of the ITA) grants taxpayers the liberty to 
choose their method among the five transfer pricing methods, and restricts the Commissioner 
from applying a different method where the taxpayer has applied any of the OECD prescribed 
methods. 
 
7.3 Objective 2: To Investigate Measures that Curtail Transfer Pricing Employed by 
                           Other Countries (i.e United Kingdom, South Africa, Kenya and China) 
                           and their Experiences of this Phenomenon 
This objective was meant to assist in understanding how other countries have dealt with 
transfer pricing issues within their jurisdictions. This would enable Zimbabwe to draw 
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lessons from them, avoid the same mistakes made by these countries, and ultimately 
strengthen its transfer pricing rules. The selection of countries in this study was based on the 
major trading partners of Zimbabwe and some of the countries which form part of the BRICS 
countries. This has not been done in previous studies both theoretically and contextually.  
 
7.3.1 THEME 3: Measures Employed by Selected Countries 
Findings from both literature and interview data revealed that despite the inherent flaws of 
the OECD’s arm’s length principle, it is the most widely accepted model among the countries 
if compared to the UN’s guidelines. While countries such as China and South Africa have 
enacted CbC reporting, Zimbabwe is lagging behind, yet this mechanism would enhance 
transparency in transfer pricing reporting by MNEs and allow ZIMRA to detect transfer 
pricing abuse better. Though, Zimbabwe’s unique environment poses specific challenges to 
the tax authority and taxpayers, the country has so much to learn from these countries such as 
documentation requirements and interpretation notes (see Chapter 5).  
 
The unique economic, political and social systems in Zimbabwe expose the government to 
unique challenges which require creative and practical solutions. Solutions to base erosion 
and profit shifting cannot be universal, and the evidence shows that most proposed solutions 
emanate from developed economies which carry different economic, political and social 
structures compared to African states, and as such having global standards to fix 
domesticated problems is rationally exploitative. Dharmapala (2014) describes this as the tug 
of war between global welfare and national welfare. 
 
Despite this objective having been exclusively addressed in Chapter 5, the need for partnering 
and collegiality with other tax agencies and transnational agencies was evident in the 
empirical data (TC2, 4 and 5). The need for information sharing and transparency was 
emphasised and confirmed by Lohse and Riedel (2013). Therefore, examining the transfer 
pricing policies in other countries helped draw lessons for Zimbabwe and informed the 
conclusions to this study.  
 
7.4 Objective 3: To Examine the Laws and Policy Measures in Zimbabwe that  
                            Regular Transfer Pricing 
This objective was centred on the legislation and policies that Zimbabwe has put in place to 
regulate transfer pricing. To achieve this objective, (i) the laws and policy measures in 
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Zimbabwe were explored (ii) the opportunities and challenges faced with the current rules as 
well as (iii) the capacity of ZIMRA to effectively implement the rules were examined. The 
effectiveness of the transfer pricing laws and policies in Zimbabwe is critical as Sikka and 
Willmott (2010:30) mention that failure by governments/political processes to meet public 
demands threatens social stability and the state’s survival. Literature has also shown that 
there is little or no research which considers this context extensively as is done in this study. 
 
Faced by sophisticated tax avoidance strategies by MNEs, Holtzman and Nagel, (2014) 
indicate that governments revised their legislation by introducing significant penalties, new 
documentation requirements, and increased audit procedures. These were examined, and the 
rationale and extent to which the OECD and the UN guidelines have been adopted was also 
relevant and critical in determining the efficacy of the local rules.  
 
7.4.1 THEME 4: Laws and Policy Measures in Zimbabwe 
The MOF was asked what triggered the introduction of new rules. They indicated that the 
move from GAAR was a result of their ineffectiveness which was detrimental to the national 
revenue collections. This move reflects rational decision-making (Jukka, 2001) where they 
chose to adopt what gives them a higher payoff. Furthermore, the previous legislation 
(Section 98) made it technically and legally difficult for the Commissioner to ascertain 
transfer pricing abuse as well as making appropriate adjustments (other than just exercising 
his discretion). Hence, the respondents were asked to comment on the existence of provisions 
such as documentation requirements, penalties, Advance Pricing Agreements, and the 
effectiveness of the fiscal appeal court. Table 13 presents the results of the questions posed to 
the respondents on the transfer pricing laws and policies in Zimbabwe. The MOF referred the 
researcher to ZIMRA for most of the questions. ZIMRA acknowledged that it influences 
policy to a large extent as they make recommendations to the MOF to amend the legislation 
where they feel it is lacking. 
Table 13: Laws and Policy Measure in Zimbabwe 
  TC (Yes) ZIMRA (Yes) 
Availability of APAs 0% 10% 
Clear Documentation  Requirements 14% 10% 
Availability of Deadlines 0% 20% 
Availability of Penalties 14% 10% 
Effective Fiscal Appeal Court 14% 0% 
Source: Own Compilation 
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Each of these measures are discussed separately below. 
 
7.4.1.1 Availability of APA Procedures in Zimbabwe 
Having realised that other countries have adopted APA procedures to minimise disputes 
between taxpayers and the tax authority, the question posed to the interviewees sought to 
establish whether Zimbabwe provides for this. The results propose that according to ZIMRA, 
APAs were not included in the transfer pricing legislation as 90% gave an outright adverse 
response to the existence of APAs in Zimbabwe and 10% indicated a yes with uncertainty. 
The majority of ZIMRA officials confirmed that they have never invoked or applied APAs. 
Similarly, TCs concurred, with TC4 repeatedly saying “there is really nothing like that”. 
Both ZIMRA officers and TCs alluded to the benefits of APAs and failed to understand why 
they remain excluded from the local transfer pricing legislation.  
 
Their non-existence could be because the MOF feels that APAs are another source of leakage 
(MOF2). The MOF indicated that they only had advance tax rulings. MOF1 argued that while 
APAs may be treated as a way of managing risk, they could be manipulated as the agreement 
is done before exchange rate adjustments, inflation adjustments and losses. They attributed 
this to the vast knowledge of the tax professionals who are familiar with ways of taking 
advantage of existing rules, and assist taxpayers in avoiding tax. The fear displayed here 
confirms Oguttu’s (2017) assertion that often African tax authorities lack experience and 
expertise to administer APAs and thus are exposed to a high risk of being taken advantage of 
by the MNEs. 
 
The confirmation of the absence of APAs in Zimbabwe also suggests that ZIMRA risks 
having multiple disputes with taxpayers (Oguttu, 2006b) and that the legislation lacks an 
important ingredient for a better transfer pricing regime. Having the taxpayer and the 
Revenue Authority agree on a transfer price in advance would mean that the price is at arm’s 
length. This means that the price would be similar to what would be charged between 
independent enterprises which would also mean less tax avoidance. 
 
7.4.1.2 Clarity of Documentation Requirements by ZIMRA 
The new legislation (Section 98B of the ITA) places an obligation on companies with 
associate transactions to maintain documentation. A question was posed to the respondents to 
establish if the legislation was clear on what was expected from the taxpayers regarding 
135 
 
preparation, maintenance, and submission of the transfer pricing documentation. Knowing 
this would not only help to assess the adequacy of the rules but also help iron out ambiguity, 
speculations and varied interpretations and treatments of transfer pricing rules by taxpayers. 
 
As shown in Table 13, the majority 9/10 (90%) of the ZIMRA respondents complained about 
the clarity of documentation requirements as contained in the Zimbabwean laws. They 
suggested that a guide or standard on the preparation of this documentation should be issued. 
Similarly, TCs 6/7 (86%) confirmed that section 98B of the ITA refers users to the 35th 
schedule for documentation requirements, but fails to provide specific guidelines on how the 
documentation can be generated.  
 
A large percentage (86%) of the TCs expressed concern over the lack of documentation 
clarity and interpretation notes.  They revealed that they had to rely on the OECD model 
which has a three-tier reporting requirement, that is, the local file, master file and then the 
CbC reporting. They further explained that for doing a master file they consult Annexure 1 of 
Chapter 5 of the OECD model and for the local file, there is also Annexure 2 of Chapter 5. 
They also indicated that they have not done the CbC reporting, because of the restriction that 
one’s turnover must be about €750million. They explained that the CbC reporting is trying to 
get them to include in the financials, the transactions and operations they have in Zimbabwe 
and the other countries. They presumed that most companies would not qualify to do a CbC 
report because of the high threshold. However, countries such as South Africa signed a local 
CbC reporting regulation into law (see Chapter 5).  
 
TC respondents from international accountancy firms added that they referred to South 
African documents as samples of transfer pricing documentation in order for them to prepare 
documentation for their clients. This corresponds with the concerns echoed by Tapera and 
Majachani (2017) when they stressed that the new rules are not supported by practice notes or 
compliance guidelines. One ZIMRA official (ZIMRA4) hinted that they were waiting for 
taxpayers to make submissions and then they would draft standard guidelines on the contents 
and structure they required based on those submissions. This emphasized the point by TC2 
who repeatedly argued that, “ZIMRA is not so sure on how to proceed”, and that some of the 
ZIMRA officers would consult with him on how to implement the rules. Shallow information 
leaves ZIMRA with no grounds to penalise the client for undetailed documentation unless the 
taxpayer totally fails to prepare any transfer pricing documentation. Failure by ZIMRA to 
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disclose the contents and structure requirements is hypocritical according to Brunsson 
(1993:7), in that they demand something from taxpayers which they themselves do not know 
how to prepare. 
 
The question which came next was whether ZIMRA officials knew what to do with the 
documentation. One interviewee (TC2) submitted documentation to ZIMRA and ZIMRA 
replied acknowledging receipt and stating that it did not know what to do with it. However, 
most of the consultants revealed that because the law is not explicit; they urge their clients to 
comply by maintaining the documentation in case ZIMRA approaches them. Failure to 
produce such would be giving ZIMRA a reason to punish them.  
 
It was interesting to note that TC6 indicated that documents prepared by TCs which ZIMRA 
require will be supplied, but their content does not contain the truth. The researcher deduced 
that the authenticity of the contents remains ZIMRA’s job to verify. This is consistent with 
Brunsson’s (1982:30) theoretical assumptions that sometimes unfavourable information is 
suppressed in rational decision-making. However, the presentation of false information 
purporting that it is a true representation of the organisation’s position is embedded in the 
hypocrisy and impression management theory described by Elsbach and Sutton (1992) (see 
Section 2.5.2). 
 
Conclusively, both ZIMRA and TCs concurred that the documentation requirements are not 
clear. In essence the legislation provides basically the principal position. Documentation 
preparation is tripartite according to Chapter V of OECD (2015), but ZIMRA does not 
specify whether the MNEs should maintain the local file, master file or the CbC report. 
Participants recommended enhanced documentation requirements, and are supported by 
Durst (2015a:12) for their augmentation of enforceability. However, he also warns against 
too many documentation requirements that are too voluminous and difficult for both the 
taxpayer to prepare and the tax authority to assess. These findings mean that though the 
legislation is not clear on the exact documentation requirements, failure to maintain proper 
documentation tends to disadvantage the taxpayer by exposing him to a high risk of scrutiny 
and possibly penalties.  
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7.4.1.3 Clarity of Deadlines for Submission of Transfer Pricing Documentation 
It was also important to find out whether the submission deadlines for the transfer pricing 
documentation are clearly provided so as to minimise unnecessary taxpayer penalties and 
enhance tax administration by ZIMRA. Furthermore, Lohse and Riedel (2013:8) found 
reduced income shifting with strengthened transfer pricing documentation requirements. 
 
A majority (80%) of ZIMRA officials confirmed that they do not have submission dates for 
transfer pricing documentation, and that they had been receiving many enquiries from clients 
pertaining to whether they have a template document and when they should be submitted. 
ZIMRA8 indicated that the legislation implies that taxpayers maintain contemporaneous 
documentation which can only be submitted after ZIMRA requests it. There was unanimous 
consensus among the TCs that no stipulated deadlines for the submission of transfer pricing 
documentation exist. It appears TCs encourage their clients to keep some sort of 
documentation should ZIMRA ever request it to avert penalties. 
 
7.4.1.4 Availability of Specific Penalties that Apply to Transfer Pricing Abuse 
The question was targeted at establishing the strength of the transfer pricing regime in 
Zimbabwe, since having clear penalties specific to transfer pricing abuse would strengthen 
the rules (Lohse & Riedel, 2013:8). 
 
From Table 13 above, it can be noted that 90% of ZIMRA officers refuted that there are 
penalties specific to transfer pricing. Tax consultants (TC1-6) also opposed the existence of 
specific penalties. The lack of specific transfer pricing penalties was confirmed in Chapter 5, 
with the rest of the countries reviewed having penalties in place except for Zimbabwe. These 
findings are in tandem with the findings by Lohse (2012) which showed that only 27% of the 
44 countries which they studied had specific transfer pricing penalties translating to 73% of 
the countries not having specific penalties. Taxmatrix (2016) confirmed that local 
Zimbabwean rules lack a separate penalty regime.  
 
The researcher further probed if there is any punishment for non-compliance with the transfer 
pricing rules. Many ZIMRA officials (ZIMRA 1-9) highlighted that because of the absence of 
specific penalties, general or traditional penalties (Section 46 of the ITA which deals with 
additional tax) apply. They explained that under-declaration attracts 100% penalty for first 
offenders while those who are in the habit of committing the same offence get a 200% 
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penalty. ZIMRA also indicated that it has a penalty load model where taxpayers can get tax 
penalties waived. However, 10% of the ZIMRA officers criticised this saying this loading 
model is limited by a lot of subjectivity, leaving the penalty regime weak.  The National 
Budget (2017) echoed that the penalty regime was too discretionary thereby promoting 
corruption between taxpayers and the ZIMRA officers.  
 
TCs highlighted that some of their clients would ask them questions as to what penalties they 
would face if they failed to maintain the documentation. Their response was that no specific 
penalties were in place, but failure to have the documentation would give ZIMRA the liberty 
to uplift the values and charge them penalties as if you have done an underpayment/under-
declaration. They added that ZIMRA could also use Section 81 (general offenses) whereby if 
a taxpayer fails to keep documentation as required by the Commissioner, he would be 
penalised apart from having his revenue raised or some expenses disallowed. TCs suggested 
that there is a need for specific penalties rather than generic penalties, while the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF1,2,3) simply acknowledged that ZIMRA has stringent penalties which are 
guided by the ordinary legislation. 
 
The issue of construing transfer pricing together with other offences does not show the 
gravity of the revenue lost through transfer pricing. Lohse and Riedel (2013:8) emphasized 
this when they found that specific (e.g. for missing or incomplete transfer pricing 
documentation) rather than general penalties increased compliance with transfer pricing. 
Some of the respondents stressed that it is important to benchmark and fine-tune the penalty 
regime for practice to be in line with other countries. Other respondents believed that we are 
all in a global village and therefore steps to match what is practiced in other countries are 
warranted. 
 
7.4.1.5 The Effectiveness of the Fiscal Appeal Court in Zimbabwe 
In order to come up with a robust transfer pricing regime it would be critical to assess any 
possible gaps that could weaken the rules. Hence the researcher asked respondents about the 
effectiveness of the Fiscal Appeal Court and the availability of dispute resolution procedures.  
 
Just like the penalties, ZIMRA confirmed that the dispute resolution procedures for transfer 
pricing disputes are the same as with the general procedures for any tax assessment disputes.  
ZIMRA itself acknowledged that the fiscal court is not effective with many respondents 
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(ZIMRA 1-9) citing that though the fiscal court is in existence, it was being limited by 
several factors as proved by multiple unresolved cases. TCs (TC1-7) echoed the same, 
expressing disgruntlement over pending court cases. Some of the challenges highlighted by 
TCs were that the court is understaffed with only one judge who is overwhelmed by work 
(deals with all kinds of taxes: income tax, transfer pricing tax, VAT cases and many others). 
Other TCs alluded to the fact that there have always been allegations that the court does not 
have a presiding judge who is well versed in taxation. One tax consultant (TC4) indicated that 
ZIMRA raised an assessment objecting to the price that a taxpayer had charged and the 
taxpayer disputed it and the case is still before the courts. The respondents concurred that 
delays in concluding transfer pricing cases was one area weakening the transfer pricing 
regime.The fiscal court backlogs are confirmed by the Zimbabwean transfer pricing case 
which was submitted in 2014 and only concluded in 2018 (CF Pvt Ltd v ZIMRA) (see 
Chapter 3). TCs also expressed concern over the demands of the law that the taxpayer has to 
pay the additional tax whether or not the case has been finalised (Section 69 of the Income 
Tax Act). 
 
Though failure to conclude cases may seem more prejudicial to the taxpayers (with pending 
court cases), it also mars the chances of ZIMRA appraising its legislative and operational 
capacity in order to improve. TCs stressed that this situation is not peculiar to Zimbabwe 
alone, but is common in Africa, citing that there are not many transfer pricing cases except 
for the famous Unilever case of Kenya (2005). The legal implementation of the transfer 
pricing rules is affected by judges that have been said to be “panicking”, overwhelmed and 
with lack of expertise as evidenced by backlogs in the fiscal court cases. This contradicts the 
assertion by Maya (2015:5) that the courts have power to decide on the taxpayer’s 
compliance or non-compliance with the demands of the law.  
 
The inefficiencies of the Fiscal Appeal Court highlighted by the respondents contradict the 
assertions by Bagchi et al (1995) that a tax administration system with a combination of an 
omniscient judge and an omniscient tax agency would address tax avoidance. According to 
the researcher, the fiscal court is the apex authority which should set precedence and become 
the source of law. Thus, delaying the conclusion of court cases does not only stifle legislative 
progress but also weakens tax administration and clouds taxpayer confidence in the tax 
system. 
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7.4.2 THEME 5: Current Rules - Opportunities and Challenges 
In order to assess the adequacy of the transfer pricing rules, apart from knowing the 
provisions of the rules, it was also important to find out the challenges that are currently 
being faced by both taxpayers and the tax authority. Respondents were asked to comment on 
the opportunities and challenges that arise as a result of the new rules and the opportunities 
are discussed first in Table 14. 
 
7.4.2.1 Opportunities  
 
Table 14: Current Rules Opportunities 
 Participant Strata Shifting Burden of 
Proof 
Strengthening 
Transfer Pricing 
Rules 
Boost Administrative 
Confidence 
Increasing Business 
TC (Yes) 0% 71% 0% 100% 
 
ZIMRA (Yes) 100% 100% 90% 0% 
 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
The new rules have presented great opportunities, with ZIMRA applauding them for shifting 
the burden of proof and the strengthening of the transfer pricing rules. 90% of ZIMRA added 
that these rules had now boosted their confidence to go and face the taxpayers and challenge 
their transfer prices if they are not in tandem with the arm’s length principle. 71% of the TCs 
acknowledged that the rules had strengthened the transfer pricing rules and all saluted them 
mainly for increased business as clients are trickling in for transfer pricing services. Tax 
consultants (TC1-TC7) professed that the new rules brought a niche for them a situation that 
has created significant volumes of work. This has led to the establishment of separate 
divisions specifically for transfer pricing. Though Collins and Mulligan (2014) stress that 
upskilling taxpayers on transfer pricing as well as acquiring licenses for software needed to 
assist in determining the transfer prices comes with costs, the TCs confirmed that the benefits 
of providing transfer pricing services to clients outweighs the costs.  
 
ZIMRA officers also explained that the new rules were strengthening their endeavour to curb 
tax avoidance. They indicated this in comparison with the period where they had the anti-
avoidance rules (Section 98) only where it was ZIMRA’s responsibility to prove that a 
transaction done by a taxpayer was mainly to avoid, postpone or evade tax (or not at arm’s 
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length) – it was a difficult task according to them. ZIMRA7 stated that Section 98A, which 
prescribes what is termed tax splitting of transactions done in stages by various enterprises, 
was introduced because of the weaknesses of Section 98 in 2014. However, the section later 
changed when the specific transfer pricing rules (Section 98B and the 35th Schedule) were 
issued in 2016. This was echoed by Tapera and Majachani (2017) when they emphasized the 
new rules provided a more objective approach in adjusting the transfer prices than the old 
rules which required the commissioner to exercise discretion. The next section considers the 
challenges that arise from the application of the transfer pricing rules. 
 
7.4.2.2 Challenges 
On the challenges side, the respondents stressed that the legislation was not yet watertight, 
and there is still a knowledge gap with regards to transfer pricing within ZIMRA as well as 
on the taxpayer’s side. The other challenge that was cited was that Zimbabwe has a unique 
economic environment. For example, how its financial sector operates and how businesses 
have been conducting business poses difficulties in applying the rules universally. Guided by 
deductive coding the three main challenges that emerged are presented below. 
 
Table 15: Current Rules Challenges 
Participant strata Lack of Databases Lack of Clear 
Documentation 
Requirements 
Lack of 
Legislative 
Clarity 
TC (Yes) 71% 71% 100% 
 
ZIMRA (Yes) 90% 60% 30% 
 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
Of all the challenges raised by both groups, three could be summarised as the major ones. 
The lack of databases was ranked by ZIMRA as the highest at 90%; followed by the lack of 
clear documentation requirements at 60%; and the lack of legislative clarity at 30%. To the 
contrary, 100% of the TCs regarded the latter namely the lack of legislative clarity as the 
biggest challenge which was followed by the lack of databases and lack of documentation 
clarity at 71% respectively. The disparity between the views of the two groups explains the 
difference in the challenges faced by each of them in the execution of their respective duties 
which are diametrical. As to why TCs have raised concerns over legislative inconsistences, 
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this could be a pointer towards legislative inadequacies, as they stressed that the local laws 
are not precise and simplified for the taxpayers. However, it is interesting to note that as 
much as ZIMRA claim to understand the legislative provisions, TCs refute this impression 
and claim that they know better than ZIMRA. A lack of clear documentation has earlier been 
alluded to and as such, only a lack of databases and a lack of legislative clarity will be 
discussed. 
 
7.4.2.2.1 Lack of Databases 
The findings show that finding comparable data in Zimbabwe is a big challenge. The problem 
of maintaining databases is not peculiar to Zimbabwe but rather to the bulk of developing 
countries. This was confirmed in Chapter 5 with all the African countries reviewed having no 
databases except for China in Asia and the UK in Europe. For the tax authority/taxpayer to 
effectively apply the OECD’s prescribed transfer pricing methods, such as CUP, it proves 
difficult in the current set up. When further probed on how they were handling that, ZIMRA 
officers explained that they heavily rely on their counterpart, SARS, for comparable data. 
However, ZIMRA 10 emphasised that getting information from other tax authorities is costly 
and often time-consuming depending on the cooperativeness of the particular tax authority.  
 
ZIMRA 1-4 indicated that finding comparable data is difficult in Zimbabwe because only one 
company may be dealing in that line of business. They added that most of the MNEs rely on 
European databases which ZIMRA officers argued present a different market with different 
economic conditions. Furthermore, because of this limitation, objecting to taxpayer’s transfer 
prices has been difficult, and in most cases clients have dragged ZIMRA to court. ZIMRA 1-
3 expressed that if they fail to get comparable data they conduct functional analysis to 
establish the rationale for performing the service with a subsidiary outside Zimbabwe. 
Therefore, failure to justify the transaction gives ZIMRA the grounds to invoke Section 98 to 
say the sole reason of this transaction was to postpone, avoid or evade tax. 
 
TCs also stressed that accessing the databases is expensive for them as it requires 
subscription fees and other expenses. Only two consulting firms (TC1 and TC2) have 
managed to secure commercial databases such as the “Onesource” and “KT Mine”, offered 
by Thompson & Reuters.  International TCs do not have a database of their own but get data 
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from their firm’s global database (Africa and India) with considerable information coming 
from their Indian databases. One consulting firm (TC2) indicated that they had to send a team 
to South Africa to get proper training on how to use the KT Mine. KT Mine is mainly used 
for benchmarking royalties and commissions while Onesource is used for other transactions. 
They indicated that they only apply KT Mine and Onesource when they have failed to get 
comparables locally.  
 
7.4.2.2.2 Lack of Legislative Clarity 
Given that there are new rules in place, it was important to establish the extent to which they 
are clear for all the stakeholders to avoid unnecessary administrative squabbles which are 
unproductive. One interviewee (ZIMRA4) said “we wouldn’t be having court cases if the 
legislation was clear”. In spite of the new changes, ZIMRA believed taxpayers will always 
look for ways of circumventing the new laws, “so we cannot say we have arrived but rather 
we need continuous improvement” (ZIMRA3 and 4). In the words of ZIMRA 4, “we are still 
crawling, and we could learn from our counterparts’ mistakes and take advantage of them 
and copy from what they have done”.  ZIMRA7 had this to say, “the legislation that has been 
introduced is sort of like half-baked, but at least if something is said to be half-baked it may 
eradicate hunger but at a small scale”. Of the countries reviewed in this thesis only Kenya 
and Zimbabwe have not provided interpretation guidelines for the public on the transfer 
pricing rules (see Chapter 5).  
 
A lack of legislative clarity received fewer votes from ZIMRA because ZIMRA believed that 
the legislation was now clearer compared to the old regime which had general anti-avoidance 
measures. Similarly, the Ministry (MOF1-3) believed the rules are close to being adequate, 
but also emphasised that they would not relax, but continue looking at how to deter any 
identified loopholes. However, TCs stressed that transfer pricing legislation was difficult to 
understand because of its reference to the OECD as well as the language which was not 
simplified for a layman. Kirchler et al (2008) and Christensen and Kapoor (No date) 
emphasize the importance of legislation to protect national tax bases. 
 
The researcher asked further the reasons why TCs believed that the legislation was not clear. 
Their responses are provided below.  
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(i) Inconsistencies between ALP and Thin Capitalization Rule  
Unlike ZIMRA officers, TCs consider a lack of legislative clarity to be the biggest challenge 
of them all. They cited discrepancies arising from the inconsistent treatment of the thin 
capitalization rule. They explained that it was not clear as to what takes precedence between 
Section 16 (1)(q) (which restricts the debt to equity ratio to 3:1) and the arm’s length 
principle. ZIMRA argues that the thin capitalization rule is in the principal Act unlike the 
transfer pricing rule which is a subsidiary legislation because it refers to the 35th Schedule. 
They further state that the thin capitalization ratio of 3:1 complements the transfer pricing 
rules, and the section on 3:1 is actually saying that “notwithstanding any provision in any 
other section”, and in light of that  the thin capitalization rule would prevail.  
 
ZIMRA emphasises that there is a need to have the debt capped because the cost of the debt 
will suppress taxable income since the finance charge is tax deductible. The excess portion of 
the interest is regarded as a dividend and is taxed. If they do not disallow the excess it will 
erode their tax base with a lot of interest being paid out of the country probably to a tax haven 
country or other jurisdiction with favourable tax rates. To the contrary, these fixed debt to 
equity ratios are discouraged by paragraph 17 of the OECD guidelines for its inflexibility. 
However, in terms of revenue, ZIMRA loses if the new rules (ALP) are applied, and MNEs 
win because the interest that they used to disallow (which is above 3:1) will be lost. ZIMRA 
does this to fulfil the intention of the law and to make sure that the state is not unnecessarily 
prejudiced. 
 
However, TCs argue that they would have done their benchmarking and aligned the prices to 
an arm’s length amount. They add that putting a cap on what arm’s length/independent 
enterprises would do makes no sense and so they should leave the market to operate freely. 
ZIMRA further adds that some MNEs are unscrupulous, given that at the end of the year they 
shift the date of the debt to the next period since the legislation was not clear on when to 
recognise the debt to equity ratio or they simply inflate the equity values. Considering that 
Zimbabwe’s transfer pricing rules were recently introduced, there is a high probability of 
ambiguities which require improvement to minimise multiple interpretations. This is a 
contradictory world that feeds into the politics and not the action of good governance which 
Brunsson (1982:37) advocates. Brunsson (1982:43) expands on how ambiguity may be 
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exploited for political ends. Tax consultants also have challenges with domestic transfer 
pricing which will be discussed next. 
 
(ii) Inconsistencies as a Result of Domestic Transfer Pricing 
Compared to other tax jurisdictions, ZIMRA can legally apply transfer pricing adjustments to 
domestic transactions. Tax consultants (TC1-6) expressed concern over the application of 
transfer pricing rules to domestic transactions which the OECD is silent about. They alluded 
to the assumption that transfer pricing rules target foreign enterprises, but the bulk of their 
clients approaching them are those that do in-country transfer pricing, while inquiries from 
MNEs are few. The existence of non-compliant MNEs also suggests evidence of free-riders 
which Ekstrom et al (2014:56) describe as social actors who take advantage of others and 
discourage the compliant firms. TCs question the reason for the rules to apply to domestic 
transactions, arguing that no significant differences exist since the tax rate is the same, and 
the conditions are the same. Oguttu (2006a:139) concurs and notes that the revenue leakages 
through such transactions are minimal. 
 
TCs acknowledged that this requirement is burdensome particularly to the taxpayers because 
(i) consulting tax consultants is expensive and (ii) more often than not the comparables are 
not available because the enterprises are too small. TC2 added that the documentation is a 
costly requirement making reference to one of their clients; a financial institution with seven 
subsidiaries which they charged about $200,000 for documentation. Jones, Temouri and 
Cobham (2018) found evidence of large sums of fees being paid to the big four accountancy 
firms to develop abusive tax strategies. However, the UN (2017) believes both developed and 
developing countries need to have domestic transfer pricing rules that counter transfer pricing 
manipulation and eliminate double taxation due to transfer pricing adjustments. 
 
TCs advocated for thresholds to be set for those who should comply just like it is done for 
Value-Added Tax (VAT). This is meant to exonerate very small enterprises from complying 
with the transfer pricing documentation requirements. TC6 said, “Imagine an entity with a 
revenue of a hundred thousand dollars to do a transfer pricing documentation maybe would 
cost them $20 000 then it is unjustified.” Saunders-Scott (2013) also established that 
increased transfer pricing regulation is associated with significant compliance costs for the 
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taxpayer. Compliance costs of taxpayers are not affected by the tax law alone, but also by its 
enforcement through the tax authorities (Eichfelder & Kegels, 2012:18).  
 
The rationality of Zimbabwe burdening small firms with compliance costs against limited 
administrative capacities is exploitative. Ordinarily the aspect of paying tax should be just 
and fair (canons of good tax system) (Tapera & Majachani, 2017). Although it may be driven 
by the country’s hunger to protect its shrunken tax base and eliminate poverty since many 
Zimbabweans are living below the poverty datum line, this measure may cause disinvestment 
(both domestic and foreign). Such a situation would be unhealthy for an economy which is 
grappling with a plethora of economic hardships such as high unemployment rates and 
negative balance of payments. TCs (5-7) were not supportive of this decision arguing that it is 
contrary to the “Zimbabwe pro-investment, mantra” by the current President of the Republic 
as it overburdens the local business enterprises. Zimbabwe’s decision to go beyond the 
standards of international law has legal and/or implementation rationality implications. The 
legal rationality is affected by the local context where the local legislation takes precedence 
over the international transfer pricing guidelines.  
 
Having identified the legislative capacity and the challenges posed by the current rules, it was 
imperative to inquire on the ability of ZIMRA to tackle transfer pricing concerns. 
 
7.4.3 THEME 6: ZIMRA Implementation Capacity 
Kirchler, Hoezl and Wahl (2008:212) suggest that the effectiveness of revenue authorities 
highly depends on the tax legislation, the budget allocated to them by government, the 
transfer pricing knowledge levels of the officers, the experience and the skills of the 
personnel. The respondents were thus asked about ZIMRA’s capacity and ability to 
implement the rules effectively.  The questions were centred on administrative issues such as 
financial resources, experience and policies within ZIMRA. 
 
ZIMRA alluded to the fact that they employ both deterrent and persuasive measures 
interchangeably depending on individual cases, a decision which is highly discretionary and 
according to Scott (2000) reflects rational decision-making behaviour which is concretized by 
Feld and Frey (2002). Table 16 shows ZIMRA’s capacity to implement the new transfer 
pricing rules as perceived by the respondents. The Table shows the codes supported by the 
147 
 
ZIMRA implementation capacity category as informed by primary data and the theoretical 
foundations.  
 
Despite the results shown in Table 16 below, the MOF believes ZIMRA has implementation 
capacity since they do a lot of training with various organisations at a regional level (such as 
SADC) and at a global level.  
 
Table 16: ZIMRA Implementation Capacity 
 Implementation Capacity TC (Yes) ZIMRA (Yes) 
Lack of Experience 14% 50% 
Lack of Financial Resources 14% 40% 
Lack of Expertise 71% 30% 
Lack of Sound Staffing Policy 57% 30% 
Lack of Specific Transfer Pricing Team 14% 30% 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
A lack of experience was highlighted by 50% of the ZIMRA respondents followed by a lack 
of financial resources at 40% while lack of expertise, sound policy and transfer pricing teams 
were tied at 30%. TCs believe ZIMRA lacks expertise the most as indicated by 71% of the 
respondents, followed by a lack of sound staffing policy at 57%, and then a lack of 
experience, finance and specific transfer pricing team being the lowest at 14% respectively. 
All these administrative issues are important, but for emphasis only experience and financial 
resources, expertise and sound staffing policy will be discussed. 
 
7.4.3.1 Experience and Financial Resources 
Half of ZIMRA officers argue that ZIMRA is incapacitated by a lack of experience because 
the subject is still new, and many officers have not experienced much regarding transfer 
pricing by MNEs. TCs concurred that ZIMRA personnel need to embark on work related 
learning with countries that have embraced transfer pricing earlier, for example South Africa. 
They emphasised that they should collaborate with the South African tax authority and carry 
out joint audits. TCs added that on the ground, ZIMRA has mostly new trainees and it takes 
time for them to be moulded into experienced staff.  
 
ZIMRA concurred that it would be good to send teams to the countries where ZIMRA has 
disputes such as Dubai and China, but in most cases the resources are not permitting to 
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undertake such a mission. ZIMRA (3, 5, 7, 10) alluded to the fact that they face financial 
constraints particularly because transfer pricing is an area that involves collaborations with 
other tax jurisdictions, an exercise that is not easy or cheap. TCs (2, 3) alluded to the 
misplaced priorities by higher authorities who are involved in unscrupulous activities (such as 
fraud and bribes) which drain the fiscus.  
 
7.4.3.2 Expertise 
Expertise is a critical ingredient for a successful transfer pricing administration since 
(Saunders-Scott, 2013) found less profit-shifting from a country with skilled tax agents than 
where the tax authority has limited resources. It is therefore of concern that the lack of 
expertise was the highest with 71% of TCs claiming that they knew better than the ZIMRA 
officers. International accountancy firms indicated that they enrolled with institutes in the UK 
and specialised in transfer pricing. TC2 stressed that some of the ZIMRA officers consult him 
on how to handle certain cases. Though most TCs stressed that knowledge and skills were 
lacking in ZIMRA, they admitted that ZIMRA is making an effort to train their staff. “It is a 
learning curve”, TCs (5, 7) echoed.  
 
Primary data revealed that ZIMRA has not been active in transfer pricing audits, and this may 
be a sign of lack of expertise. This is despite previous studies (Marques & Pinho, 2016; Beer 
& Loeprick, 2013:18 and Lohse et al, 2013) having found suppressed profit shifting after 
increased tightening of transfer pricing rules. Certain TCs (5 and 7) even said most of the 
ZIMRA officers are trainees who often exhibit lack of knowledge and skills. Others 
expressed concern over the time taken (as long as 3-4 months) by ZIMRA to respond to client 
queries which they indicated confirmed that they were oblivious of how the transfer pricing 
legislation is to be applied. TC6 stressed that ZIMRA lacked expertise to scrutinise mining 
transactions and validate the losses claimed by mining enterprises. He explained that mining 
operations require a high level of expertise which ZIMRA lacks because its employees are 
accountants and economists who know nothing about geophysical and geological 
movements. High transfer pricing risks in the mining sector were also identified by 
Kwaramba, Mahonye and Mandishara (2016:51). 
 
The findings reveal that ZIMRA is making efforts to build its capacity through training 
activities, thus, taking heed of Brunsson’s warning (1993:2) in his rationality theory 
assumptions that if an organisation fails to train its staff it would be limited.  
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7.4.3.3 Sound Staffing Policy 
All the ZIMRA officers conceded that the staffing policies within ZIMRA support transfer 
pricing activities. To the contrary, 57% of the TCs believe that ZIMRA policies are not 
supportive as these policies are not sound. They highlighted that ZIMRA’s training came to 
naught because of frequent internal staff transfers and high staff turnover. Collins and 
Mulligan (2014:18) also found that tax authorities are constrained by problems of up skilling 
their staff on the intricacies of transfer pricing and losing them to accountancy firms. 
Regarding retention of specialised tax officers, Oguttu (2016:19) stressed that tax authorities 
need to adopt policies that align salaries with those paid in the private sector.  
 
Staffing issues such as having mostly trainees on the ground and having multiple human 
capital movements are not supportive policies. They advocated for specialisation rather than 
multi-skilling since transfer pricing is a complex issue which requires undivided attention. 
However, ZIMRA4 denied these allegations arguing that the personnel assigned specifically 
in the investigations department are not moved. A TC (TC3) added that having a long tenure 
of office with a Commissioner General in an acting capacity (for instance more than three 
years) alone stalls progress. TCs expressed their doubt over the ability of ZIMRA to dissect 
transactions and come up with informed positions. ZIMRA was castigated for its approaches 
which are reactive rather than proactive thereby discouraging voluntary compliance (TC3). 
This was also blamed on management which is not properly seated with most of them in 
acting capacities. 
 
ZIMRA also noted with concern that the department that deals with transfer pricing issues is 
housed at head office only, which is a huge limitation when it comes to executing transfer 
pricing issues at regional level. They indicated that this limitation promoted unfair treatment. 
ZIMRA2 gave an example of a case where a taxpayer received a clean audit three/four times 
from Bulawayo/Gweru officers. Then only when Investigations officers from Harare came 
did they unearthed transfer pricing issues, and the client started protesting against that, 
arguing that these had not been uncovered in the previous audits. ZIMRA just shrugs this off 
on the basis that the Commissioner makes mistakes and is allowed to correct himself. 
ZIMRA suggested that there is need for the regional auditors to be capacitated for transfer 
pricing purposes to eliminate these inconsistencies. 
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Combining results from laws and policy measures, current rules-based 
opportunities/challenges and ZIMRA’s capacity helped assess the current transfer pricing 
regime in Zimbabwe with a view to inform policy, taxpayers and tax authorities. The study 
tried to bring a balanced view by considering the administrative capacity of ZIMRA as well 
as the legislative capacity in order to draw a balanced assessment. Legislative capacity refers 
to legislative powers that ZIMRA can exercise as provided for in the Acts of Parliament. It 
can be concluded that the new transfer pricing rules introduced in Zimbabwe are a good start 
though there is and will always be room for improvement as MNEs continue to strategise 
ways of circumventing tax as discussed in the next section.  
7.5 Objective 4: To Examine the Nature and Types of Transfer Pricing Strategies  
                              Utilised among MNEs in Zimbabwe 
Understanding the nature and types of transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs in Zimbabwe 
was important to consider in order to be able to influence policy and to ensure administrative 
effectiveness, since “one cannot attack an enemy that he/she does not know”. This aligns with 
McBarnet’s (2001) viewpoint where he proposes that appropriateness and comprehensiveness 
of legislation should be considered in light of the sophistication and “creative non-
compliance” schemes employed by taxpayers in the specific country. Sikka and Willmott 
(2010:7) espoused that MNEs direct their attention to transfer pricing strategies that minimise 
taxes in order to achieve higher shareholder value, and executive rewards. In this regard, 
respondents were asked what strategies are used by MNEs to avoid tax through transfer 
pricing.  
 
7.5.1 THEME 7: Transfer Pricing Strategies 
Ten transfer pricing strategies, believed to be used by MNEs in Zimbabwe to minimise their 
tax obligations with regard to transfer pricing, emerged from the interviews. These strategies 
confirm Ruiz and Romero (2011) list of strategies associated with cross-border trade, which 
include over/under-invoicing, thin capitalization, misclassification of goods and the use of tax 
havens. The results from ZIMRA and the tax consultants are presented in Table 17 overleaf. 
It should be noted that the percentages do not represent the actual proportion of usage of 
these strategies but rather the extent to which they are believed to be used by the respective 
groups. 
 
 
151 
 
Table 17: Transfer Pricing Strategies 
 Strategy TC (Yes) ZIMRA (Yes) 
Use of Services 57% 70% 
Over-invoicing 43% 60% 
Under-invoicing 14% 30% 
Thin Capitalisation 14% 40% 
Tax Havens 14% 30% 
Low Tax Jurisdiction 14% 20% 
Treaty Shopping 0% 40% 
Re-invoicing 0% 10% 
Tax Incentives 14% 20% 
Profit Shifting 43% 40% 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
From a ZIMRA perspective, the use of services (inflating management fees for services 
supplied to the subsidiary in Zimbabwe) emerged as the most widely used strategy (70%) 
followed by over-invoicing (60%) with thin-capitalization, treaty shopping and profit shifting 
all at 40%, as the most leading transfer pricing strategies used in Zimbabwe. Treaty shopping 
(attaining unwarranted treaty benefits), under-invoicing and tax havens also followed at 30%, 
while tax incentives, had 20% together with low tax jurisdiction, and lastly re-invoicing was 
at 10%.  
 
From a tax consultants’ perspective, the use of services is also the highest with 57%, 
followed by over-invoicing and profit shifting at 43%, while under-invoicing, thin 
capitalization, tax havens, tax incentives and low tax jurisdiction was at 14%. Re-invoicing, 
and treaty shopping were not considered by TCs to be used at all by MNEs as schemes to 
minimise their tax obligations with regard to transfer pricing. Although all the strategies are 
important, one may find that some of the strategies overlap and one strategy is not used in 
isolation (see Schindler and Schjelderup, 2013:3). For the sake of emphasis, only use of 
services, over/under-invoicing, thin capitalization and tax havens will be discussed. 
 
7.5.1.1 Use of Services 
The code, “use of services”, means the use of administrative, technical and managerial 
services to manipulate transfer prices.  Almost every respondent, including the Ministry of 
Finance (TC1-7, ZIMRA1-10 and MOF3), had something to say about the use of services. 
Apparently abuse is experienced mainly with management services which include marketing 
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services, IT services, and consultancy services. All of the three groups indicated that the use 
of management fees was the dominant strategy used by subsidiary companies that pay their 
parent companies management fees which are not commensurate to the work done. Others 
(ZIMRA6, 7 and 8) highlighted that some of the services claimed would never have been 
rendered. They explained that the scheme inflates expenses in Zimbabwe so that the taxable 
income in Zimbabwe is low. This results in the fees income transferred to the parent to be 
taxed either at a low rate or zero tax depending on the jurisdiction of the parent company. For 
example, ZIMRA7 indicated that a subsidiary in Zimbabwe will be claiming that they 
received training from their parent company (outside the country) yet nobody came to train 
them. This is contrary to Section 15(2)(a) of the ITA which requires that the expense should 
have been incurred. ZIMRA added that it will be difficult for ZIMRA to prove that there was 
no training, and a good comparative for such a transaction is also difficult to find. 
 
The Ministry respondents revealed that they mainly suspect the mining sector as the haven 
for transfer pricing manipulation through abuse of services. They wondered whether some 
fees claimed by these companies will be reasonable, questioning the kind of service that 
would have been performed for a value of $10million. High risk of transfer pricing abuse by 
the mining sector was also confirmed in Section 3.2.4 of Chapter 3. 
 
Abuse of services may also occur through selling processes where procurement is done by 
foreign enterprises that inflate the mark-ups when they sell to Zimbabwe. An example that 
was given is, a parent company (outside Zimbabwe) that will claim that they are charging 
their subsidiary (in Zimbabwe) management fees of 5% of turnover. ZIMRA argued that the 
charging of fees based on turnover instead of cost is wrong, and the OECD recommends the 
cost plus method. Similarly, TCs confirmed that the charging of a percentage of turnover 
instead of cost by MNEs is one of the biggest transfer pricing schemes in Zimbabwe. They 
explained that associated enterprises pass on items like royalties, patents (intangible property) 
and audit fees incurred outside Zimbabwe to their Zimbabwean firm.  
 
According to the findings, MNEs are deliberately choosing use of services over other 
strategies which confirm observations by Scott (2000:3) that taxpayers are social actors 
which engage in deliberate calculative strategies that give them minimum tax payments. 
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7.5.1.2 Over/Under-invoicing  
Over-invoicing also proved to be a major challenge with MNEs inflating imports and 
expenses. Over-pricing of services especially management services offered to subsidiaries 
outside Zimbabwe results in erosion of the tax base. ZIMRA emphasised that if a subsidiary 
is purchasing goods from a holding company, there is an aspect of over-invoicing by the 
holding company so that money can be transferred to their country of residence. Just like 
ZIMRA, TCs chose over-invoicing as the second most used transfer pricing strategy.  
 
The mining sector has been identified as a high risk area with under-pricing activities 
especially where the mining company does the extractions in Zimbabwe and the processing is 
done by a parent outside Zimbabwe. They usually under-price the mineral and would then 
over-price the processing charges from outside Zimbabwe and that negatively affects the 
country’s revenue. The high transfer pricing risk in the mining sector has been alluded to by 
Kwaramba et al (2016:51). It can be deduced that over-invoicing and under-invoicing 
generally happens simultaneously with one over-pricing or under-pricing the service or the 
goods depending on where they want them to be taxed and where they will benefit more. This 
finding is consistent with a report by GIZ (2010:20) which suggests that much transfer 
pricing abuse occurs through over-invoicing and under-invoicing of cross-border 
transactions.  
 
7.5.1.3 Thin Capitalization 
Thin capitalization is where a company is excessively financed by debt rather than by equity 
in order to take advantage of the tax deduction that comes with the interest payments. The 
ZIMRA officers 3, 5, 6, 9 acknowledged that they frequently encounter thinly capitalized 
companies where the local company pays excessive amounts of interest to foreign companies. 
They emphasised that the interest will be charged at artificially high rates which will suppress 
the taxable income locally. The OECD (2015) describes debt shifting as the easiest means of 
tax avoidance by MNEs, which gives MNEs a competitive advantage over domestic business.  
 
An example that was given by ZIMRA is that of where an enterprise from Mauritius that has 
a subsidiary in Zimbabwe, wants to charge interest on a loan (from parent to subsidiary) but 
they know that they have some restrictions because of section 16 (1)(q). In order to avoid 
these restrictions (disallowing of the excess) a holding company would give the money to a 
bank and instruct the bank to forward the money to a subsidiary company in Zimbabwe. They 
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instruct the bank the rate of interest should be 20%. Ultimately, when the subsidiary uses the 
money they pay the interest to the bank and the bank then remits the money back to the 
holding company. In this process, the bank is just a conduit which will send the money to the 
holding company so the revenue authorities will not pick it up as they would just think it is a 
bank loan. This strategy is said to be prevalent in Zimbabwe, and was confirmed in Section 
3.3.2 of Chapter 3. 
 
Thin capitalization was third along with other strategies as the TCs confirmed that MNEs 
provide each other with interest free loans for the financing transactions or pay expenses on 
behalf of each other. An example is where company A is supposed to report a profit of $100k 
but the profit is reduced by incurring expenses on behalf of another subsidiary. Such a 
transaction is unlikely in an uncontrolled transaction as no one would be willing to pay for 
something on behalf of another company without getting anything in return for it. The 
findings show that thin capitalization fixed ratios are encouraged by BEPS, but the OECD 
(2015) acknowledged that they are subject to manipulation. Oguttu (2017:41) encourages 
levying withholding taxes on interest rather than fixed ratios.  
 
7.5.1.4 Tax Havens 
Tax havens are jurisdictions with relatively favourable tax rates, zero tax and/or weak tax 
administration systems. ZIMRA1 reported that the manipulation of pricing of service fees, 
such as consultancy fees, would mainly be used by local companies which have other 
associated companies in these tax haven countries (such as Jersey, Barbados, Isle of Man). 
Article 4 of the OECD guidelines (D3) mentions “place of residence” in terms of companies 
and individuals which is referred to as the tie-breaker rule. An example of how this guideline 
is abused is as follows: There is a holding company in Malaysia (with no factory, but just 
offices) and there is a subsidiary in Zimbabwe (with a factory). Malaysia is well known as a 
tax haven as it has favourable tax rates so many companies will not be having operations in 
Malaysia, but will just rent offices for income shifting (ZIMRA8).  
 
It has been noted with concern that MNEs take advantage of the tax differentials and shift 
profits from a higher tax jurisdiction to a lower tax jurisdiction such as Switzerland (ZIMRA1 
and 8). TCs 1-4 disclosed that they have clients with subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions and 
profit shifting definitely occurs because Zimbabwe is a high tax region.  This behaviour by 
MNEs of ‘hiding’ income and assets in low tax jurisdictions or tax havens is in tandem with 
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the revelation by Oguttu (2016:8) and was confirmed in the SABMiller case study (see 
Section 2.6.2.1) where SABMiller was taking advantage of the low tax rates offered by the 
Netherlands. It shows rational thinking by MNEs, but also depicts hypocrisy at the highest 
level.  
The exploitative behaviour of MNEs is said to do harm in three ways which are physical, 
economic and psychological and among them include depletion of scarce resources, loss of 
FDI and increased poverty (Mehafdi, 2000). The various strategies such as the use of tax 
havens reflect the self-serving attitude of a few MNEs that cause “the detriment of many”. 
Sikka and Willmott (2013) added that because of neo-liberalism, tax avoidance has been 
normalised and is engineered by the big accountancy firms. Lowering the tax burden is 
attractive to companies since payment of additional taxes is detrimental to shareholder value 
(Nardi, 2016). Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016) defend transfer pricing abuse by MNEs 
arguing that it is justified by the CSR activities carried out by the same. 
 
Despite these transfer pricing strategies, ZIMRA has also been alleged to be contributing to 
revenue leakages through corruption. It has been accused of impression management, by 
putting big banners of their vision and mission statements together with banners of Zero 
Tolerance to Corruption yet the majority of the officers are corrupt and unscrupulous (TC3). 
Ali, Fjeldstad, and Sjursen (2013) found that corruption by tax officials reduces tax 
compliance by 6% in South Africa. 
 
Through content analysis, the researcher discovered that while Zimbabwe has tried to align 
its transfer pricing rules to international standards, the exploitative rationalities of MNEs and 
the implementation challenges of the transfer pricing policies mainly caused by its economic 
realities compel it to take reactive steps that may not resemble global principles. 
 
There seems to be strong unevenness in both interpretation of the transfer pricing rules as 
well as implementation, for instance the treatment of the thin capitalization rule vis-à-vis the 
arm’s length principle. The disharmony in tax laws create opportunities for exploitation by 
taxpayers (Dharmapala, 2014), and legislative clarity is one of the canons of a good tax 
system (Tapera & Majachani, 2017:6-7). Though the interpretive differences among the three 
actors are healthy and simply confirm the existence of rationality traits in them, an 
unharmonised tax system is unhealthy. This is exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of the fiscal 
appeal court (as characterised by the fiscal backlogs) while Bagchi (1995) advocates that 
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there is need for an omniscient judge. From a practical perspective, the legal rationality is in 
favour of ZIMRA as evidenced by the requirement for taxpayers to pay for the additional tax 
even before the case is concluded by the courts (Section 69 of the ITA). Next are the detailed 
novel findings from “Thinking with theory”. 
 
7.6 PART 2: THINKING WITH THEORY  
This section crystallises the traditional forms of analysis such as coding with a scholarly 
evidenced way of data analysis referred to as ‘thinking with theory’ which involves plugging 
theory with data as suggested by Marn (2015) and Mazzei and Jackson (2012). This section 
discusses the theoretical implications of the findings of this study as guided by the rationality 
theory (refer to Chapter 2) stratified into legal, implementation and exploitative lenses. These 
formed the three main themes that guided the theoretical coding process.  
 
7.6.1 Theoretical Coding 
The researcher interrogated the literature and assumed an appropriate theory that could 
provide a more generalised account of the behaviour and views around transfer pricing in line 
with rationality theory. A conceptual framework was therefore arrived at that would guide the 
objectives of the research and the theorisation required for the study. In order to provide 
dependable and confirmable research (Section 6.9), the researcher worked with her original 
interpretation and employed the trustworthiness provided by a second coder. This approach is 
supported by the seminal article of Barbour (2001:1116). Barbour (2001:1116) advocates that 
consensus discussions between autonomous coder and researcher are a solid basis for 
qualitative research. The researcher and second coder agreed on a theoretical code book and 
data were coded in this regard  (The codes and quotations are available on request to the 
researcher). Given the categorisation agreed to in terms of prefix coding (Friese, 2014), the 
researcher subsequently presented the outcome of ‘thinking of the study through the lens of 
the substantive theory’. The sections that follow are emblematic of this thinking. 
 
7.6.2 Theoretical Definitions 
This section expounds on three main rationalities, namely; 
 Legal rationality; 
 Implementation rationality; and 
 Exploitative rationality. 
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The theory of rationality as viewed legally, from an implementation rationality point of view 
(how to shift from the rules into strategies and operations) and exploitative rationality is well 
grounded in the data with five categories and 89 codes. Rationality, legally-anchored, is the 
rule-based rationality applied through legal/policy means, while implementation rationality 
(closely tied to legal rationality) is what happens in practice, in the application of the legal 
framework within the context. Extant literature (Oguttu, 2016:15; and Sikka and Willmott, 
2010:5) has confirmed the gaps that arise between legislative and implementation 
frameworks. This may be the gap between the legal, rule-based paradigms and the reality on 
the ground; the lack of rule-following often necessitated by the messy applied realities or 
exigencies of the situation as indicated by Bradley (2015) when he observed that the 
implementation of these diverse rules has provided complexities that vary from country to 
country. Exploitative rationality is also rationality, but which seeks to use capitalist logic to 
exploit a situation and/or the legal framework so that profit may be maximised. Brunsson 
(1993:8) indicates that hypocritical responses are survival strategies of the organisation. 
Exploitative means that rules are followed in a creative and contradictory way (loopholes are 
found) so that tax avoidance or tax evasion happens and governance is not upheld. This was 
echoed by Brunsson (1986:165) when he mentioned that companies may exploit legislative 
inconsistencies by applying rationalistic decisions to their benefit, leading to less tax 
revenues that impacts on using tax for public good (Sikka and Willmott, 2010:30).  
 
7.6.3 Theoretical Contributions 
Chapter 1 highlighted the importance of this study in assessing the transfer pricing rules in 
Zimbabwe through exploration of the rational styles of the key players in transfer pricing 
practices. Quiggin (2005) stresses that the aim of globalisation was to prevent 3rd World 
poverty and debt from happening, but with MNEs being monopoly providers of investment 
and employment, and negotiating for generous tax concessions; globalisation has widened the 
gap between the rich and the poor. Kotz (2000) added that neo-liberalism magnifies class 
conflicts which can discourage capitalist investment. This leaves governments in a catch-22 
situation regarding which path to take between promoting investment and maximising their 
tax base for the betterment of social amenities. While Kotz (2000) hints that globalisation 
creates difficulties for individual states to independently regulate business across their 
borders, he emphasises that the major limiting factor is the political will rather than the 
technical feasibility of doing so. The following section discusses the theoretical gaps and the 
theoretical contributions thereto. 
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7.6.3.1 Theoretical Gap: The Rationality Trichotomy 
This study addresses scholarly gaps by contributing to new knowledge by exploring an 
under-explored three-layered rationality concept (legal, implementation and exploitative). As 
highlighted in Chapter 1, this has not been covered in any literature in terms of the 
confluence of these three areas, and as applied to transfer pricing. The researcher theorises 
how the key players respond to transfer pricing as influenced by the rationality decision-
making processes. It captures the subjective human dimensions which are neglected in the 
existing transfer pricing theory (Li, 2005:47). The subjective nature of human beings portrays 
rationality characteristics which are revealed in the rationalistic decision-making and actions 
of organisations. This is a modest contribution that this study brings; however, the researcher 
encourages further inquiries on transfer pricing by other scholarly endeavours.  
 
Weber’s (1968) rationality theory (which mainly captures the legal dimension), may be 
extended through additional implementation and exploitative rationality layers that emerged 
in this study. ZIMRA itself pervades transfer pricing with complexity through their rational 
decisions (with the code “state power on our side” mindset) which are inconsistent, 
uninformed and paradoxical. This was evident at field level. Within the overall transfer 
pricing practice, there were countless instances of implementation reality challenges, and 
rationalistic decisions infused in the empirical data categorised around the three layered 
theoretical foundations. 
 
7.6.3.2 Theoretical Gap: The Rationality Role of Tax Consultants 
Sikka and Willmott (2010:28) are alert to the exploitative behaviour practiced by 
accountancy firms, and indicate that the behaviour of these have just been looked at from a 
single perspective in scholarly researches leaving the dark/negative side unexplored. They 
add that most researchers have placed their focus on the claims by the accountancy firms that 
they are professional in their conduct and custodians of good governance while ignoring the 
need to dissect their transactions. Such behaviour amounts to impression management as 
defined in this study. Brunsson (1993:8) argues that such hypocritical characteristics are a 
survival strategy for corporates where they exploit inconsistencies by employing rationalistic 
decisions to their advantage, and this organisational behaviour remains a critical research 
agenda.  
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This study captures the text and sub-text of transfer pricing services rendered to MNEs by tax 
consultants being the “Janus-faced” elements of compliance and exploitative responses to 
transfer pricing situations. Sikka and Willmott (2010:28) emphasise the role of tax 
consultants and their argument maybe extended by the role of other key players (in tax 
avoidance) identified in this study with some also having been identified by Hasseldine et al 
(2012) such as tax authorities, tax advisors, corporate taxpayers, and the society. Kotz (2000) 
further indicates the resourcefulness of MNEs that can drive them to dilute threatening 
legislation.  
 
Despite Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016:2) defending the tax avoidance by MNEs arguing 
that it is justified by Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Sikka and Willmott (2010:30) 
refute such claims arguing that such behaviour is exploitative and detrimental to public good. 
CSR by a MNE which is avoiding tax would be regarded as impression management by this 
study. This study reinforces the importance of the legislative and administrative muscle of the 
tax authority. It moves from abstract and anecdotal evidence to empirical dissection of the 
transfer pricing problem in a developing set up context. 
 
7.6.3.3 Theoretical Gap: Territorial Tax System versus Global Standards 
Oguttu (2016) calls specifically for research to study the transfer pricing environment at a 
country level in order to capture country-specific needs arguing that the unique economic and 
political structures of African states demand specific practical solutions. Durst (2015a:13) 
also believes that international solutions will not solve developing country problems. Wells 
and Lowell (2014) stress that the fundamental problems of transfer pricing arise from the 
long-standing problems of the OECD guidelines. This study recognises Zimbabwe as a 
country with peculiar economic, social and political structures and reinforces how such 
unique enterprises demand special redress.  
 
The governments which are at the top of the hierarchy face rational decision-making between 
tightening their tax laws and creating a “pro-business environment” to meet their economic 
needs (Hasseldine et al, 2012). For African states the elite e.g. the politicians do not 
necessarily pay tax (Christensen & Kapoor, No date) because of impunity and because they 
control politics there are no legal implications on these larger- than- life political personalities 
who are operating big businesses in Zimbabwe. Sikka and Willmott (2013) observe that the 
political elite sometimes become a law to themselves to such an extent that legal structures 
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such as ZIMRA become intimidated to penalise such elite figures for non-compliance with 
tax laws. This is typical in Zimbabwe, and such structures are barred from enforcing the law 
by the people who are in control of the government as evidenced by Financial Gazette (2018) 
headlined “Zim big wigs shield companies from ZIMRA”. Primary data (TC2 and 3) have 
also uncovered the corruption of unscrupulous ZIMRA officials who extort money from 
errant taxpayers through bribes. All this exhibits a consequentialist approach to governance 
which is self-serving and with negative repercussions on the economy at large. 
 
The findings of this study show that substantial work still needs to be done to strengthen the 
transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. They also reveal that Zimbabwe is peculiar in that the 
canons of taxation are not observed at a higher level thereby exposing Zimbabwe to high 
levels of profit shifting and negatively affecting ordinary citizens. The study also concurs 
with Oguttu (2016) that the OECD fails to capture the specific needs of African developing 
states, and therefore nations should not just take up prescriptions of international laws which 
are a representation of few countries, but rather exercise their sovereignty. 
 
7.6.4 Responses to Exploitative Rationality in Transfer Pricing 
The negative or exploitative elements such as over-invoicing were evident in the data and are 
reported in Zimbabwe. The existence of legal rationality to prevent and penalise is also 
evident. What is of concern is the implementation of these rules and the capacity to make 
sure that the laws/rules are adhered to. From Chapter 1, it was noted that developing 
countries are handicapped by weak regulative and administrative frameworks (AFRODAD & 
ZEPARU, 2014; and ZIMCODD, 2014). This study ratifies this significant finding and 
acknowledges that a gap exists between the legal and the implementation rationality which 
was alluded to by the likes of Oguttu (2016:18-19). She outlines three factors that aggravate 
BEPS in Africa which are (1) a lack of relevant international tax laws, (2) inadequately 
developed domestic laws causing techniques such as treaty abuses, and (3) limited 
administrative capacity (which include heterogeneous tax systems, incompetent and corrupt 
tax officials, lack of training of staff, poor remuneration and poor staffing policies and lack of 
electronic and technological advancement of tax systems). There is strong evidence of these 
same issues in the data for instance, a lack of legislative clarity, ineffective fiscal appeal, 
court backlogs, a lack of expertise, corruption, and impartiality (refer to thinking with 
objectives). ZIMRA is not adequately capacitated both with legislative and administrative 
resources, thereby causing implementation reality challenges. A lack of harmony between 
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legislative resources and administrative resources affects effective implementation of the 
transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. One gets the sense of a very functional machine that is 
trying to get up to speed, but it is hampered by design and capacity challenges. Dharmapala 
(2014) also stresses inconsistencies in tax laws and their implementation as a limitation to 
fighting profit shifting. Hasseldine et al (2012) calls for the calibration of policies and 
administrative responses to tax avoidance. Transfer pricing is regulated by international 
standards (Hasseldine et al, 2012), but implementation in Zimbabwe is affected by national 
context and domestic legislation.  
 
The data elucidated a number of legislative and implementation issues, and addressed 
stakeholders at economic and social levels. The study has also revealed that various transfer 
pricing strategies exist and has ratified the findings of previous studies that a properly 
planned transfer pricing regime combined with government action suppresses tax avoidance 
practices.  It also revealed how the administration of transfer pricing is affected by the 
national context and domestic laws, as Zimbabwean transfer pricing rules exceeds the 
international standards by enacting domesticated transfer pricing. Additional knowledge on 
the transfer pricing subject is also provided to help demystify the claim by Fuest et al (2013) 
that little is known about the effects of base erosion but yet there is significant empirical 
evidence of its existence. 
 
Additional to the discussions of how there is a solid legal framework, there is quite a bit of 
impression management to place Zimbabwe in a good light. There is variation in the data, 
too, and a cross cutting view of participants showing that there is no general agreement on 
some important areas such as documentation requirements. There is a clear message 
throughout that Zimbabwe has the intent to respond to exploitative rationalities; however, the 
researcher is left wondering if this is possible, given the number of challenges experienced. 
Taking this vast amount of information into account, the next section provides the revised 
conceptual framework after considering the findings from literature and primary data. 
 
7.6.5 Conceptual Framework after Coding (contribution) 
The central theory in this study, rationality theory, was split three-fold into legal, 
implementation and exploitative dimensions, and the first two juxtaposed with the latter, with 
the main choices being to comply or exploit. These elements are drawn from looking at the 
rational decisions and actions taken by the key players in transfer pricing issues and to show 
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their effect on other stakeholders as shown in Figure 4. At the initial stages of 
conceptualisation in Chapter 2 the role of the tax consultant was not as visible and the 
implementation realities have now been emphasised through data, and the impact evident on 
the citizens and shareholders. 
 
Figure 4: Revised Conceptual Framework 
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The conceptual framework proved to be a stable working theorising of the study. The three 
main role-players of Zimbabwe feeding into the rationality, that is legal (rule-based), 
implementation (which is how the rules play themselves out) and the exploitative rationality 
of non-compliance had strongly grounded codes. These codes, together with the literature, 
were interpreted to form themes and then final assertions.   
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The government is rationalised in choosing between national sovereignty and the global 
standards, while the tax authority (ZIMRA) is faced with implementation rationalisation and 
implementation realities as a result of the legal and administrative resources. The voice of the 
tax consultants as an invisible hand speaks together with the MNEs in the compliance or 
exploitation decisions. All these decision-making processes by the three prominent actors 
have either had positive or negative repercussions on the citizens and the shareholders. Where 
trust in the tax system exists, the ability to generate revenue for public good should not be a 
struggle. The data has shown how the government is faced with the dilemma to align transfer 
pricing rules to national priorities against appeasing global expectations. It has also shown 
that tax authorities are flooded with both legislative deficiencies and administrative 
incapacities which undermine their enforcement abilities and determine their exploitative 
choices (given that they have state power on their side). MNEs on the other hand have 
exploitative traits “close to their skin”, and given their resourcefulness they can afford to pay 
exorbitant fees of tax practitioners in exchange for tax-saving advice which has negative 
effects on the citizens and positive effects on the shareholders. 
 
According to Weber (1968), legal rationalisation means adhering to the rules even when they 
cease to make sense. These traditional ways of doing things (this rationality) is not helping 
because the society is not static as it is affected by the political, economic and social 
environment. This rationalisation becomes disadvantageous because of its prescriptive nature, 
bureaucracies and hierarchies. Therefore, can these rules change? The Zimbabwean operating 
environment is volatile and heavily depends on the rationality characteristics of the political 
domain as economic actors. Although the rationality theory is criticised for its concept of 
aggregating the judgements, views, interests, and preferences of different social/economic 
actors (Elster and Hylland, 1986), it was very useful in the operationalisation of tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing and in assessing the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe. 
 
Impression management was evident from the MOF, ZIMRA and the MNEs. There is enough 
rationality within the persuasion and compliance spheres of these actors. Impression 
management is used to emphasise a compliant system and there are clear sub-texts in the 
system that do not lend themselves to effectiveness of the transfer pricing legal and 
implementation rationalities for the good of the country. Transfer pricing practices attach 
importance to showing the prevailing interpretive realities that show the in/effectiveness of 
national and international standards. Though ZIMRA claims that it has administrative 
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effectiveness, the majority of the tax consultants strongly disagreed with this. In many 
instances tax consultants were acknowledging the conception of an unpredictable and uneven 
tax system which allows inefficiencies. These inefficiencies were a product of 
implementation realities affected by legislative gaps, communication gaps, interpretive 
discord, financial constraints and knowledge gaps. Sikka and Willmott (2013) also believe 
that developing countries may lack the resources to fight base erosion.  
 
7.7 Applied Contributions: Summing up Transfer Pricing Practices 
The findings show that rationality characteristics of economic actors drive a critical struggle 
for supremacy within the national and international contexts.  It was confirmed that the 
OECD is not a “one size fits all”, and that its applicability in Zimbabwe needs to be reviewed 
regularly. Data obtained from this study also shows that despite the substantial overlap 
between the OECD and UN transfer pricing guidelines, the OECD is preferred and 
dominantly applied, and this was theorised as rational behaviour (objective 1). Compared to 
the domestic legislation the OECD and the UN guidelines are more persuasive than binding. 
Though the magnitude of enhanced revenue yields as a result of the new rules has not been 
ascertained, the UN (2017) highly recommends that national jurisdictions develop their 
domestic transfer pricing rules. Use of management services to manipulate transfer prices is 
the dominant strategy applied by MNEs in Zimbabwe (objective 4). ZIMRA has also been 
encouraged to draw lessons from tax authorities of other jurisdictions (objective 3). The study 
also revealed that the CUP and the Cost Plus methods are the most applied in Zimbabwe 
(objective 1). 
 
The study expands the work of Hasseldine et al (2012) which identified social actors such as 
the tax authorities, tax advisors, corporate taxpayers, the society and related behaviour of 
researchers by engaging the tax authority, ZIMRA, MNEs, TCs and MOF. Their study 
focused on the regulation of tax practitioners, while this study explores the neglected 
significant differences in national contexts and transfer pricing rules at a domesticated level. 
It followed a qualitative enquiry as suggested by Finer and Ylonen (2017) who praise 
qualitative approaches for enhancing understanding of complex social phenomena such as 
transfer pricing and in awarding access to previously unknown truths against the limitations 
of dominant quantitative tax avoidance researches. This study crosses the disciplinary 
boundaries of accounting and the political economy to contribute to tax laws and policy.  
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This study modestly added to the body of knowledge regarding transfer pricing as a tax 
avoidance issue which Sikka, Haslam, Kyriacou and Aggrizzi (2007) say is neglected. The 
theoretical extension of rationality is complementary to Weber’s theory of rationality. In fact, 
beneath the subjective and interpretive paradigms, is a strong stream of sub-text that enables 
the practice of transfer pricing within a domesticated and international arena. The need to 
balance foreign investment, public demands, global fitting, and national priorities within 
diverging laws, standards and processes espouse the overt and covert dimensions of transfer 
pricing.  
 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter crystallises the findings from the data together with the theoretical perspectives 
that undergird the study. Rationality elements were strong in all economic actors as well as 
impression management. The objectives of the study were met, and the Zimbabwean tax 
regime rigorously assessed. The formative evaluations of the transfer pricing rules in 
Zimbabwe show that Zimbabwe adopted global regulations. These efforts are dampened by 
both legislative and administrative incapacities. The international standards are not universal 
and so the country’s unique situations are to be addressed at a domesticated level. Zimbabwe 
has introduced transfer pricing legislation that requires local companies to comply as well.  
The next chapter provides the conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
“The concept of transfer pricing is topical and subject to contradictory views…The reality 
is much more complicated than it seems, because the situations in the economic 
environment are so different that the transfer pricing analysis can become extremely 
complex” – Cazacu  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This study sought to assess the effectiveness of the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe, a 
subject that has become topical worldwide because of globalisation and unprecedented 
growth in international trade. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the research took place at a time 
when Zimbabwe has been making strides to improve its transfer pricing administration, as 
evidenced by significant legislative reforms in a space of two years (2014 - 2016). The 
harmful effects and risks of transfer pricing practices by MNEs pose insurmountable pressure 
on tax jurisdictions, and also create economic turmoil among taxpayers and tax practitioners. 
The study also comes at a time when Zimbabwe has faced political unrest and economic 
downturn, and is making efforts to attract foreign investment with the new president having 
declared, “Zimbabwe open for business and foreign investment” (Reuters, 2018). Wanting 
foreign investment and attracting it are two different things, of which the latter is often a 
challenge for many developing nations. Political harmony, economic, legislative and 
administrative systems are some of the ingredients needed to attract investment. The 
international community has intervened with the OECD and UN having issued transfer 
pricing guidelines. This study examined the approaches adopted by Zimbabwe against these 
international guidelines, and related them to the practices adopted by South Africa, Kenya, 
China and the UK (all being trade partners of Zimbabwe). 
 
This chapter provides the contributions of the study to the body of knowledge by 
summarising the major findings from the previous chapters and providing suggestions for 
future research. Section 8.2 presents the research objectives and how they have been 
addressed, Section 8.3 provides a summary of the contributions of this study. Section 8.4 
presents the contextual contributions, while Section 8.5 presents the theoretical contributions, 
and Section 8.6 discusses the methodological contributions of the study. Section 8.7 reveals 
the conclusion and research limitations, while Section 8.8 presents recommendations and 
Section 8.9 makes suggestions for future research. 
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8.2 Realisation of Research Objectives 
In order to achieve the overall objective of assessing transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe so as 
to effectively regulate MNEs transactions without depriving Zimbabwe of its legitimate 
revenue and without impeding foreign investment into Zimbabwe, the following research 
objectives guided the study and were addressed in the respective chapters. 
 
Table 18: Realisation of Research Objectives 
OBJECTIVE ADRESSED IN 
1. To explore the Transfer Pricing methods outlined in the OECD and United 
Nations guidelines 
Chapter 4, and 7 
2. To compare the laws and policy measures in Zimbabwe that regulate 
transfer pricing against the OECD and UN guidelines 
Chapter 3 and 7 
3. To examine measures that curtail transfer pricing employed by other 
countries (i.e. South Africa, Kenya, China and the UK) and their experiences 
of this phenomenon. These countries were selected so that Zimbabwe could 
draw lessons from them. 
Chapter 5 and 7 
4. To examine the nature and types of transfer pricing strategies utilised 
among MNEs in Zimbabwe by means of a document review and then 
operationalising it in an interview schedule 
Chapter 2, 3 and 7 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
The study followed a systematic approach guided by the objectives, literature and theoretical 
perspectives provided for in Chapter 1 and 2. Chapter 3 explored the transfer pricing rules 
existing in Zimbabwe, and Chapter 4 provided the findings of the document review of the 
seminal guidelines on transfer pricing, and compared them with the transfer pricing rules and 
policies in Zimbabwe. It was found that despite the OECD’s theoretical superiority its 
guidelines have their own flaws which would require local laws to address. In Chapter 5, a 
country by country analysis was conducted with selected countries in order to draw transfer 
pricing lessons from them and make informed recommendations to Zimbabwe. All the 
selected countries have adopted the OECD guidelines, but are at an advanced stage with their 
transfer pricing laws in comparison to Zimbabwe. Chapter 6 presented the qualitative 
methodological choices and processes applied in the study, while chapter 7 presented the 
interview results and their interpretation. This led to the emergence of new information that 
provided the basis for the original contribution to the body of existing knowledge on transfer 
pricing in Zimbabwe from a contextual, theoretical and methodological perspective.  
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8.3 Summary of Contributions 
The following table is created to foreground the contributions of this study. 
 
Table 19: Summary of Contributions 
Contribution Details 
Contextual Assessing both legislative and administrative capacities of a developing country in addressing transfer 
pricing at a domesticated level has received little attention in existing literature. Further, the comparison 
of the UN and OECD transfer pricing guidelines as an examination of their applicability to the 
Zimbabwean context has not been considered in previous academic research. Thus, the research findings 
contribute to the formulation of a revised transfer pricing policy for Zimbabwe as Saunders et al (2012) 
stress that the role of research is to provide material for the development of laws. 
Theoretical (Central to 
a PhD Study) 
This study addresses scholarly gaps by contributing to new knowledge by exploring an under-explored 
and researcher-conceptualised three-layered rationality view. Central to a PhD study, the researcher has 
built on existing theoretical frameworks deemed relevant to the research objectives and direction of this 
study. The three-layered view, in terms of ‘rationality’, is not written up, as yet, outside of this study. The 
study uncovered these notions, and presents the theorising thereto, as the original contribution. 
Methodological To the best knowledge of the current researcher, no study has been carried out following interpretive, 
qualitative approaches (especially) and using interviews and document analysis as two data sources with 
purposive sample of participants who might be difficult to access. The study breaks new ground for an 
area that is predominated by quantitative methodologies. 
  Source: Own Compilation  
 
8.4 Contextual Contributions 
Business advisers and scholars claim that transfer pricing is an on-going international tax 
conundrum, and this study contributed to the research on transfer pricing as a tax avoidance 
tool which has been neglected in the academic tax literature. The central gap to formatively 
evaluate transfer pricing laws and policies both contextually and theoretically applying 
qualitative methods has not been done before in Zimbabwe. Oguttu (2017:18) encourages 
research that addresses specific needs at national level and Dharmapala (2014) acknowledges 
the limitations of the BEPS Action plan in addressing domestic problems. 
 
Considering the eccentric characteristics of Zimbabwe’s economic, social and political 
environment and scrutinising the complex structures and practices within the country was 
critical given that Sikka and Willmott (2010:9) allude to developing countries tax authorities 
only able to adjust transfer pricing if they have the necessary administrative and legislative 
resources. Kotz (2000) added that the effectiveness of legislative powers is a function of 
political will as MNEs, through lobbying and patronage may dilute threatening legislation. 
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A comparative examination was made between the OECD and UN transfer pricing 
guidelines, and findings showed that the UN has negligible differences with the OECD, with 
the latter having constant updates unlike the former, resulting in little or no application of the 
former in Zimbabwe. A country-by-country analysis was also conducted with selected 
countries, and findings revealed that the OECD’s ALP is widely used for determining transfer 
prices. This wide use of the OECD guidelines in many jurisdictions, including Zimbabwe 
may be an exhibit of geopolitical supremacy. The ALP is achieved through the application of 
the five methods prescribed by the OECD. Apparently the traditional transactional methods 
are preferred to the profit transactional methods. Though Zimbabwe has progressed from 
general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR) to specific transfer pricing rules, the implementation of 
the rules is limited by both legislative and administrative factors.  
 
Sikka and Willmott (2010:7) espoused that MNEs direct their attention to transfer pricing 
strategies that minimise taxes in order to achieve higher shareholder value and executive 
rewards. These strategies include among others, the commercial tax avoidance strategies sold 
by accountancy firms which they say have been neglected by accounting researchers which 
predominantly focus on auditing and accounting matters. Findings of this study revealed that 
MNEs in Zimbabwe are indeed in the habit of avoiding tax through strategies such as 
manipulation of transfer prices of management services, over-invoicing/under-invoicing, 
treaty shopping and use of low tax jurisdictions with the assistance of tax professionals. 
Hence Zimbabwe took a step in the right direction when it enacted specific transfer pricing 
rules in 2016 though their effectiveness is largely affected by a lack of legislative clarity, 
inconsistencies in application of rules, legislative inadequacies, and an incapacitated tax 
authority.  
 
A lack of legislative clarity was shown by inconsistencies in the treatment of the ALP against 
the thin capitalization rule of 3:1 with the latter taking precedence over the former. It is not 
conclusive as to whether Zimbabwe should continue with the thin capitalization rules because 
the BEPS Action Plan 13 supports it. On the other hand, other countries such as South Africa 
repealed the thin capitalization rule of 3:1 and embraced the ALP. Durst (2015a:14) also 
warns developing countries of giving unwarranted attention to BEPS arguing that they should 
concentrate on their already limited enforcement resources on developing fiscal instruments 
that will enhance their revenue. The restrictions on management fees against the arm’s length 
principle were also raised, and participants requested ZIMRA to provide clarity on this issue. 
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The rules have also been accused of being unfairly applied to domestic transactions and the 
participants acknowledged that domestic transactions pose a transfer pricing risk to the 
national tax base. Tax consultants were most vocal regarding the non-selective application of 
domestic transfer pricing arguing that it burdens the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
and defeats the pro-business mantra. Despite the tax consultants venting their frustrations 
over the application of transfer pricing rules to domestic transactions, it seems related 
companies with domestic transactions are the ones complying with the rules more than those 
that have cross-border transactions. This definitely discourages the compliant firms and has 
fiscal implications which have an ultimate effect on the public good. Findings suggest that 
Zimbabwe is the only country applying transfer pricing to domestic transactions which results 
in high compliance costs for domestic firms while international guidelines are silent about it. 
In the final analysis, this research suggests that domestic transfer pricing be reconsidered 
from a Zimbabwean perspective. 
 
Legislative inadequacies have also been cited with the local laws failing to address the 
documentation requirements, specify the deadlines for submission of the documentation, 
provide a specific transfer pricing penalty regime, as well as capturing APAs. A lack of 
APAs was revealed as placing a great disadvantage for Zimbabwe as this creates uncertainty 
yet certainty is what investors are searching for. Oguttu (2006b:473) commends APAs 
despite the fact that developing countries lack the experience and expertise to administer 
them (Oguttu, 2016, Becker, Davis & Jakobs, 2014). According to the transfer pricing best 
practices in Chapter 4, most countries have strengthened their transfer pricing legislation by 
enacting APAs and improving their documentation requirements. 
 
Other countries such as South Africa have legislated the Country-by-Country report as part of 
the transfer pricing documentation required by the tax authority yet Zimbabwe does not 
specify the contents nor structure of even the local file let alone the master file. This is a big 
limitation if transfer pricing is to be effectively administered. The taxpayers are in turmoil 
with regard to when to submit the documentation, and similarly ZIMRA does not know how 
the documentation should be structured.  
 
On the administrative side, the tax authority (ZIMRA) is incapacitated with a lack of 
interpretation notes to simplify the rules and to minimise multiple interpretations. ZIMRA 
also lacks sound staffing policies which exposes it to high staff turnover (losing staff to tax 
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consultancy firms), multiple staff transfers and instability coupled with numerous managerial 
positions in acting capacities. Such revelations ratify the findings by Collins and Mulligan 
(2014:18) that tax authorities fail to retain their staff members and lose them to the big four 
accountancy firms. ZIMRA is also restricted by inadequate experience, knowledge and skills 
as well as the absence of a specialised transfer pricing team, an area which would 
indisputably strengthen its transfer pricing administration. 
 
ZIMRA lacks databases for comparable data leaving tax consultants with the burden to 
subscribe to commercial databases which are exorbitantly expensive. The use of foreign 
databases is permissible by law but is hypocritical, rational and exhibits impression 
management as these databases do not reflect the economic characteristics of Zimbabwean 
pricing models. Because of Zimbabwe’s economic status and weak economic activity, 
comparable data is a big challenge, and tax consultants have resorted to subscribing to 
databases such as KT Mine and Onesource administered by Thompson Reuters. Access to 
such databases would aid in addressing the major challenge of the effective administration of 
transfer pricing. Therefore, the MOF was urged to create a database for comparables. 
 
Knowledge gaps and the inconsistent application of rules have been cited especially in 
regional offices since transfer pricing is only handled at the head office in Harare. Lack of 
administrative coordination within the tax authority can promote revenue leakages through 
transfer pricing. Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the fiscal appeal court deters investment 
as transfer pricing adjustments are frequently contested, and court cases remain unresolved. 
The rationality tendencies of ZIMRA in forcing taxpayers to pay additional tax before the 
court process has been concluded were castigated. 
 
Having a robust penalty regime is an ingredient for an effective transfer pricing system. 
Paradoxically, Zimbabwe resorts to the ordinary penalties for transfer pricing cases. Though 
the general penalties may prohibit non-compliance tendencies, of the countries reviewed 
(Chapter 5), Zimbabwe was the only country without specific penalties. ZIMRA uses general 
penalties and invokes Section 81 of the ITA for failure to keep transfer pricing 
documentation, and for non-compliance with any of the rules. However, participants 
indicated that it was important to benchmark and fine-tune the penalty regime and practices 
for transfer pricing in order to align them with international standards.  
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8.5 Theoretical Contributions 
This study attends to scholarly gaps by contributing to new knowledge by exploring an 
under-explored three-layered rationality concept (legal, implementation and exploitative). 
The conceptual framework after coding (Section 7.6.5) represents the integration of the 
contribution. The researcher, therein, theorises how the key players respond to transfer 
pricing as influenced by the rationality decision-making processes and extends the insights on 
different kinds of rationality theory, as applied to a critical context. This study modestly adds 
to the body of knowledge regarding an all important concern of transfer pricing as a tax 
avoidance issue which Sikka et al (2007) said was neglected. The theoretical extension of 
rationality is complementary to Weber’s (1968) theory of rationality and provides additional 
vocabulary thereto, backed up through empirical work in one country, but with generic areas 
that may be applied more universally. The need to balance foreign investment, public 
demands, global fitting, and national priorities within diverging laws, standards and processes 
espouse the overt and covert dimensions of transfer pricing.  
 
This study ratifies the role played by tax consultants as carriers of the Janus elements 
(elements where one has to look in two directions simultaneously) of compliance and 
exploitative responses to transfer pricing by MNEs. ZIMRA is not adequately capacitated 
both with legislative and administrative resources, thereby causing implementation reality 
challenges. For instance, the use of foreign databases is permissible at law but hypocritical 
and exibiting impression management as these databases do not reflect the economic 
characteristics of Zimbabwean pricing models. 
 
Dharmapala (2014) also stresses inconsistencies in tax laws and their implementation as a 
limitation to fighting profit shifting. It is not only the complexity arrangements of MNEs that 
complicate transfer pricing, but ZIMRA also pervade transfer pricing with complexity 
through their rational decisions (with the “state power on our side” mind set) which are not 
always consistent. 
 
Despite the transfer pricing strategies employed by MNEs, it has also been alleged that 
ZIMRA is contributing to revenue leakages through corruption. It has been accused of 
impression management by putting big banners of their vision and mission statements 
together with banners of Zero Tolerance to Corruption yet the majority of the officers are 
corrupt and unscrupulous (see Section 7.5.1.4). The uneven implementation of the rules has 
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also been described as loopholes for revenue leakages and is stifling production and therefore 
suppressing potential tax revenue.  
 
Transfer pricing is regulated by international standards (Hasseldine et al, 2012), but 
implementation in Zimbabwe is affected by the national context and domestic legislation 
which novels the war between territorial sovereignty and global fitting. Data also revealed 
that Zimbabwe is peculiar in that the canons of taxation are not observed at a higher level, 
mainly because of “politics leading the economy” and not the other way round. Resultantly, 
this exposes Zimbabwe to high levels of profit shifting that ultimately negatively affect 
ordinary citizens. The study also concurs with Oguttu (2016:20) that the OECD fails to 
capture the specific needs of the African developing states, and therefore nations should not 
just take up prescriptions of international laws which are a representation of few countries, 
but rather exercise their own sovereignty. 
 
The findings revealed some legislative deficiencies, communication gaps, inconsistencies and 
administrative challenges. These findings illuminate legislative gaps that are still in existence, 
the importance of administrative capacity and suggest focal areas for future research to be 
conducted by both national and international agencies and researchers. Additional knowledge 
on the transfer pricing subject is also provided to help demystify the claim by Fuest et al 
(2013) that little is known about the effects of tax base erosion yet there is significant 
empirical evidence of its existence. 
 
8.6 Methodological Contribution 
The researcher took a grand step in employing qualitative methodologies following the 
interpretivism paradigm in a space that is predominated by quantitative research. The 
crystallization of in-depth interviews and document analysis in a manner that is demanded by 
qualitative designs (richness and rigour) represents the methodological contribution. 
Interview data were gathered from information-rich participants (tax consultants, tax 
authorities and legislators) supported by literature (Hasseldine et al, 2012). The qualitative 
methodological norms (Moon et al, 2016) and ethical considerations have been observed 
(Greener, 2008). Interview de-briefing, member checks and synergistic guidance by the 
second coder increased the trustworthiness of the data. No study has previously been done on 
transfer pricing following interpretive qualitative approaches (especially) and using 
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interviews and document analysis as two data sources with purposive sampling of 
participants who might be difficult to access. 
 
8.7 Overall Conclusion and Limitations 
The research objectives were achieved by the theoretical and contextual noveling of findings 
from both primary and secondary data which strengthened the results. The research involved 
a formative evaluation of the transfer pricing regime in Zimbabwe and found an outlier, i.e. 
the application of transfer pricing to domestic transactions. While the risks associated with 
transfer pricing are postulated to be high in cross-border transactions, Zimbabwe settled for 
national sovereignty against global standards. The irony is in that related party firms with 
domestic transactions are complying with the rules more than those with cross-border 
transactions – an occurrence that is harmful to the fiscus. 
 
While the OECD guidelines have been predominantly adopted in the world, the UN 
acknowledges that profit shifting can manifest differently as determined by the legal and 
administrative framework. Importantly, international standards are not universal and so a 
country’s unique situation should be addressed at a domestic level. Transfer pricing is a 
global issue, and its practice is not uniform for all countries. Because of the heterogeneity of 
economic environments, controversies, and complexities surrounding the transfer pricing 
concept as alluded to by Cazacu (2017:19), the claims of this study may persuade further 
questions and the world would benefit from additional research through different renditions if 
alternative theoretical underpinnings are applied.  
 
The central theory applied in this study namely; rationality theory, helped elucidate the 
intricacies and nuances of transfer pricing. Its stratification into three layers helped to 
formatively evaluate transfer prices in Zimbabwe, and contribute to the claims of this study, 
though it was limited by its concept of aggregating the views, judgements and preferences of 
different economic factors as echoed by Elster and Hylland (1986). However, it was most 
appropriate as it captured the subjective human dimensions which Li (2005:47) suggested are 
greatly neglected in the existing transfer pricing theory. Borkowski (1990) also believed that 
the existing theory “addressed only specific variables rather than the transfer pricing 
environment as a whole”. Not only is the application of the rationality theory to transfer 
pricing a theoretical contribution, but its stratification into three dimensions as well is an 
extension of the seminal work by Weber (1968). 
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Though the research followed the methodological norms as guided by qualitative enquiries, it 
was nevertheless subject to limitations. The exploratory nature of the study, and the 
subjectivity in applying purposive sampling cannot be ignored. The interview data is a 
reflection of the opinion and ideas of certain participants at a certain time, and the documents 
used in document review being limited in that they were written for certain reasons and not 
for the purposes of this study. The combination of both methods helped counter the 
weaknesses of the other and crystallisation helped by allowing for multiple realities to be 
considered. The interpretivist paradigm helped illuminate the understanding of the transfer 
pricing subject despite the inherent limitations of qualitative inquiry.  
 
Ethical considerations were followed, but the sensitivity of tax matters and the transfer 
pricing subject is presumed to have resulted in limited responses from the MNEs. The 
concept of hypocrisy and impression management evident in all the major economic players 
heightened the sensitivity of respondents to transfer pricing matters. Despite this, the 
researcher managed to get valuable responses from the MOF, TCs and ZIMRA. 
 
Zimbabwe has much to lose with an ineffective tax system since a greater portion of its tax 
revenue comes from taxing MNEs that have invested in their country (Oguttu, 2016:27). 
Addressing tax-motivated transfer pricing by MNEs would result in increased national 
revenue and the provision of quality public goods and services. Thus the study can 
confidently conclude that evidence from both literature and primary data confirm the 
deficiencies in the Zimbabwean transfer pricing rules. Despite Zimbabwe’s commendable 
efforts to plug tax avoidance through transfer pricing, its legislative framework is not yet 
water-tight and has room for improvement. The antagonistic and rationalistic behaviour of 
MNEs and the lack of adequate legislative instruments pose implementation challenges for 
ZIMRA. The divergence between national and international tax systems also create 
challenges for tax authorities, and all this demands domesticated solutions if revenue 
leakages as a result of transfer pricing are to be effectively plugged. 
 
8.8 Recommendations for Zimbabwe’s Transfer Pricing Administration 
Findings of this study have theoretical implications for the citizens, the government, ZIMRA, 
tax practitioners as well as MNEs as explained below. The recommendations from the study 
are presented for the advancement of transfer pricing legislation and practice in Zimbabwe.  
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8.8.1 Alignment of International Standards with African Needs 
Zimbabwe is not yet a member of the OECD and the OECD guidelines are persuasive rather 
than mandatory. After having reviewed literature and gathered interview data, it is 
recommended that the hybrid approach should be considered – that is, where the OECD and 
the UN guidelines address the specific needs of developing countries. In addition, and as 
suggested by some respondents, ATAF should be approached to develop guidelines for 
African countries. Oguttu (2016:20) believes that the BEPS Action plan is limited by its 
inability to appreciate the specific needs of developing nations. This calls for customised 
guidelines and strategies. Therefore, in future it is recommended that ATAF develops transfer 
pricing guidelines that best align with the needs of African tax jurisdictions.  
 
8.8.2 Government Enhancement of Domestic Transfer Pricing Rules  
The success of tax compliance systems is a function of the elements of various economic 
players which include the state, the tax authority, taxpayers and tax practitioners. The 
government has a very significant role to play in the development of tax systems if it is going 
to fulfil its public mandate. Weak tax systems mean low detection of transfer pricing abuse 
which is countered by MNE aggressivity.  
 
Legislative empowerment is critical together with the provision of finances to capacitate the 
revenue collecting agent, ZIMRA. The fiscal appeal court should also be capacitated to 
effectively discharge its duties. It is the apex authority which should set precedence and 
become the source of law. Its delays in concluding cases do not only stifle the legislative 
progress but also weakens tax administration and clouds taxpayer confidence in the tax 
system. 
 
The study also recommends that Zimbabwe come up with thresholds for the preparation of 
transfer pricing documentation for domestic transactions as suggested by the UN (2017) and 
practised by countries such as South Africa in their cross-border transactions (Chapter 5, 
section 5.2.1). For instance, related companies with domestic transactions below $150 000 
could be exempted from preparing transfer pricing documentation. This will help minimise 
tax compliance costs and promote growth for the emerging businesses.  
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8.8.3 Provision of Interpretation Notes and Exercising of Due Diligence by ZIMRA   
A lack of interpretation notes from ZIMRA has been described as a limitation to the 
effectiveness of the transfer pricing rules. It is therefore recommended that ZIMRA prepares 
interpretation notes to simplify the rules and reduce multiple intepreattions by stakeholders. 
 
The call on ZIMRA to exercise due diligence especially with the mining sector, requires 
specialist training, financial resources and sound policies so as to minimise the risk of 
revenue losses. Chiweshe (2016) also stresses the importance of an aggressive audit team 
which checks transfer pricing compliance by MNEs. Particular attention is required with the 
transfer prices of management fees among related companies. ZIMRA is encouraged to draw 
lessons from tax authorities of other jurisdictions, and is strongly urged to get rid of 
unscrupulous officers within its organisation. 
 
8.8.4 Elimination of Inconsistencies 
The results suggest that ZIMRA should eliminate inconsistencies by providing interpretation 
notes to the public, iron out disparities between the principal and subsidiary legislation, and 
desist from abusing the notion that they have state power on their side. Creation of supportive 
staffing policies that promote efficiency is encouraged. To achieve this, ZIMRA has to 
improve the specialisation of its staff’s skills by training them on the nuances and intricacies 
of transfer pricing as well as decentralising transfer pricing practice to allow regional offices 
to handle transfer pricing cases at a regional level. Capacitating the regional officers would 
ensure uniform application of the transfer pricing provisions. A specialised team is envisaged 
to help close the skills gap as well as resolve sector issues that require technical expertise and 
to conduct aggressive transfer pricing audits.  
 
Zimbabwe has a lot to learn from its counterparts such as South Africa which have 
experience in transfer pricing administration, and could adopt other measures such as CbC 
reporting that South Africa has incorporated. Collegiality with other tax authorities is 
encouraged, and Zimbabwe is urged to adopt APAs, specific documentation requirements, 
and a specific penalty regime to iron out legislative and administrative gaps, ensure certainty 
and promote foreign direct investment.  
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8.8.5 Intensive Scrutiny of MNEs 
The capitalist ideologies of MNEs are contrary to the neoliberal systems of states. However, a 
culture of cooperative compliance should be cultivated, and the onus is upon the government 
to develop a robust tax system which enables ZIMRA to discharge its mandate with the 
necessary legislative support. ZIMRA should be actively involved in transfer pricing audits 
and scrutinise MNE transactions especially those in the mining sector. 
 
8.8.6 Regulation of Tax Practitioners 
Findings also revealed that it is not only the MNEs that need to be regulated. The call by 
Hasseldine et al (2012) for states to regulate tax consultants is critical as it is evident that 
other countries are prosecuting these accounting firms for misconduct and for selling 
unacceptable tax avoidance strategies/schemes. For example, South Africa’s KPMG and the 
Gupta case which implicated one of the big four accountancy firms (Cropley & Brock, 2017). 
Zimbabwe does not have such regulations, and so would benefit from introducing them. 
 
8.8.7 Community Engagement 
Sikka and Willmott (2010:3) highlight that the operationalisation of transfer pricing may be 
invisible to the citizens. The rationalisation theory helped unpack some rational decisions 
made by those with power and economic resources. Social and economic effects are visible, 
and are characterised by codes such as ‘they have state power on their side’. MNEs should 
engage members of the community from which they operate if they are to balance their right 
to make a profit and their moral duty to pay their fair share of tax. 
 
8.9 Suggestions for Future Research 
Research is an on-going process and research on tax avoidance which continues to be a 
global problem, is not an exception. Therefore, benefits would accrue if the following 
suggested theoretical and pragmatic research on transfer pricing is conducted: 
 Research which primarily focuses on the complexities of transfer pricing of intangible 
transactions because this study focused on the broad views of transfer pricing and did 
not separate tangible from intangible transactions;  
 Research on alternative methods to the arm’s length principle. As a competing 
method, the Global Formulary Apportionment method emerged from the study but the 
applicability of this method was not considered. Therefore, future research that is 
oriented and guided by the Global Formularly Apportionment method is suggested;  
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 Research on the application of transfer pricing on domestic transactions is noble and 
if so, what is the magnitude of revenue lost through domestic transactions and how 
much revenue is recovered versus the investment lost. This should also include the 
transfer pricing and compliance cost implications on SMEs; 
 Research on tax incentives awarded to foreign investors especially in the extractive 
industry to determine if they yield the expected results, and to determine the impact of 
these tax incentives on the economic well-being of developing countries; and  
 Research to advance knowledge on transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe especially 
focusing on the mining sector despite the magnitude of enhanced revenue yields as a 
result of the new rules not having been ascertained, as the UN (2017) highly 
recommends that national jurisdictions develop their own domestic transfer pricing 
rules.  
 
8.10 Conclusion 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in relation to transfer pricing with regard to 
contextual, theoretical and methodological gaps. The researcher embraced the post-modern 
approach to triangulation called crystallisation championed by Ellingson (2009) which fits 
well with the interpretivist lenses (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The combination of interviews 
and documents also provided a certain rendition on transfer pricing as a practice. The study 
analysed various documents and 20 interviews with ZIMRA, MOF and tax consultants were 
conducted by the researcher. Literature, document analysis, interview analysis, and 
theoretical positions informed the conclusions of this study. The findings provided variety, 
diversity and different renditions regarding transfer pricing as a concept and suggest various 
areas for improvement.  The findings of the study reinforce the axiological assumptions that 
humans are subjective and rational, and this position influences the tax compliance decisions 
of MNEs. The fight against abusive transfer pricing practices, strengthening of the legislative 
provisions and the capacity buiding of the tax authority should assist in broadening the tax 
base and ultimately help finance the nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
  
180 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, L. and Drtina, R. 2010. ‘Multinational Transfer Pricing: Management Accounting 
Theory Versus Practice’. Management Accounting Quarterly, 11(3): 1-8. 
Addison, S and Mueller, F. 2016. ‘The dark side of Professions: The Big Four and Tax 
Avoidance.’  Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 28 (8): 1263-1290. 
AFRODAD and ZEPARU. 2014. Illicit financial flows: Towards a more integrated approach 
for curbing illicit financial flows from Zimbabwe. Harare. AFRODAD. 
Ahiakpor, JCW. 2010. ‘Multinational Corporations in the Third World: Predators or Allies in 
Economic Development? Religion and Liberty. Volume 2. Available from: 
http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-2-number-5/multinational-
corporations-third-world-predators-o  [Accessed 13 November 2016]. 
Ali, M. Fjeldstad, OH. and Sjursen, IH. (2013). To pay or not to pay? Citizens’ attitudes 
towards taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa. Afrobarometer Working 
paper No 143. 
Ali, M. Fjeldstad, OH. and Sjursen, IH. 2010. Factors affecting Tax Compliant Attitude in 
Africa: Evidence from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa. Afrobarometer.  
Available from: https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4727-factors-affecting-tax-compliant-
attitude-in-africa.pdf [Accesed 09 January 2017]. 
Alm, K. McClelland, GH. and Schulze, WD. 1992. ‘Why do people pay taxes?’ Journal of 
Public Economics, 48: 21-38. 
Ariel, B. 2012. ‘Deterrence and moral persuasion effects on corporate tax compliance: 
Findings from a randomised controlled trial.’ American Society of Criminology, 50 (1) 
27-69. 
Asongu, SA. and Nwachukwu, JC. 2016. ‘Rational Asymmetric Development: Transfer 
Mispricing and Sub-Saharan Africa’s Extreme Poverty Tragedy. AGDI Working Paper. 
Economics and Political Implications of International Financial Reporting Standards.’ 
IGI Global, 2016, 282-302.  
Asongu, SA. 2015. Rational Asymmetric Development: Transfer pricing and Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s Extreme Poverty Tragedy. African Governance and Development Institute 
Working Paper N0 15/054. MPRA. 
Atkinson, R. and Flint, J. 2001. Social Research Update. Surrey: University of Surrey. 
181 
 
Avi-Yonah, R. 2015. ‘Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach To Taxing Multinationals, 
U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 364, U of Michigan Law and Econ 
Research Paper No. 15-012, Available from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344760 
[Accessed 2 December 2017]. 
Azemar, C and Corcos, G. 2009. ‘Multinational Firms’ heterogeneity in tax responsiveness:  
The role of transfer pricing. The world Economy. Wiley Blackwell, 32 (9): 1291-1318. 
Babbie, F. and Mouton, J. 1998: The Practice of Social Research. Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bagchi, A. Bird, R. and Das-Gupta. 1995. An economic approach to tax administration reform. 
International Centre for Tax Studies. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Baker, R. 2005. Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market 
System. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Baker and McKenzie. 2006. Cross-border Transactions Handbook. Baker and McKenzie. 
Available from: www.law.northwestern.edu/professionaled/documents/archive/cross-
border%20Transactions%20Handbook_Roeder.pdf [Accessed 09 July 2014]. 
Baker, P. 2013. ‘Is there a cure for BEPS?’ British Tax Review, 2013, 5: 605-606. Available 
from: http://www.fieldtax.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BTR-2013-5-605-606-Is-
there-a-cure-for-BEPS.pdf [Accessed 13 June 2015]. 
Barbour, R. S. (2001). ‘Checklists for improving rigour in qualitative research: A case of the 
tail wagging the dog? BMJ’. British Medical Journal, 322 (7294): 1115–1117. 
Bateman, C, R. 2007. Minimising risk of transfer pricing audit and awakening the giant of 
corporate stewardship: An ethical decision-making model (EDDM) for multinational 
enterprise (MNE) Transfer Pricing. Journal of legal, ethical and regulatory issues,10 (2): 
109-127. 
Batrancea, LM. Nichita, RA. Batrancea, L and Moldovan, B, A. 2012. ‘Tax compliance 
models: from Economic to behavioural approaches.’ Transylvanian review of 
Administrative Sciences, (36): 13-26. 
Becker, J. Davis, RB. and Jakobs, G. 2014. ‘The economics of Advance Pricing Agreements. 
UCD Centre for economic research.’ Working paper series. WP14/19. 
Beer, S. and Loeprick, J. 2013. ‘Profit shifting: Drivers and potential counter measures.’ WU 
International Taxation Research. Paper Series, WP 2013-03. 
Behrens, K. Peralta, S. and Picard, PM. 2014. Transfer pricing rules, OECD guidelines, and 
market distortions. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 16 (4): 650-680.  
182 
 
Benari, G. 2009. Tricky Tax: Two tax avoidance schemes explained. Institute of Scientific and 
Technical Communications. Available from: http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Tricky_Tax.pdf  [Accessed 10 June 2015]. 
Benke, RL. and Edwards, JD. 1980. Transfer Pricing Techniques and uses. New York: 
National Association of Accountants.  
Bernard, AB. Jensen, JB. and Schott, PK. 2006. Transfer pricing by US- Based multinational 
firms, NBER Working paper 12493. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Beuselinck, C. Deloof, M. and Vanstraelen, A. 2014. Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and 
tax enforcement: evidence from public versus private multinationals. Review of 
Accounting studies, 20 (2): 710-746. 
Bhat, G. 2009. Transfer pricing, tax havens and global governance / Ganapati Bhat. – Bonn: 
DIE, 2009 – Discussion Paper / DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik; 7/2009 
Bird, RM. 2008. ‘Tax challenges facing developing countries.’ Working Paper Series. IIB 
Paper No 9 Annual Public Lecture Series of the National Institute of Public Finance and 
Policy, New Delhi, India, March 12, 2008. 
Blackwell, C. 2010. A meta-analysis of incentive effects in tax compliance experiments. In J. 
Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez and B. Torgler (eds.), Developing Alternative Frameworks 
for Explaining Tax Compliance Behavior: 97–112. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Blaufus, K. Bob, J. and Otto, PE. 2014. The Effect of Tax Privacy on Tax Compliance - An 
Experimental Investigation. Arqus Discussion Paper No 164. Available from: 
http://www.arqus.info/mobile/paper/arqus_164.pdf  [Accessed 15 March 2018]. 
Bolino, MC. 1999. Citizenship and impression management: Good Soldiers or good Actors?   
Academy of Management Review, 24(1): 82-98. 
Borkowski, SC. 1997. The transfer pricing concerns of developed and developing countries. 
The International Journal of Accounting, 32 (3): 321-336. 
Borkowski, SC. 1996. ‘An analysis (Meta- and otherwise) of multinational transfer pricing 
research. The International Journal of Accounting’, 31 (1): 39-53. 
Borkowski, SC. 1990. ‘Environmental and Organisational factors affecting Transfer Pricing: A 
survey.’ Journal of Management Accounting Research. 2 (3), 79-99. 
Bowen, GA. 2009). ‘Document analysis as a qualitative research method.’ Qualitative 
Research Journal, 9 (2): 27-40. doi:10.3316/QRJ0902027. 
 
183 
 
Bradley, W. 2015. ‘Transfer Pricing: Increasing tension between multinational firms and tax 
authorities.’ Accounting and Taxation, 7 (2): 65-73. 
Braun, V and Clarke, G, T. 2014. Thematic Analysis. Qual Res Clin Health Psychol, 24: 95-
114. 
Brinkmann, S. and Kvale, S. 2015. Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. 3rd Edition. London: SAGE Publications. 
Brock, G. and Pogge, T. 2014. Global Tax Justice and Global Justice. MOPP2014; 1 (1) 1-15 
Bruce, R., 2011. “Tax turns nasty’, Accounting and Business, 14: 2, 18-20. 
Brunsson, N. 2007. The consequences of decision-making. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Brunsson, N. 1982. ‘The irrationality of action and action rationality: Decisions, Ideologies and 
Organisational Actions.’ Journal of Management Studies, 19 (1) 29-4. 
Brunsson, N. 1986. ‘Organising for Inconsistencies: On organisational conflict, Depression and 
Hypocrisy as Substitutes for Action.’ Journal of Management Studies, 3 (3-4): 165-185. 
Brunsson, N. 1993. ‘The Necessary Hypocrisy.’ The International Executive, 35 (1): 1-9. 
Bryman, A. and Burgess, RG. 1994. ‘Analysisng qualitative data.’ Taylor and Francis elibrary 
Buckley, PJ. and Casson, M. 1985. The economic theory of the multinational enterprise. 
Palgrave Macmillan, UK. 
Burns, RB. and Burns RA. 2008. Business Research Methods and Statistics using SPSS. Los 
Angeles. Sage Publications.  
Cant, R. 2012. International tax and transfer pricing: China hot issues. Dezanshira and 
Associates. Available at www.dezanshira.com [Accessed 12 January 2017]. 
Cazacu, AL. 2017. Transfer Pricing- An international problem. Junior Scientific Researcher, 3 
(2): 19-25. 
Chakaipa, S. 2010. Local Government Institutions and Elections. In de Visser, J. Steytler, N. 
and Machingauta, N. Eds. Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue. 
South Africa. Community Law Centre, 31-68. 
Chakanyuka, T. 2015. “Zim Trade Deficit Soars”. SundayNews. May 2015. Available: 
http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/zim-trade-deficit-soars/  [Accesed 02 February 2018] 
Ching-Wen, L. and Hsiao-Chen, C. 2010. Motives of transfer pricing strategies – systematic 
analysis. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd, 110 (8): 1215-1233. 
Chitemba, B. 2017. “ECONET, ZIMRA Bossess in a US$300m Scandal”. Available from:  
http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/econet-zimra-bosses-in-us300m-scandal/  [Accessed 12 
August 2018].  
184 
 
Chiweshe, KL. 2016. The transfer pricing implications of hard to value intangibles: Challenges 
and recommendations. Masters Dissertation, North West University. 
Cho, JY. and Lee, EH. 2014. Reducing confusion about Grounded Theory and Qualitative 
Content Analysis: Similarities & differences. The Qualitative Report, 19 (32): 1-20. 
Christensen, J. 2012. ‘Africa’s lost tax revenue, Lost development opportunities.’ In “Africa’s 
Capital Losses: What can be done?” Bulletin No 87 - Fall 2012. 
Christensen, J. 2011. ‘The looting Continues: Tax havens and corruption’. Critical perspectives 
on International Business, 7 (2): 177-196. 
Christensen, J. and Kapoor, S. No date. Tax Avoidance, Tax competition and Globalisation: 
making tax justice a focus for global activism. Accountancy Business and the Public 
Interest, 3 (2). 
Christian Aid. 2013. ‘Multinational Corporations and the Profit Shifting lure of tax havens.’ 
Christian Aid Occasional Paper Number 9. Christian Aid 2013. 
Cohen, N. and Arieli, T. 2011. Field Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological 
Challenges and Snowball Sampling.  Journal of Peace Research, 48 (4): 423-435. 
Collins, T and Mulligan, E. 2014. Ireland’s introduction of transfer pricing: A New Institutional 
Theory perspective: Accounting, Finance and Governance Review, 21 (1&2) Special 
issue on taxation. 
Cools, M. Emmanuel, C and Jorissen, A. 2008. Management control in the transfer pricing tax 
compliant multinational enterprise. Accounting, Organizations and Society. 33 (6): 603-
628.  
Cooper, DR. and Schindler, PS. 2011. Business Research Methods. 11thed. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Companies. Inc. 
Cooper, DR. and Schindler, PS. 2008. Business Research Methods. 10th Ed. Boston, M, A & 
Burr Ridge, IL: McGraw-Hill. 
Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. 2008. Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for 
developing grounded theory (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
Creswell, JW. 2014. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. 4th Ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Creswell, JW. 2009. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. 3rd Edition. New Dehli SAGE. 
Creswell, JW. 2007. Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
Approaches. 2nd Ed.  London: Sage. 
185 
 
Cristea, AD. and Nguyen, DX. 2014. ‘Transfer Pricing by multinational firms: New evidence 
from foreign firm ownership.’ MPRA, Paper No 61922. 
Cropley, Ed and Brock, J. 2017. KPMG’s South Africa bosses purged over Gupta scandal.  
Reuters. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kpmg-safrica/kpmgs-south-
africa-bosses-purged-over-gupta-scandal-idUSKCN1BQ16P  [Accessed 30 September 
2018]. 
Cugno, RJ and Thomas, K. 2009. A book review of Laura Ellingson’s Engaging Crystallisation 
in Qualitative research: An introduction. The Qualitative Report, 14 (2): 111-115.  
Dachs, P. 2014. South Africa: New Capitalization rules. International Tax Review. Available 
from: http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3375350/South-Africa-New-thin-
capitalisation-rules.html [Accessed 9 July 2018]. 
Davies, RB. Martin, J. Parenti, M. and Toubal, F. 2014. Knocking on tax haven’s door: 
Multinational firms and transfer pricing. University College of Dublin, School of 
economics.  
WP14/21. Available from: http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/WP14_21.pdf  [Accessed 12 January 
2017]. 
Davis Tax Committee (DTC). 2014. Interim report on Action Plan 5 - Harmful tax practices 
2014.  
Dean, K A. 2014. Transfer pricing: An evaluation of Section 31 of the Income Tax Act. 
Masters Dissertation, University of Capetown. 
Deloitte, 2018. International Tax Kenya Highlights, 2018. Available from:  
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-
kenyahighlights-2018.pdf?nc=1  [Accessed 25 August 2018]. 
Deloitte. 2014. Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide. Available from:  
http://www.deloitte.com/tax  [Accessed 10 December 2014].  
Deloitte, 2016. Global Transfer Pricing Guide. Available from: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/tax/articles/global-transfer-pricing-country-
guide.html  [Accessed 21 December 2016].  
Denzin, NK. and Lincoln, YS. 2005. The SAGE Handbook of qualitative research. 3rd Ed. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Denzin, NK. and Lincoln, YS. 2011. Disciplining the practice of qualitative research. In 
Denzin & YS. Lincoln (Eds.), The Sage handbook of qualitative research (4th ed., 1-20). 
Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage. 
186 
 
Denzin, NK. and Lincoln, YS. 2000. Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative 
research. In Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative 
research (2nd ed.1-28). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
De Waegenaere, A. Sansing, R. and Wielhouwer, J. 2006. Who benefits from inconsistent 
multinational transfer pricing rules? Contemporary Accounting Research, 23, 103–131 
DezanShira and Associates. 2011. Transfer Pricing in China. 2ndEdition. China Briefing. The 
Practical Application of China Business.  
Dharmapala, D and Riedel, N. 2012. Earnings shocks and tax-motivated income-shifting: 
Evidence from European multinationals, CESifo working paper: Public Finance, No. 
3791. 
Dharmapala, D. 2014. What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review 
of the Empirical Literature, CESifo Working Paper, No. 4612.  
Dowling, GR. 2014. The curious case of corporate tax avoidance? Is it socially irresponsible? 
Journal of Business Ethics, 124 (1): 173-184. 
Dul, J. and Hak, T. 2008. Case study methodology in Business Research. 1st Ed. Butterworth-
Heinemann.  
Durst, MC. 2015a. Limitations of the BEPS reforms: Looking beyond corporate taxation for 
revenue gains. ICTD Working Paper 40. 
Durst, M. 2015b. The Tax Policy Outlook for Developing Countries: Reflections on 
International Formulary Apportionment. ICTD Working Paper 32. 
Eccles, R. 1985. The Transfer Pricing problem: A theory for practice. Lexiton: Lexiton  
MA. 
Economywatch. 2018. Zimbabwe General Government Revenue (% of GDP) Statistics.  
 Available from: 
http://www.economywatch.com/economicstatistics/Zimbabwe/General_Government_Re
venue_Percentage_GDP/  [Accessed 19 August 2018].  
Eden, L. 1998. Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and Corporate Income Taxation in 
North America. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
Eden, L. 2009. Taxes, transfer pricing and the multinational enterprise. In Alan Rugman 
(editor). Oxford Handbook of International Business, 2nd Edition. Oxford University 
Press. 
Eden, L. and Smith, LM. 2011. The ethics of Transfer Pricing. Available from: 
http://www.business.ualberta.ca/en/Departments/AOIS/Conferences/FraudInAccounting
OrganizationsAndSociety  [Accessed 07 July 2014].  
187 
 
Eichfelder, S. and Kegels, C. (2012): Compliance costs caused by agency action? Empirical 
evidence and implications for tax compliance, Schumpeter Discussion Papers, No. 2012-
005, University of Wuppertal, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, 
Wuppertal. Available from: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:468-20120410-
151433-1 [Accessed 24 April 2017].  
Einstein, A. No date. AZ Quotes. Available from: https://www.azquotes.com/quote/87286 
[Accessed 13 April 2019] 
Ekstrom, SC. Dall, L. and Nikolajeva, D. 2014. Tax Motivated Transfer Pricing. Seminar 
Paper 05-06-2014. LundsUniversitet. 
Ellingson, LL. 2009. Engaging crystallisation in qualitative research: An introduction. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 240. 
Ellingson, LL. 2014. ‘The truth must dazzle gradually”. Enriching relationship research using 
crystallisation framework. Journal of social and personal relationships.’ 1-9 SAGE. 
Elo, S. and Kyngas, H. 2008. ‘The qualitative content analysis process.’ Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, 62 (1): 107-115. 
Elsbach, KD. and Sutton, RI. 1992. Acquiring organisational legitimacy through illegimate 
actions: A marriage of institutional and impression management theories. Academy of 
Management Journal. 35 (4): 699-738.  
Elster, J. and Hylland, A. 1986. Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge University 
Press. New York.  
Eriksson, J. 2014. ‘On the Policy Relevance of Grand Theory.’ International Studies 
Perspectives, 15 (1): 94-108. 
Ernst and Young. 2018. Worldwide transfer pricing reference guide. 2017-2018 
Ernst and Young. 2016a. Worldwide transfer pricing reference guide. 2015-16. 
Ernst and Young. 2016b. Zimbabwe enacts new transfer pricing legislation. Global tax alert, 
Transfer pricing. Available from: www.ey.com/taxalerts [Accessed 26 January 2017] 
Ernst and Young. 2015. OECD Releases Final Reports on BEPS Action Plan. Global Tax Alert 
2015. 
Etienne, J. 2011. Compliance Theory: Agoal framing Approach. Law & Policy, 33 (3): 305-
333. 
European Commission. 2014. European Union, Trade in goods with Zimbabwe.   
Evers, MT. Meier, I and Spengel, C. 2014. Transparency in financial reporting: Is Country by 
Country reporting suitable to combat International profit shifting. Discussion Paper No 
14-015. 
188 
 
Feld, Lars P., and Frey Bruno, L. 2002. The tax authority and the taxpayer. An exploratory 
analysis. Unpublished paper. 
Financial Gazette. 2018. “Bigwigs shield companies from ZIMRA”. Available from: 
https://www.financialgazette.co.zw/feed-items/bigwigs-shield-companies-from-zimra/ 
[Accessed 23 July 2018].  
Financial Gazette. 2016. “MMCZ Transformation nears Completion”. February 2016 
Available:https://www.financialgazette.co.zw/?s=mmcz+a+conduit+for+transfer+pricing 
[Accessed 22 January 2018]. 
Finer, L. and Ylonen, M. 2017. Tax-driven wealth chains: A multiple case study of tax 
avoidance in the Finnish mining sector. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 48 (53-81) 
Frederick the Great. No date. AZ Quotes. Available from: 
https://www.azquotes.com/quote/857054  [Accessed 9 April 2018].  
Friese, S. 2014. Qualitative data Analysis with ATLAS.ti (2nd ed) London: Sage Publications. 
Fuest, C, Spengel, C, Finke, K, Heckemeyer, J, H and Nusser, H. 2013. Profit shifting and 
“aggressive” tax planning by multinational firms: Issues and options for reform. ZEW 
Discussion Papers. No 13-078. 
Fuest, C. Hebous, S and Riedel, N. 2011. International profit shifting and multinational firms 
in developing economies. International Growth Centre. Available from: www.theigc.org 
[Accessed 12 April 2014]. 
Fuest, C. and Riedel, N. 2010. Tax evasion and avoidance in developing countries: The role of 
international profit shifting. Oxford: Oxford University, WP 10/12. 
Fuest, C. and Riedel, N. 2009. Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax expenditures in developing 
countries: A review of the literature. Report prepared for the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID). Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.  
GAO (Government Accountability Office-US). 2008. International Taxation- Large U.S 
Corporations and Federal Contractors with Susidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax 
Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions. Highlihts of GAO- 09- 157 (A report to 
congressional Requesters). Available from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/284522.pdf 
[Accessed 19 July 2014]. 
GAO. 1989. Content Analysis: A methodology for structuring and Analysing written material. 
Transfer Paper 10.1.3 Content analysis. 
GIZ Sector Programme Public Finance, Administrative Reform. 2010. Addressing tax evasion 
and tax avoidance in developing countries. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur. Eschborn. 
189 
 
Available: https://www.taxcompact.net/documents/2011-09-09_GTZ_Addressing-tax-
evasion-and-avoidance.pdf  [Accessed 13 November 2016].  
Goodman, ND. Tenenbaum, JB. Feldman, J. and Griffiths, TL. 2008. A Rational Analysis of 
Rule‐Based Concept Learning. Cognitive Science, 32(1): 108-154.  
Greener, S. 2008. Business Research Method. Dr Sue Greener &Ventis Publishing Aps. 
BookBooN.com. 
Grondona, V. 2018. Transfer Pricing: Concepts and Practices of ‘Sixth Method’ in Transfer 
Pricing. Tax Cooperation Policy Brief No 2. Available from: 
https://www.globaltaxjustice.org/sites/default/files/TCPB2_Transfer-Pricing-Concepts-
and-Practices-of-the-%E2%80%98Sixth-Method%E2%80%99-in-Transfer-
Pricing_EN.pdf  [Accessed 30 September 2018]. 
Grubert, H. and Mutti, J. 1991. Taxes, tariffs and transfer pricing in multinational corporate 
decision making. The Review of Economics and Statistics: 285-293. 
Gupta, P. 2012. Transfer Pricing: Impact of Taxes and Tariffs in India. Vikalpa, 37 (4): 29-46.  
Hai, OT. and See, LM. 2011. Intention of Tax Non-compliance- Examine the gaps. 
International Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 2 (7): 79-83. 
Hammer, R, M. 1996. Will the Arm’s Length Standard stand the Test of Time? The Specter of 
Apportionment. 24 Intertax, 24 (1): 2-9. 
Hansen, DR. Crosser, R, L and Laufer, D. 1992. Moral ethics v Tax Ethics: The case of 
Transfer Pricing among Multinational Corporations. Journal of Business Ethics.11 (9): 
679-686.  
Hasseldine, J. Holland, K. and van der Rijt, P. 2012. Companies and taxes in the UK: Actors, 
actions, consequences and responses. eJournal of Tax Research. 10 (3): 532-551. 
Hearson, M. and Brooks, R. 2012. ‘Calling Time- Why SABMiller should stop dodging Taxes 
in Africa.’ Available from: 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/calling_time_on_tax_avoidance.p
df  [Accessed 09 August 2014].  
Heckemeyer, JH. and Overesch, M. (2013), Multinationals’ profit response to tax differentials: 
Effect size and shifting channels. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne 
d'économique, 50: 965–994. 
Heggmair, M. Boehlke, N. and Ali-Nakyea, A. 2013. International Transfer Pricing in 
Developing Countries: Ghana Rising. International Transfer Pricing Journal, Nov/Dec 
2013. IBFD, 395-399.  
190 
 
Henry, J. 2012. The price of offshore revisited. Tax Justice Network. Available from: 
www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf  
[Accessed 15 December 2015].  
Herring, W. and Longaker, M. 2014, 'Wishful, rational, and political thinking: The labor theory 
of value as rhetoric', Argumentation & Advocacy, 50 (4): 193, Masterfile premier, 
Ebscohost. [Accessed 10 March 2018].  
Hesse-Biber, SN. and Leavy, P. 2011. The Practice of Qualitative Research. 2nd Ed. New 
Dehli: SAGE. 
Hirshleifer, J. 1956. On the Economics of Transfer Pricing.’ The Journal of Business, 29(3): 
172-184. 
Ho, D. and Wong, B. 2008. Issues on compliance and ethics in taxation: what do we know? In 
Journal of Financial Crime, 15 (4): 369-382.  
Holtzman, Y and Nagel, P. 2014. An introduction to transfer pricing. Journal of Management 
Development, 33 (1): 57-61.  
Hore, J. and Mangoro, M. 2006. Students Guide to Tax in Zimbabwe. Harare: Zxnet Pvt Ltd.  
Hooghiemstra, R. 2000. ‘Corporate Communication and Impression Management, New 
Perspectives why companies engage in corporate social reporting.’ Journal of Business 
Ethics, 27: 55-68, 2000.  
Hossein, H. 2015. Qualitative Content Analysis Research: A review Article. Journal of ELT 
and Applied Linquistics (JELTAL), 3 (1): ISSN 2347-6575.  
Howitt, D. and Cramer, D. 2011. Introduction to research methods in Psychology. London: 3rd 
Ed. Pearson Education Ltd. 
Hudzerema, F. 2016. "New Transfer Pricing tax regulations to improve tax payment. BH24. 
Available from: http://www.bh24.co.zw [Acessed 9 March 2017]. 
Jomo, KS. 2012. Transfer Pricing is a financing. Global Policy and Development. Available 
www.fes-globalization.org/new_york/index.htm  [Accessed 18 June 2014]. 
Jones, CT, Temouri, Y and Cobham, A. ‘2018. Tax haven networks and the role of the Big 4 
Accountancy firms.’ Journal of world business, (53): 177-193. 
Jonge, J. 2012. Rethinking rational choice theory. A companion on rational and moral action. 
London: Palgrave MacMillan.  
Jose, LB. 2009. Decision theory and rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jukka, K. 2001. Rationality and rule following: On procedural and consequential interests of 
the rule-guided individual. Kobenhavn, Djof Forlag.  
191 
 
Kadet, JM. 2016. BEPS - ‘A primer on where it came from and where it’s going’. Tax Notes, 
Vol 150, No 7. Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2739659 [Accessed 12 August 
2017]. 
Kaplan, RL. 1990. ‘International tax enforcement and the special challenge of Transfer 
Pricing.’ U. III. Law Rev. 299.  
Keuschnigg, C. and Devereux, MP. 2012. The arm’s length principle and distortions to 
multinational firms organisations. Journal of Internal Economics, 89: 432-440. 
King, E. 2009. Transfer Pricing and corporate taxation. Problems, practical implications and 
proposed solutions. Carlifornia: Springer.  
Kirchler, E. Hoezl, E. and Wahl, I. 2008. Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The 
“slippery slope” framework.’  Journal of Economic Psychology, 29:210–25. 
Kirchler, E. Maciejovsky and B. Schneider, F. 2001: Everyday representations of tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight: Do legal differences matter? Discussion Papers, 
Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic 
Processes, No. 2001,43.  
Klassen, K. Lisowsky, P. and Mescall, D. 2017. Transfer Pricing: Strategies, Practices and Tax 
Minimisation. Contemporary Accounting Research. 34 (1): 455-493. 
Klassen, KJ. and Laplante, SK. 2012. ‘Are U.S Multinational corporations becoming more 
aggressive income shifters.’ Journal of Accounting Research, 50 (5): 1245-1285. 
Kohlbacher, F. 2006. ‘The use of Qualitative Content Analysis in case study.’ Research Forum 
Qualitative Social Research, 7 (1) Art. 
Kothari, CR. 2004. Research Methodology, Method & Techniques.New Age International. 
New Delhi: New Age International. 
Kotz, D. 2000. Globalisation and Neoliberalism. Rethinking Marxism, 12 (2) 64-79. 
KPMG, 2018. Nigeria Country-by- Country Reporting Regulations are published. Available 
from:  https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2018/06/tnf-nigeria-cbc-reporting-
regulations-are-published.html [Accessed 21 July 2018]. 
KPMG. 2016. Global Transfer Pricing Review. Recent developments from around the world. 
KPMG International Cooperative. Available from: 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/11/global-transfer-pricing-
review.pdf [Accessed 21 December 2016]. 
KPMG. 2013. Global Transfer Pricing Review. Available from: http://www.kpmg.com/tax 
[Accessed 18 October 2014]. 
192 
 
Kruger, J. 2012. South African Transfer Pricing - A paradigm shift in the dark. SAIT. 
Available from: http://www.thesait.org.za/news/97359/South-African-Transfer-Pricing---
A-Paradigm-Shift-In-The-Dark.htm [Accessed 30 January 2017]. 
Kudrle, RT. 2009. Did blacklisting hurt the tax havens? In Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, 12 (1): 33-49. 
Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. 2009. Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research 
interviewing.  California: Sage. 
Kwaramba, M. Mahonye, N and Mandishara, L. 2015. Capital flight, natural resources and 
institutions in Zimbabwe. Centre for the study of African economies Conference Paper 
2015. Oxford UK. Available from: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=CSAE2015&paper_id=970 [Accessed 17 
December 2016]. 
Kwaramba, M. Mahonye, N. and Mandishara, L. 2016. ‘Capital flight and trade misinvoicing 
in Zimbabwe.’ African Development Review, 28 (1): 50-64. 
Kwaramba, N. 2016. Unemployment levels in Zimbabwe a disaster in waiting. The Zimbabwe 
Independent. 12 August, online Available from: 
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/08/12/unemployment-levels-zim-disaster-
waiting/ [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 
Lagarden, M. 2014. Intangibles in a Trnasfer Pricing Context: Where Does the Road lead to?  
International Transfer Pricing Journal. September/ October 2014. IBFD. Available 
from:  
https://www.ibfd.org/sites/ibfd.org/files/content/pdf/itpj_2014_05_int_1-free-article.pdf 
[Accessed 13 May 2018]. 
Lall, S. 1973. ‘Transfer Pricing by Multinational firms.’ Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 35 (3): 173-195. 
Latham, B. 2007. Sampling: What is it? Quantitative Research Methods. ENGL5377. Spring 
2007.  
Leech, NL. and Onwuegbuzie, AJ. 2007. An Array of Qualitative Data Analysis Tools: A call 
for Data Analysis Triangulation. School Psychology Quarterly, 22 (4): 554-584.  
Lehner, M. No date. Article 9: Associated Companies.Available from: www.steuerrecht.jku.at 
[Accessed 30 September 2018]. 
Lenssen, G. Bevan, D. Fontrodona, J. and Preuss, L. 2010. Tax avoidance and corporate social 
responsibility: you can’t do both, or can you? Corporate governance, 10 (4): 365-374. 
Levin, J. and Milgrom, P. 2004. Introduction to Choice Theory. 
193 
 
Leviner, S. 2008. An overview: A new era of tax enforcement - from “big stick” to responsive 
regulation. Journal compilation. Regulation and governance, 2: 60-380 Blackwell 
Publishing Asia Pvt Ltd.  
Li, L, Tim, S and Dongxian, G. 2017. International Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: 
Evidence from Linked Trade-Tax Statistics in the UK, CESifo Working Paper, No 6594, 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich 
Li, J. 2006. Transfer Pricing and Double Taxation: A review and comparison of the New 
Zealand, Australia and the OECD Transfer Pricing rules and Guidelines. International 
Tax Journal. Spring. 49-62. 
Li, J. 2005. A comparative empirical study of international transfer pricing practices and audits 
in New Zealand, Australia and China. PhD Lincoln University. 
Lohse, T. and Riedel, N. 2012. The impact of transfer pricing regulations on profit shifting 
within European multinationals, FZID Discussion Papers, No.61-2012, Available from: 
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-7962 [Accessed 21 January 2015].  
Lohse, T and Riedel, N. 2013. Do transfer pricing laws limit international income shifting? 
Evidence form European multinationals. CeSifo Working paper No 4404. Available 
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/84180/1/cesifo_wp4404.pdf   [Accessed 23 
February 2015]. 
Lohse, T. 2012. The Impact of Anti-Avoidance Measures on Profit Shifting Strategies of 
Multinational Companies – A Comparison of Developed and Developing Countries. PhD 
Thesis, University of Mannheim. 
Lohse, T. Riedel, N. and Spengel, C. 2012. The Increasing Importance of Transfer Pricing 
Regulations – a Worldwide Overview. Oxford, WP 12/27. 
Loncar, I. Zrinka, G. and Mves, V. 2011. Regulation of transfer pricing in Croatian Banking 
Industry.  International Journal of Management Cases, 94-106 (13). 
Long, RB. No date. Brainy Quotes. Available from: 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/russell_b_long_115484 [Accessed 21 April 2018]. 
Lord Bramwell. No date. Forbes Quotes: Thoughts on the Business of Life. Available from:  
https://www.forbes.com/quotes/author/lord-bramwell/ [Accessed 05 March 2018]. 
Majoni, T. 2015. Zim loses $12 billion to multinationals. The Zimbabwean, 18 March. 
Available from: http://www.zimbabweansituation.com/news/zimsit-m-zim-loses-12-
billion-to-multinationals/  [Accessed 4 November 2016]. 
194 
 
Marn, T. M. 2015. Thinking with Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research. The 
Qualitative Report, 20(6), 762-764. Available from:  
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol20/iss6/3 Accessed: 16/7/2017. 
Marshall, MN. 1996. Sampling for qualitative research. Family 13 (6): 522-525. 
Marques, M and Pinho, C. 2016. Is transfer pricing strictness deterring profit shifting within 
multinationals? Emperical evidence from Europe. Accounting and Business Research. 46 
(7): 703-730.  
Matei, G. and Pirvu, D. 2011. Transfer pricing in the European Union. Theoretical and Applied 
Economics, 18 (4) (557): 99-110.  
Maya, F. 2015. Can stopping ‘Tax dodging’ by MNEs close the gap in finance for 
development? What do the big numbers really mean? 2015 Draft for consultation.  
Mazzei, LA. and Jackson, AY.  2012. Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research: Viewing 
Data Across Multiple Perspectives. Reconceptualizing Educational Research 
Methodology. 3 (1).  
McBarnet, D. 2001. When compliance is not the solution but the problem: From changes in 
law to changes in attitude. Canberra: Australian National University. Centre for tax 
system and integrity.  
McIntosh, K. & Buckley, J. 2015. Economic development in fragile and conflict-affected 
states: Topic guide. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.  
McNair, D. Dottey, R. and Cobham, A. 2010. Transfer pricing, and the taxing rights of 
developing countries. ChristianAid. Available from: 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/iHYPERLINK"http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/C
A_OP_Taxing_Rights.pdfAccessed"mages/CA_OP_Taxing_Rights.pdf  [Accessed 13 
November 2016].  
Meadows, LM. Verdi, A. and Crabtree, BF. 2003. Keeping up appearances: using qualitative 
research to enhance knowledge of dental practice. Journal of Dental Education, 67 (9): 
981-990. 
Mehafdi, M. 2000. The Ethics of International Transfer Pricing. Journal of Business Ethics. 28 
(4): 365-381.  
Mills, CW. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. New York. 
Mogalakwe, M. 2006. The use of documentary research methods in social research. African 
Sociological Review, 10 (1): 221-230. 
195 
 
Moon, KTD. Brewer, SR. Januchowski-Hartley, SR. Adams, VM. and Blackman, DA. 2016. 
A guideline to improve qualitative social science publishing in ecology and conservation 
journals. Ecology and Society, 21(3):17. 
Murphy, R. 2012. Accounting for the missing billions: In Draining Developing? Controlling 
flows of illicit funds from developing countries, World Bank 265-307.  
Musarurwa, D. 2013. “Zimbabwe lost US$12 billion in illegal financial outflows”. Available 
from: http://nehandaradio.com/2013/09/15/zimbabwe-lost-us12-billion-in-illegal-
financial-outflows/ Accessed 21/7/2018.  
Nardi, G. 2016. Transfer Pricing: Accounting Policies Application. Masters Thesis. 
Department of Economics and Management. Universita Degli Studi Di Padova.  
National Budget Statement. 2016. “Building a conducive Environment that attracts foreign 
direct investment”. Presented by Hon PA. Chinamasa on 26 November 2015.  
National Budget Statement. 2017. “Pushing Production Frontiers Across All Sectors of the 
Economy”. Presented by Hon PA. Chinamasa on 8 December 2016.  
National Budget Statement. 2018. “Towards A New Economic Order”. Presented by Hon PA. 
Chinamasa on 7 December 2017 
Nayar, S. and Stanley, M. 2015. Qualitative research methodologies for occupational science 
and therapy. New York: Routledge. 
Newsday. 2017. “ZIMRA loses sleep over Transfer Pricing”. Available from: 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/03/zimra-loses-sleep-transfer-pricing/ [Accessed 18 
July 2018].  
Nielsen, SB. Schindler, D and Schjelderup, G. 2014. Abusive Transfer Pricing and Economic 
Activity. CESifor Working Paper No 4975. 
Nitsch, V. 2012. Trade Mispricing and Illicit Flows: In Draining Developing? Controlling 
flows of illicit funds from developing countries, World Bank 309-334.  
Nor JM. Ahmad, N. and Saleh, NM. 2010. Fraudulent financial reporting and company 
characteristics: tax audit evidence. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting. 8 (2): 
128-142. 
Novikovas, M. 2011. Transfer Pricing model for taxpayers and tax administrator. PhD Thesis. 
Vilnius University.  
Noy, C. 2008.Sampling knowledge: the hermeneutics of snowball sampling in qualitative 
research.  International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 11 (4): 327-344.  
OECD. 2008. OECD Guidelines for MNEs. OECD Publishing. Paris, France. Available from: 
www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428.pdf [Accessed 11 January 2017].  
196 
 
OECD. 2010a. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations.Available from: www.oecd.org [Accessed 17 October 2013]. 
OECD. 2010b. Review of comparability and of profit methods: Revision of Chapters I - III of 
the transfer pricing guidelines. Available from: 
]http://www.oecd.org/tax/transferpricing/45763692.pdf [Accessed 23/09/2013]. 
OECD. 2015. Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial 
Payments, Action 4 – 2015 Final Report, Paris: OECD Publishing. Available from: 
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/limiting-base-erosion-involving-interest-deductions-and-
other-financial-payments-action-4-2015-final-report_9789264241176-en   [Accessed 2 
December 2017]. 
OECD. 2017. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
OECD. 1998. Harmful Tax Compettion: Emerging Global Issue. Organisation for Economeic 
Cooperation and Development. Paris.  Available from: 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf  [Accessed 12 July 2016].  
OECD. 1995. Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations. Part II Applications. OECD, Paris. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE/GD(95)
31&docLanguage=En  [Accessed 9 November 2016].  
Oguttu, A, W. 2006b. Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes: Are “Advance Pricing 
Agreements” the way forward for South Africa? SA Mercantile Law Journal, 18 (4): 
460-473.  
Oguttu, AW. 2006a. Transfer pricing and Tax avoidance: Is the arm’s length principle still 
relevant in the e-commerce Era? 18 SA Mercantile Law Journal: 138-158.  
Oguttu, A, W. 2017. Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa-Part 2. A critic of some 
priority OECD Actions from an AAfrican Perspective. ICTD working paper 64.  
Oguttu, A, W. 2016. Tax Base Erosion and profit shifting in Africa-Part 1’s response to the 
OECD BEPS Acction plan. ICTD Working paper 54.  
Olibe, KO. and Rezaee, Z. 2008. Income shifting and corporate taxation: the role of cross-
border intrafirm transfers. Review of Accounting and Finance, 7 (1): 83-101. 
Olivier, L. and Honiball, M. 2011. International Tax, A South African Perspective. 5th Ed. 
Capetown: SiberInk.  
O’ Malley, A. No date. Notable Quotes. Available from: http://www.notable-
quotes.com/o/omalley_austin.html  [Accessed 17 April 2018].   
197 
 
Onwuegbuzie, AJ. and Leech, NL. 2007. Sampling Designs in Qualitative Research: Making 
the Sampling Process More Public. The Qualitative Report, 12 (12): 238-254.  
Owen, GT. 2014. Qualitative methods in higher education policy analysis: Using interviews 
and document analysis. The Qualitative Report, 2014,19 (52): 1-19.  
Padmakshan, M. 2009. SABMiller Foster’s buy in tax net. The Economic Times Online. Dec 
01 2009. Available from: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-
products/liquor/sabmiller-fosters-buy-in-tax-net/articleshow/5286378.cms [Accessed 11 
April 2014].  
Pierre EA. and Jackson AY. 2014. Qualitative data analysis. After coding. Qualitative Inquiry, 
20 (6): 715-719. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.   
Pollock, K. 2012. Procedure versus process: ethical paradigms and the conduct of qualitative 
research. Pollock BMC Medical Ethics, 2012, 13:25.  
Prasad, BD. No date. Content Analysis: A method in Social Science Research. CSS. In Lal 
Das, DK. and Bhaskaran, V. (eds). 2008. Research methods for social work, New Delhi: 
Rawat: 173-193. 
PWC. 2011. International transfer pricing. PWC, 2011. Available from:  
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/international-transfer-pricing/assets/itp-2011.pdf   
[Accessed 10 June 2014]. 
PWC. 2012. Transfer Pricing and developing countries: Final report. PWC Available from:  
appendix_d_country_study_kenya.pdf [Accessed 12 December 2014]. 
PWC (PriceWaterhouseCoopers). 2009. Pharma 2020: Taxing times ahead: Which path will 
you take? Available from: http://www.pwc.com [Accessed 17 May 2015] 
PWC. 2017. India: Proposed changes to Transfer Pricing regulations. Tax Insights from 
transfer pricing, Available from: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/pricing-
knowledge-network/assets/pwc-tp-india-proposed-tp-reg-changes.pdf  [Accessed 20 
April 2018]. 
PWC. 2015. International Transfer Pricing 2015/16. Available from: 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/international-transfer-pricing/assets/itp-2015-2016-final.pdf 
[Accessed 12 October 2016].  
Quiggin. 2005. Interpreting globalisation: Neoliberal and internationalist views of changing 
patterns of the global Trade and financial system. Overarching concerns. Programme 
Paper No 7, UNRISD.  
Reagan, R. No date. Brainy Quote. Available from: 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/ronald_reagan_109938 [Accessed 14 April 2018]. 
198 
 
Regfollower, 2017a. Transfer pricing brief: April 2017. TPA Newsletter May 4. Available 
from: https://regfollower.com/2017/05/04/transfer-pricing-brief-april-2017/ [Accessed 
23 April 2018].  
Regfollower, 2017b. UK enacts interest restriction rules. Available from: 
https://regfollower.com/2017/11/20/uk-enacts-interest-restriction-rules/ [Accessed 23 
May 2018].  
Regfollower, 2018. South Africa: SARS issues notice on penalties for non-compliance of CbC 
reporting: Available from: https://regfollower.com/2018/05/20/south-africa-sars-issues-
public-notice-regarding-penalties-for-non-compliance-of-cbc-report/  [Accessed 23 May 
2018].  
Reilly, RC. 2013. Found poems, member checking and crises of representation. The 
Qualitative Report, 18 (30): 1-18.  
Reuters, 2018. Zimbabwe president says his nation is “open for business” ahead of Davos. 
Reuters online. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-
mnangagwa-economy/zimbabwe-president-says-his-nation-is-open-for-business-ahead-
of-davos-idUSKBN1F718J  [Accessed 13 July 2018]. 
Richardson, S. 2009. Undergraduates’ perceptions of tourism and hospitality as a career 
choice. International Journal of Hospitality Management 28 (2009): 382–388.  
Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. 2003. Qualitative research practice. A guide for social science students 
and researchers. London: Sage. 
Ritzer, G. 2007. The Weberian Theory of Rationalisation and the McDonaldization of 
Contemporary Society. In: Illumination Social Life: Classical and Contemporary Theory 
Revisited. Rationalisation and McDonaldization 41-59.  
Rossing CP. and Rohde, C. 2014. Transfer pricing: aligning the research agenda to 
organisational reality.  Journal of Accounting and Organisational Change, 10 (3): 266-
287.  
Rouse, J. 2007. Practice Theory. Division 1 Faculty Publications 43. Wesleyan University. 
 Available from: 
https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=div1facpubs 
[Accessed 30 September 2018]. 
Ruiz, M. and Romero, MJ. 2011. Exposing the lost billions: How financial transparency by 
multinationals on a country by country basis can aid development [online]. Available 
from:  http://eurodad.org/up/uploadedfiles/whats_new/report.pdf [Accessed 01 
November 2012]. 
199 
 
SABMiller. 2014. SABMiller Homepage. Available from: 
http://www.sabmiller.com/index.asp?pageid=180 [Accessed 17 July 2015].  
Sachin, D. 2017. Domestic transfer pricing leeway provides a loophole for Indian companies. 
The Economic Times. Available from: 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/domestic-
transfer-pricing-leeway-provides-a-loophole-for-indian-
companies/articleshow/56927849.cms  [Accessed 20 April 2018]. 
Saldana, J. 2009. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage 
Publications. 
SARS.2018. International Treaties Agreements. Available from: 
http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/International-Treaties-Agreements/DTA-
Protocols/Pages/DTAs-and-Protocols-(Africa).aspx [Accessed 11 April 2019]  
Saunders, MNK. Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. 2012. Research methods for business students.6th 
ed.  New York: Pearson 2012.  
Saunders, M. Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. 2009. Research methods for business students. 5th 
Ed. New York: Pearson.  
Saunders, M. Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. 2007. Research Methods for business students. 4th 
Ed.  Edinburgh: Harlow. 
Saunders-Scott, M. 2013. How does transfer- pricing enforcement affect reported profits? 
Available from: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/21fe/a97446e0843ed77de62153287a2cbd07a7e9.pdf 
[Accessed 13 July 2018]. 
Schindler, D. and Schjelderup, G. 2013. Transfer Pricing and Debt Shifting in Multinationals. 
CESifo Working Paper No 4381.  
Scott, J. 2000. Rational Choice Theory. “In Understansding contemporary society: Theories of 
the present, edited by Gary Browning Abigail Halcli & Frank Webster, 126-138. 
London: SAGE Publications.  
Shaxson, N. 2012. Tax havens: An emerging challenge to Africa’s Development financing. 
Association of concerned Africa scholars. Bulletin No 87, FALL-2012. Available from:  
http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/caploss09-shaxson-
14th.pdf  [Accessed 12 January 2017]. 
Sikka, P. and Willmott. 2013. The tax Avoidance Industry: Accountancy Firms on the make. 
Critical Perspectives on International Business, 9 (4): 415-443. 
200 
 
Sikka, P. Haslam, C. Kyriacou, O. and Aggrizzi, D. 2007. Professionalising Claims and the 
state of professional education. Accounting Education: An International Journal, 16 (1). 
3-21.  
Sikka, P. 2009. Shifting profits across borders. In The Tax Gap series. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/11/taxavoidance-tax       
[Accessed 03 November 2016].  
Sikka, P. and Willmott, H. 2010. The dark side of transfer pricing: Its role in tax avoidance and 
wealth retentiveness. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21 (2010): 342-356. 
Sikka, P. and Haslam, C. 2007. Transfer Pricing and its role in tax avoidance and flight of 
capital: Some theory and evidence. Paper presentation at the 2007 American Accounting 
Association conference, 5-8 August 2007.  
Silberztein, C. 2009. Trnasfer Pricing: A challenge for developing countries. Spotlight tax and 
development. OECD Observer. No 276-277. December 2009.  
Siwele, T. 2011. Transfer Pricing: An analysis of South African Income Tax Legislation. 
Pretoria: University of Pretoria. (Mini dissertation -MComm in Taxation).  
Slemrod, J. 2007. Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion. In Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. Vol 21, Number 1, winter 2007, 25-48.  
Smith, JA. and Osborn, M. 2007. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Qualitative 
Psychology, 53-80. Available from: http://med-fom-familymed-
research.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2012/03/IPA_Smith_Osborne21632.pdf [Accessed 21 
November 2017].  
Solilova, V. 2010. Transfer pricing rules in EU member states. Acta Universitatis 
Agriculturaemendelianae Brunensis, VII (3). 
South Africa Government Gazette, 2016. Government Gazette Vol 616, No 40375. Available 
from: http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/SecLegis/LAPD-LSec-TAdm-PN-
2016-05%20-%20Notice%201334%20GG%2040375%2028%20October%202016.pdf  
[Accessed 22 June 2018].  
Spicer, BH. 1988. Towards an organisational theory of transfer pricing process. Reading in 
Accounting for Management Control, 425-452.  
Sreejesh, S. Mohapatra, S. and Anusree, MR. 2014. Business Research Methods, An applied 
Orientation.Springer International Publishing. Switzerland.  
Financial Gazette Staff reporter. 2017. Transfer guidelines complicated. Financial Gazette, 
September 7. Available from:  http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/transfer-pricing-
guidelines-complicated/ [Accessed 14 April 2018].  
201 
 
Stewart, H. Gapp, R. and Harwood, I. 2017. Exploring the Alchemy of Qualitative 
Management Research: Seeking Trustworthiness, Credibility and Rigor through 
Crystallization. The Qualitative Report, 22 (1): 1-19. 
Sunday News Online. 2017. Econet, ZIMRA in $300m tax scam. The Sundaynews. Available 
from http://www.sundaynews.co.zw [Accessed 9 March 2017].  
Tang, RYW. 1993. Transfer Pricing in the 1990s: Tax and Management Perspectives. Quorum 
book. Westport, CT.  
Tanzi, V. 2000. Globalisation, Technological developments and the work of fiscal termites, 
IMF Working Paper No 00/181. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  
Tanzi, V. 2008. Globalisation, Tax Systems and the Architecture of the Global Economics 
System. Inter-American Development Bank. Washington, DC.  
Tapera, M. and Majachani, AF. 2017. Unpacking Tax Law and Practice in Zimbabwe. Harare: 
TaxMatrix.  
Tax Justice Network (TJN). 2017. “Beginning of the end of the arm’s length principle”. 
Available from https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/09/22/beginning-of-the-end-for-the-
arms-length-principle/ [Accessed 6 February 2018]. 
Taxmatrix. 2016. Monthly Tax Update (MTU). January 2016. Tax Matrix.  
Taylor, G. Richardson G. and Lanis, R. 2015. Multinationality, Tax Havens, Intangible Assets, 
and Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of International 
Accounting Research: Spring, 14 (1): 25-57.  
Taylor, G and Richardson, G. 2014. Incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting. 
Empirical evidence from Australia. Journal of contemporary Accounting and Economics, 
10 (1): 1-15. 
Taylor, G. and Richardson, G. 2012. “International Corporate Tax Avoidance Practices: 
Evidence from Australian Firms,” The International Journal of Accounting, 47 (2012): 
469-496.  
The New Examiner. No date. “Transfer Pricing Milking Mining Revenue.”Available from: 
http://thenewexaminer.com/transfer-pricing-milking-mining-revenue/ [Accessed 22 July 
2018].  
The Guardian. 2015. “Why developing countries need to toughen up on taxes.” Available 
from: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jul/07/why-developing-
countries-need-to-toughen-up-taxes-sdgs [Accessed 26 April 2018].  
Thomas, AL. 1971. Transfer Prices of the multinational firm: When will they be arbitrary? In 
Abacus, 7 (1): 40-53.  
202 
 
Thompson, SC. 2011. Rational design theory: A decision based foundation for studying design 
methods. PhD Dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Thorpe, R. and Holt, R. 2008. The SAGE Dictionary of Qualitative Management Research. 
SAGE Publications, London. 
TJN & ActionAid International. 2012. Tax competition in East Africa: A race to the bottom? 
Tax incentives and revenue losses in Kenya. Tax Justice Network and ActionAid 
International.  
Tobin, GA. and Bergley, CM. 2004. Methodological rigour within a qualitative framework. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 48(4) 388-396.  
TPA Global. 2013. Transfer Pricing Country Summary: Kenya. Available from:  tpa-
global.com. [Accessed 08 Decemeber 2014].  
Tracy, SJ. 2013. Qualitative research methods: Collecting evidence, crafting analysis, 
communicating impact. Wiley-Blackwell.  
Tremblay, R. and Suarez, S. 2009. Canadian Tax Perspectives: The OECD Discussion draft on 
transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings- Canadian Considerations. In Tax 
Management International Journal.  
Tully, B. 2012. Transfer pricing strategies and the impact on organisations. Financial 
Executive July/ August 2012. Available from: www.financialexecutives.org [Accessed 
13 July 2014]. 
Tummons, J. 2014. Using software for qualitative data analysis: research outside paradigmatic 
boundaries. In Big Data? Qualitative approaches to digital research, 155-177. Studies in 
qualitative methodology (13).  
Unilever Kenya Case. 2005. Unilever Kenya Ltd v Commissioner of Income Tax [2005] 
eKLR. Income Tax Appeal No 753. Available from: www.kenyalaw.org [Accessed 23 
October 2015]. 
United Nations. 2017. UN Practical manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries.  
New York: UN.  
United Nations. 2013. UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.New York, 2013. UN.  
UNCTAD. 2014. “A taxing challenge: generating adequate fiscal revenues in a globalized 
world cannot be left to national authorities alone” Press release. Available from: 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=201  [Accessed 26 
April 2018].  
203 
 
Uyanik, A. 2010. Tax avoidance and evasion with transfer pricing. The business review, 
Cambridge. 14 (2): 91-97.   
Van der Zwan, P. 2017. Transfer Pricing Adjustments: Too many layers of Tax? SAIT 
Available from: https://www.thesait.org.za/news/news.asp?id=326196 [Accessed 23 
May 2018]. 
Vidal, M. Alder, P and Delbridge, R. 2015. When Organisation Studies Turns to Societal 
Problems: The contribution of Marxist Grand Theory. Organisation Studies, 36 (4): 405-
422.  
Wang, LF. and Wang, Ya-Chin. 2008. Brand proliferation and interbrand competition. The 
strategic role of transfer pricing. Journal of economic studies, 35(3): 278-292. Emerald 
Group Publishing Ltd.  
Wang, X. 2016. China Country Practice, Transfer pricing opportunities and challenges for 
developing countries in Post-BEPS Era. Committee of Experts on international 
cooperation in tax matters, 12th session, Geneva, 11-14 October 2016.  
Weber, M. 1968. Economy and society (3 Vols. 1116). Totwa, NJ: Bedminster Press. 
(Original work published 1921).  
Weichenrieder, A, J. 2009. Profit shifting in the EU: Evidence from Germany.International 
Tax Public Finance. 16: 281-297.  
Wells, B. & Lowell, C. (2014) “Tax Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s 
Length Standard,” Florida Tax Review, 15(10), 737-797.  
Williamson, CM. 2013. “Strategy in the skin: Strategic practices of South Africa’s Official 
Development Assistance”. PhD Thesis (DBL) UNISA.  
World Bank. 2013. International Transfer Pricing and Developing Economies: From 
Implementation to Application. A Toolkit for Policy Makers and Practitioners. Working 
Draft 19 February 2013. 
Yin, RK. 2011. Qualitative research from start to finish. New York The Guilford Press.  
ZELA (2016). Domestic resource mobilization in Zimbabwe’s mining sector: Enablers and 
inhibitors. ZELA, 2016.  
Zimbabwe Coalition Debt and Development (ZIMCODD). 2014. Zimbabwe’s Tax system: 
Opportunities and threats for enhancing development in Zimbabwe. Available from: 
www.zimcodd.org/sites/default/files/research/ZIMCODDZimbabweTaxJusticeMay2014
.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017]. 
 
 
204 
 
Legislation 
Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s republic of China. No 63. 2007. China 
Finance Act. 2016. (chapter 23:04). Government Printer. Zimbabwe 
Finance Act. 2017. (chapter 32). United Kingdom 
Finance Act. 2007. (chapter 11). United Kingdom 
Finance Act. 1998. (chapter 36). United Kingdom 
Income Tax Act. 1996. (chapter 23:06). Government Printer. Zimbabwe 
Income Tax Act. 1962. (No 58). South Africa 
Income Tax Act. (chapter 470). 2006. Kenya 
Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules. 2006. Legal Notice No 67. Kenya 
South Africa Practice Note 7. 1999. South Africa 
South Africa Government Gazette. 2016. Vol 616, No 40375. SARS 
Tax Procedures Act. 2015. (No 29). Kenya. Revised Edition (2018) 
Taxation International and Other Provisions Act (TIOPA). 2010. (chapter 8). United 
Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
205 
 
ANNEXURES 
ANNEXURE 1: ZIMRA Permission Letter
 
 
 
 
 
206 
 
ANNEXURE 2: MOF Permission Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
 
ANNEXURE 3:  Informed Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 
 
I, ______________________ (participant name), Position _________________confirm that 
the person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, 
procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.  
 
I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the information 
sheet.   
 
I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study.  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without penalty (if applicable). 
 
I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, journal 
publications and/or conference proceedings, but that my participation will be kept 
confidential unless otherwise specified.  
 
I agree to the recording of the interview.  
 
I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement. 
 
Participant Name & Surname ………………………………………… (please print) 
 
Participant Signature……………………………………………..Date………………… 
 
Researcher’s Name & Surname……………………………………… (please print) 
 
Researcher’s signature…………………………………………..Date………………… 
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ANNEXURE 4: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MNEs/TCs, ZIMRA and MOF 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MNEs/TCs 
 
My name is XXX and I am a PhD student with the University of South Africa. My topic is 
“Regulating MNEs transactions to minimise tax avoidance through transfer pricing, 
Case of Zimbabwe.” 
 
Thank you for the interview and for considering the following interview guideline that I shall 
work through with you. The interview is divided into two sections. Section A provides you 
with specific questions to which you are able to respond in terms of factual and substantive 
areas of transfer pricing. This does not mean that you may not express your opinion, but it 
would be useful to have your response to the more formal, legalistic and compliance 
requirements of the new rules and transfer pricing. Section B allows you to spend some time 
in the interview discussing the issues in a more open-ended and exploratory manner and for 
you to relate any specific examples, narratives and views that will add value to the topic 
under discussion so as to assess the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Section A 
This section of the interview will request that you respond to questions that require a more 
legalistic and factual consideration of the topic under discussion to help assess transfer 
pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Current rules 
1.1 Zimbabwe has recently introduced new transfer pricing rules, how have they affected  
 your operation? 
1.2 Are there explicit statutory requirements for documentation? 
1.3 How clear are the requirements by ZIMRA to maintain documentation and the deadlines  
      for submission to taxpayers? 
1.4 Does Zimbabwe have APA procedures? If so where are they laid down? 
1.5 Which specific penalties apply to transfer pricing abuse? 
1.6 What are the dispute resolution procedures in the case of a transfer pricing adjustment in  
      Zimbabwe? To what extent is the fiscal appeal court functional? 
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Current rules challenges 
2.1 What opportunities and/or challenges do you face in applying the new rules? 
2.2 How do you practically handle such opportunities and/or challenges? 
2.3 Which databases do you prefer or recommend for use for transactions that are not readily  
       available locally? 
2.4 To what extent do these databases provide comparable data, and of similar transactions? 
2.5 Would you say the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe minimise tax avoidance through  
       transfer pricing without impeding foreign investment? 2.6 And why? 
 
Transfer Pricing strategies 
3.1Do you qualify for and/ or utilise Zimbabwe’s tax incentives and do they encourage 
     foreign investment? 
3.2 Does your company follow the thin capitalization restriction of 3:1 in Zimbabwe? 
3.3 Do you have associates in low-tax jurisdictions? 
3.4 What strategies will your company adopt to comply with the new rules? 
 
Capacity of revenue authority 
4.1 ZIMRA plays a vital role in detection and oversight of transfer pricing abuse.  What 
      authority do they have to apply their mandate to transfer pricing abuse? Please explain 
4.2 What capacity do they have to apply their mandate to transfer pricing abuse? Please  
      explain. 
4.2 Is the capacity an issue of: 
Policy-Yes or No: Explain briefly 
Lack of experience-Yes or No: Explain briefly 
Financial resources-Yes or No: Explain briefly 
Do you believe ZIMRA is effective in carrying out its mandate when it comes to transfer  
pricing?  
4.3 What do you suggest should be done for the transfer pricing rules administration to be  
       effective? 
 
International guidelines 
5.1 How applicable are the OECD guidelines to Zimbabwe? 
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5.2 Of the 5 OECD methods (CUP, resale price, Cost-plus, TNNM, profit    split method) 
which ones do you use the most? 5.3 And Why? Have you had problems with applying any 
 of these methods? 
5.4 What is the relevance of UN transfer pricing guidelines in your application of transfer 
    pricing methods? 
5.5 Do you think transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe are clear and appropriate to promote  
      foreign investment? 
 
Section B 
This section of the interview will request that you respond to interview prompts that require a 
more exploratory and explanatory consideration of the topic under discussion. You are free to 
narrate experiences and examples here so as to respond to the nature of the study, and help 
assess the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Section B Question 
Zimbabwe current rules 1. Zimbabwe has recently introduced new transfer pricing rules, would you outline specifically 
some of the ways in which these rules have affected your operational thinking and operational 
behaviour? 
 
Zimbabwe current rules 2. New rules are normatively explained/interpreted for taxpayers. In your view, have you as 
taxpayers been inducted into these new rules? Do you think that the induction process (as 
described) has enabled or hampered behaviour change? 
 
 Current rules challenges 3. New rules often come with changes and change management:  
Have you faced any challenges in applying the new rules? If so explain. 
Are there any sections of the laws that govern transfer pricing and tax avoidance that you would 
like amended? Why? 
Transfer pricing strategies 
 
How will your company work strategically and adapt so as to adopt the new rules and ensure 
compliance? 
Authority and capacity of tax 
authority 
 
Are there any additional comments you wish to make about the authority and capacity of the tax 
authority over and above the responses that you provided in Section A? 
International guidelines 7. In your view, how helpful and enabling are the international guidelines and methods in the 
context of Zimbabwe and from your perspective as MNEs? 
Probe: Would you be so kind as to explain to me how you view the influence, role and authority of 
international guidelines and methods in this context? 
Which guidelines are you following, OECD or UN? Why?  
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ZIMRA 
 
My name is XXX and I am a PhD student with the University of South Africa. My topic is 
“Regulating MNEs transactions to minimise tax avoidance through transfer pricing, 
Case of Zimbabwe.” 
 
Thank you for accepting to do the interview and for considering the following interview 
guideline that I shall work through with you. The interview is divided into two sections. 
Section A provides you with specific questions to which you are able to respond in terms of 
factual and substantive areas of transfer pricing. This does not mean that you may not express 
your opinion, but it would be useful to have your factual response to the more formal, 
legalistic and compliance requirements of the new rules and transfer pricing. Section B 
allows you to spend some time in the interview discussing the issues in a more open-ended 
and exploratory manner and for you to relate any specific examples, narratives and views that 
will add value to the topic under discussion so as to assess & try to improve where necessary 
the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Section A 
This section of the interview will request that you respond to questions that require a more 
legalistic and factual consideration of the topic under discussion to help assess the transfer 
pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Current rules 
Do you feel the following areas have been adequately covered in explanations in legislation  
or separate interpretations to taxpayers? 
1.1 Are there explicit statutory requirements for transfer pricing documentation? 
1.2 How clear are the requirements by ZIMRA to maintain documentation and the deadlines  
      for submission to taxpayers? 
1.3 Does Zimbabwe have APA procedures? If so where are they laid down? 
1.4 Which specific penalties apply to transfer pricing abuse? 
1.5 What are the dispute resolution procedures in the case of a transfer pricing adjustment in  
      Zimbabwe? To what extent is the fiscal appeal court functional? 
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Current rules challenges 
2.1 What opportunities and/or challenges do you face in implementing these new rules? 
2.2 How do you practically handle such opportunities and/or challenges? 
2.3 Would you say the rules have enhanced your revenue collection mandate? 
2.4 Which databases do you prefer or recommend for use for transactions that are not readily 
      available locally? 
2.5 To what extent do these databases provide comparable data, and of similar transactions? 
2.6 Would you say the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe are enough to curtail tax avoidance  
      through transfer pricing?  
2.7 Why? 
 
Transfer Pricing strategies 
3.1 What strategies are used by MNEs to avoid tax through transfer pricing? 
3.2 Between income shifting, tax havens and tax incentives, which one is mostly used by  
      MNEs to avoid tax through transfer pricing? And why? 
3.3 How do the tax incentives offered in Zimbabwe complement or make redundant the  
      transfer pricing rules? 
3.4 How does the thin capitalization restriction of 3:1, in Zimbabwe, complement or make  
      redundant the transfer pricing rules? 
 
Capacity of ZIMRA 
4.1 ZIMRA plays a vital role in detection of transfer pricing abuse.  
4.2 What authority do you have to apply your mandate to transfer pricing abuse? Please 
       explain 
4.3 What capacity do you have to apply your mandate to transfer pricing abuse? Please  
      explain 
4.4 Is the capacity an issue of: 
Policy- Yes or No: Explain briefly 
Lack of experience- Yes or No: Explain briefly 
Financial resources- Yes or No: Explain briefly 
4.5 Have you ever detected any transfer pricing abuse by MNEs? 
4.6 What do you prefer using between deterrent measures like tax audits and persuasive  
      measures? 
4.7 What do you suggest should be done for the transfer pricing rules administration to be  
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      effective? 
 
International guidelines 
5.1 How applicable are the OECD guidelines to Zimbabwe? 
5.2 Of the 5 OECD methods (CUP, resale price, Cost-plus, TNNM, profit split method)  
      which ones do you prefer? Why? 
5.3 Have you had problems with applying any of these methods? 
5.4 What is the relevance of UN transfer pricing guidelines in Zimbabwe? Is it applied in  
      Zimbabwe? If not, why not? 
5.5 Do you think transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe are clear and appropriate to promote  
      foreign investment? 
 
Section B 
This section of the interview will request that you respond to interview prompts that require a 
more exploratory and explanatory consideration of the topic under discussion. You are free to 
narrate experiences and examples here so as to respond to the nature of the study, and help 
assess the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Section B Question 
Zimbabwe current rules 1. Zimbabwe has recently introduced new transfer pricing rules, would you outline specifically 
some of the ways in which these rules have affected your operational thinking and operational 
behaviour? And why you have moved from general anti-avoidance rules to transfer pricing rules? 
 
Zimbabwe current rules 2. New rules are normatively explained/interpreted for taxpayers. In your view, how have taxpayers 
been inducted into these new rules? Do you think that the induction process (as described) has 
enabled or hampered behaviour change? 
 
Current rules challenges 3. New rules often come with changes and change management. 
3.1 How did schedule 35 affect Section 98A and 98B of the Income Tax Act? 
3.2 How have your transfer pricing audits been affected by the new rules? And so far have you 
encountered any MNEs that have abused transfer pricing? 
3.3 Can you explain your experiences and challenges with the application of the new rules by 
MNEs? 
Transfer pricing strategies 
 
4. How will your organisation work strategically and adapt so as to adopt the new rules and ensure 
compliance? 
Authority and capacity of tax 
authority 
 
5. If you have ever detected any transfer pricing abuse, how have the rules assisted you in executing 
your mandate?  
Are there any additional comments you wish to make about the authority and capacity of ZIMRA 
over and above the responses that you provided in Section A? 
International guidelines 6. In your view, how helpful and enabling are the international guidelines and methods in the 
context of Zimbabwe and from your perspective as ZIMRA? 
Probe: Would you be so kind as to explain to me how you view the influence, role and authority of 
international guidelines and methods in this context? 
Reports say that the OECD represents interests of the developed world and is residence based 
system oriented while the UN favours the source based tax systems. Which of these is prioritised by 
Zimbabwean rules and how does this affect you as ZIMRA? 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
 
My name is XXX and I am a PhD student with the University of South Africa. My topic is 
“Regulating MNEs transactions to minimise tax avoidance through transfer pricing, 
Case of Zimbabwe.” 
 
Thank you for the interview and for considering the following interview guideline that I shall 
work through with you. The interview is divided into two sections. Section A provides you 
with specific questions to which you are able to respond in terms of factual and substantive 
areas of transfer pricing. This does not mean that you may not express your opinion, but it 
would be useful to have your response to the more formal, legalistic and compliance 
requirements of the new rules and transfer pricing. Section B allows you to spend some time 
in the interview discussing the issues in a more open-ended and exploratory manner and for 
you to relate any specific examples, narratives and views that will add value to the topic 
under discussion so as to assess the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Section A 
This section of the interview will request that you respond to questions that require a more 
legalistic and factual consideration of the topic under discussion to help assess the transfer 
pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Current rules 
1.1 What triggered the introduction of new transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe? Do you feel   
the following areas have been adequately covered in the new rules? 
1.2 Do the rules provide explicit statutory requirements for documentation? 
1.3 How clear are the requirements by ZIMRA to maintain documentation and the deadlines 
     for submission to taxpayers? 
1.4 Does Zimbabwe have APA procedures? If so where are they laid down? 
1.5 Which specific penalties apply to transfer pricing abuse? 
1.6 What are the dispute resolution procedures in the case of a transfer pricing adjustment in 
      Zimbabwe? 1.7 To what extent is the fiscal appeal court functional? 
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Current rules challenges 
2.1 How do the anti-avoidance rules work with schedule 35? 
2.2 How does schedule 35 affect other anti-avoidance sections like Section 98, 16& 23?  
2.3 Which databases do you prefer or recommend for use for transactions that are not readily 
available locally? 
2.4 To what extent do these databases provide comparable data, and of similar transactions? 
2.5 Would you say the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe are now adequate address tax 
      avoidance through transfer pricing? 
2.6 Why? 
 
Transfer Pricing strategies 
3.1 What strategies are used by MNEs to avoid tax through transfer pricing? 
3.2 Between income shifting, tax havens and tax incentives, which ones were targeted by the  
      new rules? Why? 
3.3 How do the tax incentives offered in Zimbabwe complement or make redundant the  
      transfer pricing rules? 
3.4 How does the thin capitalization restriction of 3:1, in Zimbabwe, complement or make  
      redundant the transfer pricing rules? 
3.5 So far have the new rules achieved the intended goals? 
 
Capacity of tax authority 
4.1 ZIMRA plays a vital role in detection and oversight of transfer pricing abuse.  What 
     authority do they have to apply their mandate to transfer pricing abuse? Please explain 
4.2 What capacity do they have to apply their mandate to transfer pricing abuse? Please  
      explain 
4.3 Is the capacity an issue of: 
Policy- Yes or No: Explain briefly 
Lack of experience- Yes or No: Explain briefly 
Financial resources- Yes or No: Explain briefly 
4.4 What do you suggest should be done for the transfer pricing rules administration to be 
       effective? 
International guidelines 
5.1 How applicable are the OECD guidelines to Zimbabwe? 
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5.2 Of the 5 OECD methods (CUP, resale price, Cost-plus, TNNM, profit    split method)  
      which ones do you recommend most?  
5.3 Why?  
5.4 What is the relevance of UN transfer pricing guidelines in Zimbabwe?  
5.5 Do you think transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe are clear and appropriate to promote  
      foreign investment? 
 
Section B 
This section of the interview will request that you respond to interview prompts that require a 
more exploratory and explanatory consideration of the topic under discussion. You are free to 
narrate experiences and examples here so as to respond to the nature of the study, and help 
assess the transfer pricing rules in Zimbabwe. 
 
Section B Question 
Zimbabwe 
current rules 
1. Zimbabwe has recently introduced new transfer pricing rules, would you outline specifically some of the ways 
in which these rules differ from what was there? And why you have moved from general anti-avoidance rules to 
transfer pricing rules? 
 
Zimbabwe 
current rules 
2. New rules are normatively explained/interpreted for taxpayers. In your view, how have taxpayers been 
inducted into these new rules? Do you think that the induction process (as described) has enabled or hampered 
behaviour change? 
 
Current rules 
challenges 
3. New rules often come with changes and change management:  
What do you expect should be achieved by these rules? 
What challenges have you experienced in introducing the rules? 
How does schedule 35 work with the other anti-avoidance sections of the law?  
 
Transfer pricing 
strategies 
 
5. Against the sophistication of transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs, how have the Zimbabwean rules been 
structured to counter the transfer pricing abuse by MNEs and ensure compliance? 
Authority and 
capacity of tax 
authority 
 
6. As the Min of finance, and may you explain the authority that you have conferred to ZIMRA to carry out its 
mandate effectively? 
b. May you explain the capacity (financial resources, experience…) that ZIMRA has to carry out its mandate 
 
International 
guidelines 
7. In your view, how helpful and enabling are the international guidelines and methods in the context of 
Zimbabwe and from your perspective as MoF? 
Would you be so kind as to explain to me how you view the influence, role and authority of international 
guidelines and methods in this context? 
Reports say that the OECD represent interests of the developed world and is residence based system oriented 
while the UN favours the source based tax systems. Which of these is prioritised by Zimbabwean rules and why? 
What is the relevance of UN transfer pricing guidelines in Zimbabwe? 
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ANNEXURE 5: Document Review List 
 
Summary of Documents Reviewed  
Document Name of document Background Category Source 
D1 Income Tax Act (ZW) Articulates the Zimbabwean 
transfer pricing rules 
Legislation ZIMRA Website 
D2 Finance Act (ZW) Articulates the Zimbabwean 
transfer pricing rules 
Legislation ZIMRA Website  
D3 OECD transfer pricing guidelines Inform of the transfer pricing 
perspective at international 
level 
International guidelines OECD Website 
D4 United Nations transfer pricing 
guidelines 
Comparison of the transfer 
pricing guidelines with the 
OECD 
International guidelines United Nations 
Website 
D5 CF (Pvt) Ltd Vs ZIMRA Inform the transfer pricing 
strategies and magnitude of 
problem 
Court case Internet 
D6 Kenya Unilever case  Inform the transfer pricing 
strategies and magnitude of 
problem 
Court case Internet 
D7 
 
SABMiller case study Inform the transfer pricing 
strategies and magnitude of 
problem 
Case Study Internet 
D8 National Budget Statement 2017 Inform Zimbabwean policies Budget statement Internet 
D9 National Budget Statement 2018 Inform Zimbabwean policies Budget statement Internet 
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ANNEXURE 6: All Document Groups and Quotation Count  
 
All Document Groups and Quotation Count 
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